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Abstract
Randomness is a key ingredient in every area of cryptography; and as the quote
goes, producing it should not be left to chance. Unfortunately it’s very difficult
to produce true randomness, and consuming applications often call for large, high
quality amounts on boot or in quick succession. To meet this requirement we make
use of Pseudo-Random Number Generators (PRNGs) which we initialise with a small
amount of randomness to produce what we hope to be high quality pseudo-random
output.
In this thesis we investigate some of the different security models associated with
capturing what makes a “good” PRNG, along with the problem of constructing
a secure PRNG by adapting primitives available. We focus mainly on the sponge
construction, noting that the original formulation does not lend itself well to a secure
PRNG but with some adjustment can be made into a robust and secure PRNG. This
is done by utilising a feed-forward of the inner, secure part of the sponge state, which
establishes an efficient forward security mechanism.
We then present an updated security model for PRNGs designed to capture variable
output subroutines present in some PRNGs where an adversary is allowed to request
differing amounts of output with each call to the PRNG. We maintain the ability
to prove robustness via two simpler security notions which are now extended to
variable-output versions.
We then follow with an analysis of the NIST PRNGs in this new security model,
which served as motivation for updating the security model. We show that under
certain assumptions the NIST generators do satisfy security in this model.
4
Contents
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Structure of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Background Materials 22
2.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1.1 Provable Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.2 Pseudorandom Permutations (PRPs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.1.3 Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1.4 Block Ciphers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.1.5 Extractors and One-Way Functions (owfs) . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.1.6 Random Oracle Model (ROM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.7 Ideal Permutation Model (IPM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1.8 Ideal-Cipher Model (ICM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2 Definitions of Pseudo-Random Number Generators . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.1 PRGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.2.2 PRNGs and PWIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3 Existing Security Models of PRNGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Two papers: /dev/random is not Robust and How to Eat Your
Entropy and Have It Too . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.2 Other Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4 Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.2 Universal Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.3 Leftover Hash Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5 Sponge Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.1 The Two Phases of the Sponge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5.2 The Sponge and Duplex Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5.3 The Sponge PRNG: sponge.prng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.6 Generalising the Sponge to the Parazoa Family . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.6.1 The f Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.6.2 The g Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6.3 Formal Definition of a Parazoa Function . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.7 Proof Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.7.1 Indifferentiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5
CONTENTS
2.7.2 H-coefficient Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3 A New Sponge-like PRNG with
Analysis 58
3.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.1.1 Updates to Security Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2.1 The Design of sponge.prng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.2.2 The Design of Reverie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.2.3 Differentiability of the Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Security Notions in the Ideal Permutation Model . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3.1 Preserving Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.2 Recovering Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Security Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.1 Preserving Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.4.2 Recovering Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.5 Practical Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.1 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.2 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.6 Extension to Parazoa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4 Updated Security Model for PRNGs 85
4.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.2 Definition of a VOPWI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.3 Masking Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Updated Security Notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Variable-Output Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5.1 Variable-Output Preserving Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5.2 Variable-Output Recovering Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5.3 Updated Robustness Notion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.6 Constructing a VOPWI from a PWI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5 Analysis of NIST Generators 114
5.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.1.1 NIST Seed Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.1.2 General NIST Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.2 The hash drbg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.2.2 Specification of the Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2.3 Algorithm Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.3 The ctr drbg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3.2 Specification of the Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.3.3 Algorithm Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.4 Security of the hash drbg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6
CONTENTS
5.4.1 Masking Function of hash drbg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.4.2 PRG Security of the next Function of the hash drbg . . . . . . 143
5.4.3 Variable-Output Robustness of the hash drbg . . . . . . . . . 147
5.5 Security of the ctr drbg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.5.1 Masking Function of ctr drbg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.5.2 PRG Security of the next Function of the ctr drbg . . . . . . . 154
5.5.3 Variable-Output Robustness of the ctr drbg . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6 Conclusion 163
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Bibliography 167
7
List of Figures
2.1 The one-way function security procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 A simple PRG description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3 A simple PRNG description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 The security procedures of [29]. The inclusion of seed has been omit-
ted from several algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 Preserving and recovering security games for G outputting `-bits. . . 35
2.6 The sponge construction in the absorbing phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.7 The sponge construction in the squeezing phase. . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.8 The sponge construction in both phases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.9 The sponge construction in duplex mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.10 The f function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.11 The g function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.12 The generalised g function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.13 The distinguisher D differentiating between S and T is either con-
nected as in the left or right. In the first case D has direct access to
both the public and private interfaces of S, while in the latter case
the access to the public interface of T is replaced by an intermedi-
ate system P (called sim) that can make its own calls to the public
interface of T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.14 The interfaces available to the distinguisher D. . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.15 Illustrating the method D uses to cause a contradicting output from
the simulator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.1 The game GLEG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.2 The algorithms describing the behaviour of the sponge.prng. . . . . . 63
3.3 The sponge.prng in operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 The algorithms describing the behaviour of Reverie. . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 The Reverie PRNG in operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.6 The updated security procedures, updated from the original defini-
tions given in [29]. Boxed items indicate changes. . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.7 The security game for preserving security, updated from the original
definitions given in [29, Definition 4]. Boxed items indicate changes. 68
3.8 The security game for recovering security, updated from the original
definitions given in [29, Definitions 3]. Boxed items indicate changes. 69
3.9 The algorithms nextpi0 , next
pi
1 , next2 used in proving the security of the
next function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1 Definition of a PWI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
8
LIST OF FIGURES
4.2 Definition of a VOPWI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 The updated procedure Initialise. The boxed item denotes the change
from the original definition in Figure 2.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.4 The updated procedure Initialise for bootstrapped security. The boxed
item denotes the change from the definition in Figure 4.3. . . . . . . 95
4.5 The updated security procedures, updated from the original defini-
tions given in [29, 55]. Boxed items indicate changes. The inclusion
of seed has been omitted from several algorithms. . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.6 The updated procedure Initialise for Variable-Output bootstrapped
security. Updated from Figure 4.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.7 Preserving and recovering security games for G outputting `-bits with
split masking function M. Boxes indicate changes from [29, Defini-
tions 3 & 4]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.8 The construction of preserving security adversary B from adversary A.108
4.9 The construction of the recovering security adversary B from adver-
sary A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.1 The auxiliary algorithms hash df and hashgen of hash drbg. . . . . . . 120
5.2 The algorithms describing the behaviour of the hash drbg following
the format of Definition 4.2.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3 The hash drbg algorithms and seed usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.4 The hash drbg setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.5 The hash drbg next algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.6 The hash drbg refresh algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.7 The auxiliary algorithms bcup, bcdf and bcc of the ctr drbg. . . . . . 129
5.8 The algorithms describing the behaviour of the ctr drbg in the format
of Definition 4.2.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.9 The ctr drbg algorithms and seed usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.10 The ctr drbg bcup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.11 The ctr drbg bcdf algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.12 The ctr drbg setup algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.13 The ctr drbg next algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.14 The ctr drbg refresh algorithm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.15 The security game for distinguishing between hash drbg.next and a
random generator output and masked state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.16 The algorithms D0,D1 and D2 used in proving the PRG security of
the hash drbg.next function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.17 The security game for distinguishing between ctr drbg.next and a ran-
dom generator output and masked state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.18 The algorithms D0,D1 and D2 used in proving the PRG security of
the ctr drbg.next function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
9
List of Tables
3.1 Timing test results, where results given in terms of pi are calls to the
permutation pi. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.1 The notation used in [7], updated for continuity with our own notation.117
5.2 Notation for the hash drbg, updated for continuity with our notation. 118
5.3 Parameters of the different hash drbg instantiations. . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4 Notation for the ctr drbg, updated for continuity with our notation. . 127
5.5 Parameters of the different ctr drbg instantiations. . . . . . . . . . . . 128
10
List of Algorithms
1 The absorbing function absorb[pi, r](I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2 The squeezing function squeeze[pi, r](s, `) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3 The sponge construction sponge[pi, pad, r](M, `) . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4 The duplex construction duplex[pi, pad, r] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5 The sponge PRNG construction sponge.prng[pi, pad, r, ρ] . . . . . . . 45
11
Acronyms
Acronyms
ctr drbg The NIST DRBG based on a block cipher.
DRBG Deterministic Random Bit Generator.
hash drbg The NIST DRBG based on a hash function.
PRF Pseudo-random function.
PRG Pseudo-Random Number Generator.
PRNG Pseudo-Random Number Generator.
PRP Pseudo-random permutation.
PWI PRNG with Input.
Reverie Our PRNG design.
sponge.prng The SpongePRNG design.
VOPWI Variable-Output PRNG with Input.
12
Notation
Notation
x← y When specifying algorithms, this denotes
writing the value y to the variable x.
x
$← y When x ∈ X and X is a finite set, this de-
notes choosing an element of X uniformly at
random and writing it to the variable x.
x← A(x1, . . . , xn) For a deterministic algorithm A, running A
with inputs x1, . . . , xn and output x.
x
$← A(x1, . . . , xn) For a probabilistic algorithm A, running A
with inputs x1, . . . , xn and output x.
b The width of a sponge state, in bits.
c The capacity of a sponge state, in bits.
D A Distribution Sampler, used in security
proofs to model the entropy pool available to
a PRNG.
d An enumeration of the number of entropy in-
puts into a PRNG.
Ek(v) The block cipher encryption of an input v un-
der a key k.
funcn The set of all functions on n-bit strings.
H A hash function.
H∞() Minimum entropy.
I Entropy input into a PRNG, often from an
entropy source.
λ The security parameter of a construction.
M A masking function which outputs an ideal
state when applied to a PRNG state.
nE The size of the block cipher’s input and out-
put block.
Pn The set of all permutations on n-bit strings.
r The output length of a sponge function, in
bits.
13
Notation
RO A Random Oracle.
si The ith state of a PRNG.
si The ith outer state of a sponge-based PRNG.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Structure of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. This includes both the motivation and
contributions included in the thesis. In this chapter we also give a brief roadmap of
the overall structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Research over the last few decades on cryptography has seen a divergence in theoret-
ical and practical cryptography. The current climate of real world applications calls
for more theoretically informed practical designs, along with an interest in designs
that are backed by a proof in the theoretical setting. Many designs in the literature
are still focused entirely on the theoretical setting with little thought of the practical
restraints and considerations. This can be attributed to modelling the adversary;
the strength and abilities she entails along with the environment a system is running
in. Often, PRNGs are designed either entirely from the practical perspective with
little involvement of theoretical-methods and literature, and are later analysed when
the research has caught up. This can result in catastrophic cases of bad random-
ness undermining otherwise secure cryptosystems when vulnerabilities and flaws are
discovered, such as papers attacking RC4 in TLS (such as [32]). Fortunately, there
are an increasing number of competition-based design programs, such as the SHA3,
CAESAR and NIST PQC competitions, that have meant more time and minds are
focused on confirming designs before they are utilised. However, this still often
draws primarily on practical considerations over theoretical, model based analysis.
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We would like to further the effort to bring theoretical security closer to practical
security by improving the PRNG security models, specifically those based upon [29],
by using more considerations used in practice to inform the model, such as reliability
of the PRNG at boot. Currently one of the largest disparities is the notion of entropy
estimation in a generator. In practice, a generator must utilise a mechanism to
estimate the current entropy of the state of the generator, which is often realised by
using health checking systems that monitor both ingoing entropic strings and the
output of the generator. In theoretical security models this is avoided by making it
part of the adversary to guarantee minimum entropy entering into the PRNG, while
keeping the possible entropy sources as wide as possible; in practice, entropy sources
may be far more reliable than is assumed in theory. This is obviously beneficial
in that a theoretically secure generator secure against relatively low or unreliable
entropy sources paired with a “better” entropy source should perform even better
in practice.
Another major difference between theory and practice in the context of PRNGs is
the notion of the seed of a generator. In practice, the generator must initialise itself
with what entropy is available, which may cause issues on its own when this initial
entropy is insufficient. We will touch on this below. In the theoretical setting we
often rely on a uniformly random seed generated at initialisation by the generator
from an independent entropy source to mitigate a class of attacker, or rather entropy
source, that can inform the future states of a generator. In practice this is not the
case, since there is not enough entropy and, as we stated above, the class of entropy
sources is much more restricted in the amount of output available, though generally
at a higher quality than is assumed in theory.
We now provide a brief explanation of what problems can arise from bad randomness
and how it is more than just a theoretical problem. The authors of [37] and [41]
investigated the security of certificates produced by factory-installed PRNGs and
find some worrying conclusions.
In [37] the authors used a three-phase data collection process consisting of:
1. Host discovery: Scanning the public IPv4 address space to find hosts with port
443 (HTTPS) or port 22 (SSH) open.
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2. Certificate and host-key retrieval: The second phase was to attempt either a
TLS or SSH handshake and storing the presented certificate chain for TLS or
the host-key for SSH.
3. Lastly the TLS certificate chains were parsed to generate a relational database
from the X.509 fields.
This led to 5.8 million unique TLS certificates from 12.8 million hosts and 6.2 million
unique SSH host keys from 10.2 million hosts. Of these, 5.57% of TLS hosts and
9.60% of SSH hosts used the same keys as other hosts in an apparently vulnerable
way. The authors were in fact able to compute the private keys for 64,000 (or 0.50%)
of the TLS hosts and 108,000 (1.06%) of the SSH hosts with no other information
by exploiting weaknesses in RSA and DSA when used with insufficient randomness.
The authors use an interesting quasilinear greatest common divisor (gcd) finding
algorithm to compute the pairwise gcds of all the RSA moduli, yielding 66,540
vulnerable hosts who shared one of their RSA prime factors with another host in
the survey. Vulnerable hosts included routers, server management cards, firewalls
and other network devices, all of which are headless1 and lack a human input in
terms of random entropy or, in other words, have access to only limited entropy
sources.
Throughout the paper the authors have tried to determine exactly why they have
found what they found and have done more research to find causes of confusion, such
as a collection of moduli based on all combinations of nine primes which turned out
to be a single company.
In [41] the authors collected 11.7 million public keys using a variety of sources,
including the EFF SSL repository. They collected 6.4 million distinct RSA moduli
with the remaining keys roughly evenly split between ElGamal keys and DSA keys,
plus a single ECDSA key. They found that of the 6.4 million RSA moduli, 4%
shared their RSA modulus, often involving unrelated parties. They also found that
1.1% of the RSA moduli occur more than once, some of them thousands of times.
They determined that 12,934 RSA moduli offered no security, either due to expired
1Headless means with no direct input or user interface (UI) output such as a monitor.
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certificates or use of MD5 as a hash function. However 5250 of the certificates,
including 3201 distinct 1024-bit RSA moduli are still valid and use SHA1.
Interestingly the authors went on to model the RSA moduli as graphs with edges
corresponding to the moduli connecting two (hopefully) unidentifiable primes as
vertices. Ideally, for c distinct moduli it is hoped that the graph representation
consists of c connected components, of one edge connecting two unknown primes.
Unfortunately, even for a small amount of moduli this was not the case; (see [41,
page 7-8]).
The authors concluded that the amount of shared primes, especially RSA primes,
is unacceptable and worrying, especially since many are still used and valid. The
authors have suggested that this is possibly due to incorrect seeding of random
number generators. They go on to show support for NIST’s decision to adopt DSA
as a digital signature standard but point out the weakness of ElGamal and ECDSA
if the required random nonce is not properly used.
These issues are not restricted to just the generation of RSA keys. In December
2010 there was the Sony Playstation hack where the ECDSA key was recovered due
to incorrect random nonce generation. In August 2013 there was a bug in android
that meant the PRNG was not initialised correctly and resulted in a similar recovery
of ECDSA keys that in turn, led to the theft of large sums of bitcoins. Similarly, an
HTTP session ID compromise via the java servlets engine was published in [35]. In
the 2010 paper by Ristenpart and Yilek [52], the authors reuse of random values via
reusing a VM snapshot lead to vulnerabilities in TLS such as compromise of Diffie
Hellman key exchange. A talk at the Blackhat USA conference [10] by Becherer,
Stamos and Wilcox presented how bad randomness can be used in an attack in
the cloud setting, such as requesting large numbers of password resets for a single
account, which all remain valid and active, followed by attempting to guess one of
these randomly generated password reset urls to gain access to an account.
18
1.2 Contributions
1.2 Contributions
We begin addressing some of the shortcomings mentioned in Section 1.1 in this
thesis. Namely, we present an improved PRNG design with practicality in mind,
followed by extending the security model to better capture practical requirements
of PRNGs. Finally, we provide a security analysis of a pair of NIST PRNGs that, at
the time of writing, have not received any formal analysis. The main contributions
of this thesis are summarised below:
• We provide an improved sponge-like PRNG design and prove that it satisfies
the robustness security property in the ideal permutation model, where the
underlying permutation is modelled as a public, random permutation. Our
design requires far fewer calls to the underlying permutation which has effi-
ciency benefits, especially in constrained environments and makes collisions of
the state of the generator less likely. We prove that although this design de-
parts from the sponge design, it is still encapsulated by the more general family
of parazoa designs. We present some implementation efficiency comparisons
between our design and the original sponge-based design.
• We next extend the current security model, allowing for analysis of PRNGs
with subroutines to produce variable amounts of output without updating
the internal state of the generator; or, in other words, PRNGs that allow an
adversary to request varying amounts of output with each call to the generator.
We also add several changes that we believe allows us to better specify and
model PRNGs in practise. We define the notion of a variable-output PRNG
with input, or, VOPWI which allows an adversary to vary the amount of output
received per internal state update of the generator. This new notion allows
us to analyse the security of PRNGs when outputting large amounts of output
quickly versus a smaller amount over many more calls. We formalise the need
for a seedgen algorithm and how the setup algorithm should be provided with
entropy to generate the initial state of a generator.
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• Using our updated security model we analyse the NIST PRNGs, namely the
hash drbg and ctr drbg. We analyse both designs in our new VOPWI secu-
rity model, while discussing the different design choices and how they affect
analysis. We then prove the generators are robust under several necessary
assumptions.
Parts of the research findings in this thesis have been published at SAC 2016 [39],
namely, Chapter 3.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
The main body of the thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 In this chapter we provide the preliminaries and background necessary
for the rest of the thesis. Some sections will refer back to parts of this chapter for
basic definitions, while more complex or altered definitions are included in context
throughout the remaining chapters.
Chapter 3 This chapter presents an improved design of a sponge-like PRNG based
upon the original sponge PRNG design in [18]. We show that our design is more
efficient due to fewer calls to the underlying permutation and prove that it satisfies
the notions of preserving and recovering security. This allows us to conclude that
the generator satisfies the robustness notion of security. We conclude by briefly
comparing the design to the original sponge design by considering the design as part
of the wider parazoa family.
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Chapter 4 This chapter outlines several updates to the security model of PWIs
given in [29], incorporating and building upon updates from [55]. We provide updates
that allow the capture of a more practical design of a PWI, along with the ability of
an adversary to request varying amounts of output per call to the next function of
the generator. The latter is an almost mirror of the update the authors of [29] made
to the security notion of refreshing the generator from [4] to enable an adversary
to slowly feed entropy into the generator, as opposed to all at once. Our update in
essence allows an adversary to extract output in small parts or all at once. We build
upon the notion of a masking function by allowing different distributions for different
situations in the security games, reflecting on how some parts of the state may
remain unchanged or may change in different ways. We formally define new versions
of preserving and recovering security before proving our own updated version of
robustness.
Chapter 5 We utilise our updated security model from the previous chapter to
analyse the security of the NIST random bit generators as defined in [7]. We chose
to update the security model to allow us to capture the subroutines and behaviour
of the NIST generators that allow for varying amounts of output at each call. Since
the generators are specified in full, we are also able to formally define the other algo-
rithms such as the seedgen algorithm, though we are forced to make an assumption
on its output to achieve security. We conclude that under several strong assump-
tions, the generators are variable-output robust, however these assumptions do not
necessarily transfer to practical implementations.
Chapter 6 We provide our conclusions and thoughts on future work in the related
areas.
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This chapter introduces the notation and provides an overview of the necessary
background material required for the future chapters. This includes introductory
definitions of pseudo-random number generators, related security models, other use-
ful primitives and some proof techniques that will be used.
2.1 Preliminaries
Much of this chapter is based on definitions from Katz and Lindell [40], Bellare and
Rogaway [14] and the in-progress book by Boneh and Shoup [21]. For the reader’s
convenience, an acronym and notation list are given on Page 12.
Definition 2.1.1. Let f and g be functions on the real numbers. We say that
f(x) = O(g(x)) as x → ∞ if and only if ∃M ∈ N and x0 ∈ R such that |f(x)| ≤
M |g(x)| for all x ≥ x0.
Definition 2.1.2. An algorithm taking input of size k ∈ N is said to be polynomial
time if it always terminates in time O(kc), for some constant c ∈ N0.
Definition 2.1.3. The statistical distance between two discrete random variables
X and Y over the set X is denoted
SD(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|Pr [X = x]− Pr [Y = x]| ≤ .
We say that X and Y are -close.
Definition 2.1.4. The minimum entropy of a random variable X is defined as
H∞(X) = min
x
$←X
{− log(Pr [X = x])}.
Definition 2.1.5. A source Spi is defined as an input-less randomised oracle which
makes queries to pi and outputs a string. The range of the source is denoted [S] and
is the set of all values the source outputs with positive probability, taken over the
choice of pi and the internal randomness of S.
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2.1.1 Provable Security
Unless stated otherwise, we use the usual game-based formalism from [15]; for a
game G,G(A) ⇒ 1 or GA ⇒ 1 denotes the event that an adversary A playing
the game G, results in the game outputting 1. We use G(A) → 1 or AG ⇒ 1
to denote the event that the adversary A playing the game G outputs 1. A game
consists of at least two procedures, Initialise and Finalise. The Initialise procedure
generally assigns initial values to variables, and passes them to the adversary or
other procedures. The Finalise algorithm runs once all queries by the adversary
have been made, usually followed by the adversary outputting a value. The Finalise
procedure then outputs its own value which is taken to be the output of the game.
A security game that does not make use of a random oracle is said to be in the
“standard model”; these games will usually show equivalence to a suitably “hard”
problem, such as factorisation large moduli.
Definition 2.1.6. A function negl : N → R is called negligible if for all c ∈ R>0
there exists an n0 ∈ N such that for all integers n ≥ n0, we have |negl(n)| ≤ 1nc .
2.1.2 Pseudorandom Permutations (PRPs)
Pseudo-random permutations (PRP) take as input a key and an input string. The
key picks a permutation from a family which is applied to the input. As the name
implies, a PRP should be indistinguishable from a random permutation.
Definition 2.1.7. Let P : {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n be an efficient, keyed
permutation. Then P is a pseudo-random permutation (PRP) family, if, for all
probabilistic polynomial-time distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function negl
such that: ∣∣∣Pr [DPk(·)(1n) =⇒ 1]− Pr [Dpi(·)(1n) =⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(nk),
where the first probability is taken over the uniform distribution of k ∈ {0, 1}nk
and the randomness of D, and the second probability is taken over the uniform
distribution of pi ∈ Pn, and the randomness of D.
We sometimes refer to the family of PRPs {Pk : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n}.
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Definition 2.1.8. Let P : {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n be an efficient, keyed
permutation. Then P is a strong pseudorandom permutation if, for all probabilistic
polynomial-time distinguishers D, there exists a negligible function negl such that:∣∣∣Pr [DPk(·),P−1k (·)(1n) =⇒ 1]− Pr [Dpi(·),pi−1(·)(1n) =⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n),
where the first probability is taken over the uniform distribution of k ∈ {0, 1}nk
and the randomness of D, and the second probability is taken over the uniform
distribution of pi ∈ Pn, and the randomness of D.
2.1.3 Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs)
Here we define a generalisation of a PRP, namely a pseudo-random function or PRF.
A PRF, similarly to a PRP, takes as input a key and a string. The key picks a function
from a family which is applied to the input. A PRF should be indistinguishable from
a random function.
Definition 2.1.9. Let F : {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n be an efficient, keyed
function. We call F a Pseudo-random function (PRF) family if, for all probabilistic
polynomial-time distinguishers D, there is a negligible function negl such that:∣∣∣Pr [DFk(·)(1n) =⇒ 1]− Pr [Df(·)(1n) =⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ≤ negl(n),
where the first probability is taken over the uniform distribution of k ∈ {0, 1}nk
and the randomness of D, and the second probability is taken over the uniform
distribution of f ∈ Funcn, and the randomness of D, where Funcn is the set of all
functions mapping n-bit strings to n-bit strings.
We sometimes refer to the family of PRFs {Fk : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n}.
2.1.4 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a deterministic algorithm taking a key and a fixed-length input
or block. A block cipher consists of two algorithms, an encryption algorithm and
a decryption algorithm such that the decryption algorithm is the inverse of the
encryption algorithm when queried with the same key..
25
2.1 Preliminaries
Procedure: owf
x
$← {0, 1}m
y ← f(x)
x′ ← Aowf(1λ, y)
if f(x′) = y
return 1
else
return 0
Figure 2.1: The one-way function security procedure.
Definition 2.1.10. Let n, nk ∈ N. Then an n-bit block cipher is a function E :
{0, 1}nk × {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n, where {0, 1}nk is the key space and for any k ∈
{0, 1}nk ,E(k, ·) is a permutation. It is common to write Ek(·) instead of E(k, ·).
Definition 2.1.11. Define the PRP security of a block cipher E : {0, 1}nk×{0, 1}n −→
{0, 1}n as the advantage of an adversary APRP, defined as
AdvPRPE (APRP) =
∣∣∣Pr [k $← {0, 1}nk : AEkPRP =⇒ 1]− Pr [pi $← Pn : ApiPRP =⇒ 1]∣∣∣ .
Definition 2.1.12. Define the strong PRP security of a block cipher E : {0, 1}nk ×
{0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}n as the advantage of an adversary APRP, defined as
Adv±PRPE (APRP) =
∣∣∣∣Pr [k $← {0, 1}nk : AEk,E−1kPRP =⇒ 1]− Pr [pi $← Pn : Api,−piPRP =⇒ 1]∣∣∣∣ .
2.1.5 Extractors and One-Way Functions (owfs)
Definition 2.1.13 (One-Way Function (owf)). A function f : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}∗ is
one-way if the following two conditions hold:
• There exists a polynomial-time algorithmMf computing f ; that is ∀x,Mf (x) =
f(x);
• For every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary Aowf , there is a negligible
function negl such that
Pr
[
owfAowff (λ) = 1
]
≤ negl(λ),
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for owf as described in Figure 2.1.
Definition 2.1.14 (Extractor from [46]). A function E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d −→
{0, 1}m is a (k, )-extractor if for every distribution X over {0, 1}n with H∞(X) ≥ k,
E(X,Ud) is -close to uniform.
2.1.6 Random Oracle Model (ROM)
We briefly outline the random oracle model, first formalised in [13]. A random oracle
informally returns a uniformly random string for every unique input (of arbitrary
length). We use the notation RO(x) to denote a random oracle taking input x.
Unless stated otherwise, the random oracle will always output a fixed length output.
The random oracle keeps track of previous queries and will always output the same
value for previously defined input. To summarise, when the RO is queried on the
string x, it first checks to see if the input string x has been queried before, if so
it returns the value it has linked to that input. If the x has not previously been
queried to RO then RO returns a uniformly random string.
2.1.7 Ideal Permutation Model (IPM)
An implementation of a PRNG may make use of a publicly available permutation.
To model this it is common to use the ideal permutation model (IPM).
Formally, each party has oracle access to a public, random permutation pi
$← Pn,
chosen by the challenger at the beginning of a game. The permutation can be queried
as both pi and pi−1 but, for simplicity, we write that an algorithm or entity, such as
an adversary A, has access to pi by Api. We make use of the following, which denotes
the advantage of an adversary A with oracle access to pi in distinguishing between
the distributions D0,D1 that also have access to pi:
AdvdistA (D0
pi,D1
pi) =
∣∣∣Pr [X $← D0pi : Api(X)⇒ 1]− Pr [X $← D1pi : Api(X)⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
with A being called a qpi-query adversary if it asks at most qpi queries to pi.
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2.1.8 Ideal-Cipher Model (ICM)
The ideal-cipher model (ICM) is a generalisation of the IPM (or alternatively the IPM
can be seen as a case of the ICM with a public fixed choice of key). Formally, at the
beginning of the game, the challenger chooses a random permutation pik ∈ Pn for
each key k ∈ {0, 1}nk . We make use of the following, which denotes the advantage of
an adversary A with oracle access to pik in distinguishing between the distributions
D0,D1 that also have access to pik:
AdvdistA (D0
pik ,D1
pik) =
∣∣∣Pr [X $← D0pik : Apik(X)⇒ 1]− Pr [X $← D1pik : Apik(X)⇒ 1]∣∣∣ ,
with A being called a qpi-query adversary if it asks at most qpi queries to pik.
2.2 Definitions of Pseudo-Random Number Generators
The main topic in this thesis is the investigation of pseudo-random number genera-
tors. In this section we will take a look at how the modelling of a PRG has evolved
over time, along with how security models have changed to reflect real world situ-
ations, addressed concerns and, where there is still a large gap between theory and
practice.
There are many different definitions and terms for a pseudo-random number genera-
tor; in this thesis, a PRG will refer to a Pseudo-Random Number Generator without
input for simplicity. A PRG is the most basic definition of a pseudo-random number
generator, while a PRNG or PWI will refer to a Pseudo-Random Number Generator
with input.
2.2.1 PRGs
One of the simplest definitions of a random number generator is a PRG. Taking no
additional input other than an initial state, it expands this random input into larger
amounts of pseudo-random output.
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Definition 2.2.1 (PRG). For n, ` ∈ N, a function G : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}` is a
deterministic (t, )-pseudo-random number generator (PRG) if
1. ` > n, or in other words, stretches the original seed of randomness into a larger
amount of pseudo-randomness.
2. No adversary running in time t can distinguish between
G(s0) and R
$← {0, 1}`,
for some s0
$← {0, 1}n with probability greater than .
si si+1
ri+1
G
n n
`
(n, `) ∈ N2
Figure 2.2: A simple PRG description.
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2.2.2 PRNGs and PWIs
Definition 2.2.2 (PRNG from [29]). A PRNG with input (PWI) is a triple of al-
gorithms G = (setup, refresh, next) and a triple (n, `, p) ∈ N3 where n is the state
length, ` is the output length, p is the input length of G and
• setup: is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs some public parameters seed
for the generator, along with the initial state s0;
• refresh: is a deterministic algorithm that, given seed, a state si ∈ {0, 1}n and
an input I ∈ {0, 1}p, outputs a new state si+1 := refresh(seed, si, I);
• next: is a deterministic algorithm that, given seed and a state si ∈ {0, 1}n,
outputs a pair (si+1, ri+1) = next(si) = next(seed, si), where si+1 is the new
state and ri+1 ∈ {0, 1}` is the output.
seed
s0
si si+1
si si+1
I
ri+1
setup
refresh
next
n
p
`
n n
n n
(n, `, p) ∈ N3
Figure 2.3: A simple PRNG description.
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2.3 Existing Security Models of PRNGs
In this section we briefly survey the existing security models for pseudo-random
number generators. The study of PRNGs stretches back quite far, from the early
works by Blum and Micali [20], Yao [57], to work by Desai, Hevia and Yin [27]
who model a PRNG as a pair of stateful algorithms (key,next), the model by Barak,
Shaltiel and Tromer [6] which models the generator as (setup,next), building towards
the model by Barak and Halevi [4] who use (refresh,next), to the extension of [4] by
Dodis et. al. [29] which we base the work of this thesis on. We also touch upon
some updated models that build upon [29], such as [30]. For a more complete list
and summary, see [53]. We will begin by taking a more in-depth look at [29] and [30]
which were the main influences of this thesis and incorporate the majority captured
in previous models.
2.3.1 Two papers: /dev/random is not Robust and How to Eat Your
Entropy and Have It Too
The security model introduced in [29] identified and incorporated the very applicable
situation where a PRNG may accumulate entropy at a slow rate (through low entropy
inputs) and is at risk of “prematurely” being called before enough entropy has
been gathered, and focused on building upon [4]. The updated model [30] takes a
less conservative approach to this situation through pre-mature get-next security.
Both of these papers sought to formalise these situations and to try to match the
constraints and challenges faced when instantiating a PRNG in practise with more
practically inspired restraints and security notions. Even the most recent model still,
by the authors’ admission, does not encompass the full desirable picture of what a
secure PRNG should be, less even what a secure PRNG would look like. The model
as it stands does not incorporate the entropy estimation or mixing functions present
in many real world PRNGs, for instance, but does define the notion of a scheduler
(which handles several entropy pools feeding into the PRNG) as used in the Fortuna
PRNG [31, Chapter 9].
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First we define the entropy source, which in this model is modelled as a second
adversary D and called the distribution sampler, which does not communicate with
the main adversary A. Like all adversaries, restrictions need to be made, though
these are as few as possible. The reasoning behind the entropy source being an
adversary is to emulate the potentially adversarial environment where the PRNG is
forced to operate. For the PRNG to be deemed in a “secure” state, the entropy of
the state is required to be over a given threshold γ∗ specified as part of the security
of the generator.
Definition 2.3.1. The distribution sampler D is a stateful and probabilistic algo-
rithm which given the current state σ outputs a tuple (σ′, I, γ, z) where:
• σ′ is the new state for D;
• I ∈ {0, 1}p is the next input for the refresh algorithm;
• γ is some fresh entropy estimation of I;
• z is the leakage about I given to the adversary A.
Let qD be the maximum number of calls to D in our security games. It is said that
D is legitimate if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , qD},
H∞(Ij |I1, . . . , Ij−1, Ij+1, . . . , IqD , z1, . . . , zqD , γ1, . . . , γqD) ≥ γj ,
where H∞ is the minimum entropy function as defined in Definition 2.1.4.
We model an adversary using a pair (A,D), where A is the actual adversary and D
is a stateful distribution sampler. The adversary A’s goal is to determine a challenge
bit b picked during the initialise procedure, which also returns the public parameters.
Like past security models, [29] builds upon the security notions of resilience (res),
forward security (fwd), backward security (bwd) and robustness (rob), with the latter
being the strongest with the most adversarial freedom. Before defining what each
notion entails, we describe the game framework used in Figure 2.4 where, as usual,
the challenger begins by running the Initialise procedure, and ends with the Finalise
procedure.
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Procedure: Initialise ()
σ ← 0,
seed
$← setup
s0
$← setup
e← n
corrupt← false
b
$← {0, 1}
return seed
Procedure: Finalise (b∗)
if b = b∗ then
return 1
else
return 0
Procedure: get-state ()
e← 0
corrupt← true
return si
Procedure: next-ror
(si+1, r0)← next(si)
if corrupt = true then
e← 0
return r0
else
if r0 =⊥ then
r1 ←⊥
else
r1
$← {0, 1}`
return rb
Procedure: get-next
(si+1, ri+1)← next(si)
if corrupt = true then
e← 0
return ri+1
Procedure: set-state (s∗)
e← 0
corrupt← true
si ← s∗
Procedure: D−refresh()
(σ, I, γ, z)
$← D(σ)
si+1 ← refresh(si, I)
e← e+ γ
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
return (γ, z)
Figure 2.4: The security procedures of [29]. The inclusion of seed has been omitted
from several algorithms.
Definition 2.3.2 (Robustness). A PRNG with input is called (t, qD, qR, qS, γ∗, rob)-
robust (rob) if, for any attacker A running in time at most t, making at most qD calls
to D−refresh, making at most qR calls to next/next-ror, qS calls to get-state/set-state,
and any legitimate distribution sampler D, the advantage in the game specified in
Figure 2.4 is at most . The value γ∗ is the minimum entropy required to reset the
“corrupt” flag back to “false”. As usual, the challenger first executes the Initialise
algorithm and the adversary is given access to next-ror, get-next, set-state and refresh
oracles, described in Figure 2.4. Once the adversary has asked all her queries, she
outputs her guess, passes it to the challenger and the challenger runs Finalise with
the adversary’s guess as input.
Further, we define three more games which are restrictions of the robustness game:
Definition 2.3.3. Resilience (res) is the restricted game where qS = 0.
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Definition 2.3.4. Forward-secure (fwd) is the restricted game where A makes no
calls to set-state and a single call to get-state, which must be the very last oracle
call that A makes.
Definition 2.3.5. Backward-secure (bwd) is the restricted game where A makes no
calls to get-state and a single call to set-state which is the very first call A makes.
Definition 2.3.6. Let G be a PRNG. For x ∈ {fwd, bwd, res, rob} as defined in
Definitions 2.3.2 to 2.3.5, let AdvxG,D(A) be defined as
AdvxG,D(A) := 2Pr
[
xA =⇒ 1]− 1.
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Recover(G,A,D)
(setup, refresh, next)← G
seed
$← setup; b $← {0, 1}
σ0 ← 0;µ← 0
for k = 1, . . . , qD do
(σk, Ik, γk, zk)← D(σk−1)
(s0, d, σ
′) $← Aget-refresh(seed,
γ1, . . . , γqD , z1, . . . , zqD )
if µ+ d > qD or
µ+d∑
j=µ+1
γj < γ
∗ then
return 0
for j = 1, . . . , d do
sj ← refresh(seed, sj−1, Iµ+j)
(s∗0, r
∗
0)← next(seed, sd)
s1
$← {0, 1}`
if r∗0 =⊥ then
r∗1 ←⊥
else
r∗1
$← {0, 1}`
b∗ $← A(σ′, s∗b, r∗b , Iµ+d+1, . . . , IqD )
if b∗ = b then
return 1
else
return 0
Preserve(G,A)
(setup, refresh, next)← G
seed
$← setup; s0 $← {0, 1}n; b $← {0, 1}
for j = 1, . . . , d do
sj ← refresh(seed, sj−1, Ij)
(s∗0, r
∗
0)← next(seed, sd)
s1
$← {0, 1}`
if r∗0 =⊥ then
r∗1 ←⊥
else
r∗1
$← {0, 1}`
b∗ $← A(σ′, s∗b, r∗b)
if b∗ = b then
return 1
else
return 0
get-refresh ()
µ← µ+ 1
return Iµ
Figure 2.5: Preserving and recovering security games for G outputting `-bits.
The main result of [29] is Theorem 1, the composition theorem that proves that if a
PWI satisfying two simpler notions of security called preserving and recovering secu-
rity, then the PWI is robust. We present the associated security games for preserving
and recovering security in Figure 2.5. Informally, preserving security states that if
the state of the PWI starts uncompromised, and is refreshed using compromised
input, then the next output and resulting state are still indistinguishable from ran-
dom. Similarly, recovering security implies that if a PWI is compromised, inserting
enough random entropy to refresh the internal state will ensure that the next output
and state will be indistinguishable from random.
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Definition 2.3.7 (Preserving Security). A PWI is said to have (t, p)-preserving
security, if, for any adversary A running in time the preserving advantage defined
by
AdvpresG (A) = 2Pr [Preserve(G,A) = 1]− 1,
satisfies AdvpresG (A) ≤ p, for Preserve as in Figure 2.5.
Definition 2.3.8 (Recovering Security). A PWI is said to have (t, qD, γ∗, r)-recovering
security, if, for any adversary A and legitimate sampler D, both running in time t,
the recovering advantage defined by
AdvrecG (A) = 2Pr [Recover(G,A,D) = 1]− 1,
satisfies AdvrecG (A) ≤ r for Recover as in Figure 2.5.
Theorem 2.3.9 (Composition theorem of [29]).
If a PWI has both (t, qD, γ∗, r)-recovering security and (t, p)-preserving security,
then it is ((t′, qD, qR, qS), γ∗, qR(r + p))-robust where t′ ≈ t.
Theorem 2.3.10 (Composition theorem of [33]).
Let G[pi] be a PWI that issues qpi
ref (resp. qpi
nxt) pi queries in each invocation of
refresh (resp. next); and let qpi := qpi + Q(qD). For every (qpi, qD, qR, qS)-adversary
A against robustness and for every Q-distribution sampler D, there exists a family
of (qpi + qR · qpinxt + qD · qpiref)-adversaries A(i)1 against recovering security and a
family of (qpi+qR ·qpinxt+qD ·qpiref)-adversaries A(i)2 against preserving security (for
i ∈ {1, . . . , qR}) such that
Advγ
∗−rob
G (A,D) ≤
(
Adv
(γ∗,qD)−rec
G (A(i)1 ,D) + Adv−presG (A(i)2 )
)
.
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2.3.2 Other Models
The later work [30] introduced the idea of a scheduler, inspired by the design of
the Fortuna PRNG [31] which aimed at a design to improve the recovery time of a
corrupt PRNG by allowing premature get-next queries. We will not be considering a
scheduler in this thesis since a design can easily be extended to utilise a scheduler;
however, the idea of a scheduler is an interesting prospect in terms of possibly
replacing the need for seed, by essentially blinding the entropy inputs in a way the
adversary cannot predict, mirroring the purpose of the seed. The scheduler may also
help simplify some proofs and allow for weaker refresh functions.
This extension defines several relaxed security notions that modify the security
games by removing the conservative reducing of the state entropy to 0 on a pre-
mature next query, along with adding counters to aid in determining when a PRNG
has recovered from compromise.
Informally a scheduler is a stateful deterministic algorithm taking a scheduler key
that partitions entropy inputs into several “pools” that are in themselves PRNGs, in
the hope that by refreshing pools in some schedule, one pool will eventually reach
enough entropy that refreshing the state of a central simpler PRG with this entropy
pool is enough to reset the corrupt flag. The scheduler determines which pool will
receive the next entropy input and the next pool that will be emptied when entropy
is requested.
Theorem 2 of [30] states that given a secure scheduler, entropy pools Gi, each a
robust PRNG, and given a secure PRG that will act as the central component of the
PRNG yields a premature-next robust PRNG, meaning it remains secure when an
adversary prematurely requests output. In the [29] paper, this kind of adversarial
call would result in the entropy estimation of the generator state being reduced to
0.
There are other security models that often target a particular aspect of PRNG se-
curity in practise, such as side channel leakage in [59], an extension to [29] in [1],
the paper by Terashima and Shrimpton [55] which we will discuss in further detail
in Chapter 4, and many others.
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2.4 Hash Functions
Hash functions are often used in the construction of PRNGs and universal hash
functions will prove very useful in later security proofs.
2.4.1 Preliminaries
Definition 2.4.1. A hash function with output length ` is a pair of probabilistic-
time algorithms (Gen,H) satisfying the following:
• Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1λ
and outputs a key k. We assume that 1λ is implicit in k to avoid additional
notation;
• H takes as input a key k and a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a string Hk ∈
{0, 1}`(λ).
If Hk is only defined for inputs x ∈ {0, 1}`′(λ) and `′(λ) > `(λ), then we say that
(Gen,H) is a fixed-length hash function for inputs of length `′. Since `′ > ` we also
call H a compression function.
2.4.2 Universal Hash Functions
A very useful class of hash function is the family of universal hash functions. These
hash functions can be efficiently constructed, see [45, 36]. This makes them a very
useful primitive and will be a key component in our security analysis in Section 5.4.
Definition 2.4.2 (Universal Hash Function). LetH = {Hk : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m}k∈{0,1}d
be a hash function family, then H is ρ-universal if for any inputs x 6= x′ ∈ {0, 1}n,
we have Pr
k
$←{0,1}d(Hk(x) = Hk(x
′)) ≤ ρ.
We also include two stronger sub-classes of universal hash functions in Defini-
tions 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 from [22].
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Definition 2.4.3 (XOR Universal Hash Function). Let H = {Hk : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m}k∈{0,1}d be a universal hash function family, and m be a power of two;
then H is XOR universal if ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x 6= y, the value H(x)⊕ H(y) mod m is
uniformly distributed in {0, 1}m.
Definition 2.4.4 (Strong Universal Hash Function). Let H = {Hk : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m}k∈{0,1}d be a universal hash function family, then H is a strongly universal
family if ∀x, y ∈ {0, 1}n, x 6= y, we have the probability that x, y hash to any pair of
hash values h1, h2 is
Pr [Hx = h1 ∧ Hy = h2] = 1
22m
,
or in other words, is perfectly random.
2.4.3 Leftover Hash Lemma
A very useful tool is the leftover-hash lemma, presented in various literature, such
as [29]:
Lemma 2.4.5 (Leftover-Hash Lemma).
Let H be a ρ-universal hash function, where ρ = (1 + α)2−m for some α > 0. Then
for any k > 0, it is also a (k, )-extractor for  = 12
√
2m−k + α.
Where an extractor is as defined in Definition 2.1.14. A proof of the lemma can be
found in [54, Theorem 8.37].
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2.5 Sponge Functions
2.5.1 The Two Phases of the Sponge
The sponge construction was introduced in [16] and given a formal security analysis
in [17]. The sponge design has benefited from a large amount of analysis due to
the success of Keccak in the SHA3 competition in 2012. The sponge construction is
stateful and has a b = (r + c)-bit state (called the width) split into the inner state
of c-bits (the capacity) and outer state of r-bits (the rate).The sponge construction
makes use of a keyless permutation pi that maps b-bits to b-bits, which is modelled
as an ideal permutation in the security analysis.
The normal running of the sponge is split into two phases: the absorbing phase where
it incorporates new input into the state and the squeezing phase, where the sponge
outputs a specified number of bits.
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Algorithm 1 The absorbing function absorb[pi, r](I)
Require: r < b
Interface: s ← absorb(I) with I ∈ Z∗2 and s ∈ Zb2.
P ← I‖pad[r](|M |)
s ← 0b
for i = 0 to |P |r-1 do
s ← s ⊕ (Pi‖0b−r)
s ← pi(s)
end for
return s
c
r
0
0
I0
pi
I1
pi
I2
pi
Figure 2.6: The sponge construction in the absorbing phase.
When initialising the sponge the first state is set to zero. The input message is
padded using a valid padding scheme and cut into blocks of r-bits which are then
absorbed in the absorbing phase of the sponge as described in Algorithm 1 and
described pictorially in Figure 2.6.
Next, once this initial input has been absorbed the sponge switches to the squeezing
phase as described in Algorithm 2 and shown in Figure 2.7. This algorithm is the
dual to the absorbing function. For a given state s and requested number of bits
` it outputs a string truncated to ` from the sponge function acting on state s at
the beginning of the squeezing phase. Once the squeezing phase is completed, the
sponge function finishes.
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Algorithm 2 The squeezing function squeeze[pi, r](s, `)
Require: r < b
Interface: Z ← squeeze(s, `) with s ∈ Zb2, integer ` > 0 and Z ∈ Z`2
Z ← bscr
while r|Z|r < ` do
s ← pi(s)
Z ← Z‖bscr
end while
Return bZc`
pi
r0 r1
pi
r2
pi
Figure 2.7: The sponge construction in the squeezing phase.
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Algorithm 3 The sponge construction sponge[pi, pad, r](M, `)
Require: r < b
Interface: Z ← sponge(M, `) with M ∈ Z∗2, integer ` > 0 and Z ∈ Z`2
P ←M‖pad[r](|M |)
s ← 0b
for i = 0 to |P |r do
s ← s ⊕ (Pi‖0b−r)
s ← pi(s)
end for
Z ← bscr
while r|Z|r < ` do
s ← pi(s)
Z ← Z‖bscr
end while
return bZc`
2.5.2 The Sponge and Duplex Algorithms
In full, the sponge construction is given in Algorithm 3 and shown in Figure 2.8, it
has precisely one absorbing phase and one squeezing phase.
c
r
0
0
I0
pi
I1
Absorb phase
pi pi
r0 r1
Squeezing phase
pi
Figure 2.8: The sponge construction in both phases.
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Algorithm 4 The duplex construction duplex[pi, pad, r]
Require: r < b
Require: ρmax(pad, r) > 0
Interface: D.Initialise ()
s ← 0b
Interface: Z ← D.duplex(σ, `) with ` ≤ r, σ ∈ ∪ρmaxn=0 (pad, r)Zb2, and Z ∈ Z`2
P ← σ‖pad[r](|σ|)
s ← s ⊕ (P‖0b−r)
s ← pi(s)
return bsc`
The duplex construction, given in [16] differs slightly in that it has multiple ab-
sorbing and squeezing phases and will be useful when defining the PRNG variant
of the sponge construction. The duplex construction or duplex mode is given in
Algorithm 4 and shown in Figure 2.9. Since the duplex construction has multiple
absorbing and squeezing phases, it begins by initialising the state to 0 followed by
all interactions taking place through duplex calls. This allows the construction to
continue indefinitely.
c
r
0
0
I0
pi
I1r0
Single duplex call
pi
I2r1
pi
r2
Figure 2.9: The sponge construction in duplex mode.
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2.5.3 The Sponge PRNG: sponge.prng
The authors of [18] use the sponge construction, specifically the duplex mode, to
build a PRNG, which we present below in Algorithm 5. We call this PRNG the
sponge.prng and critique it in Chapter 3. The sponge.prng relies heavily on the
duplex construction, with the addition of an optional subroutine called p.forget that
zeroes the outer state by XORing the current outer state. The p.forget subroutine
can be optionally used in an implementation after each fetch request is made to give
some measure of forward security.
Algorithm 5 The sponge PRNG construction sponge.prng[pi, pad, r, ρ]
Require: ρ ≤ ρmax(pad, r)− 1
Require: D = duplex[pi, pad, r]
Interface: P .Initialise ()
D.Initialise ()
Bin = empty string
Bout = empty string
Interface: P.feed(σ) with σ ∈ Z+2
M = Bin‖σ
for i = 0 to |M |ρ − 2 do
D.duplex(Mi, 0)
end for
Bin = M|M |ρ − 1
Bout = empty string
Interface: Z = P.fetch(`) with integer ` ≥ 0 and Z ∈ Z`2
while |Bout| < ` do
Bout = Bout‖D.duplex(Bin, ρ)
Bin = empty string
end while
Z = bBoutc`
Bout = last(|Bout| − `) bits of Bout
return Z
Interface: p.forget ()
Z = D.duplex(Bin, ρ)
Bin = empty string
for i = 1 to bc/ρc do
Z = D.duplex(Z, ρ)
end for
Bout = empty string
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2.6 Generalising the Sponge to the Parazoa Family
The sponge construction is generalised by Andreeva, Mennink and Preneel in [3].
Similar to the sponge, the parazoa function is split into two sections; compres-
sion/absorbing phase where messages or input is padded and absorbed into an n-bit
state, and the extraction/squeezing phase when output is generated.
The parazoa utilises two main functions f and g; the compression phase refers
directly to the function f , while the extraction phase refers to the g function. Each
function is of a specific form and is built up of two inner functions, which are referred
to as f1, f2, g1 and g2. Both functions are based on a permutation pi. The parazoa
also requires a padding scheme and finalise function. The padding scheme takes a
message input I and pads it into several input blocks of p-bits. The finalise function
takes the `-bit outputs and combines them into the `total-bit digest.
Definition 2.6.1. A function f : Za2 −→ Zb2 for a ≥ b is called balanced if ∀y ∈ Zb2,
y has exactly 2a−b pre-images under f .
Definition 2.6.2. For x ∈ Zn2 , define the capacity set
C(x) := {s ∈ Zn2 | ∃I ∈ Zp2 s.t. f1(s, I) = x}.
2.6.1 The f Function
Definition 2.6.3. The f function takes on input the current value of the n-bit state
si−1 and the message block Ii:
f : Zn2 × Zp2 −→ Zn2 .
The first of the sub functions f1 absorbs the message into the state and then per-
mutes the state with pi, before the second sub function f2 transforms the state while
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si−1 f1
Ii
x pi
y
f2 si
Figure 2.10: The f function.
possibly combining it with a feed-forward. More formally:
f1 : Zn2 × Zp2 −→ Zn2
f2 : Zn2 × Zn2 × Zp2 −→ Zn2
si ← f(si−1, Ii)
x← f1(si−1, Ii)
y ← pi(x)
si ← f2(y, si−1, Ii).
Figure 2.10 gives a more intuitive picture of how f operates. For further clarity,
in the case of the sponge construction, x = f1(si−1, Ii) = si−1 ⊕ (Ii‖0c) and si+1 =
f2(y, Ii, si−1) = y, the identity map. It is also required that the f1 and f2 functions
satisfy the following:
• The function f1 must satisfy the following properties:
1. ∀x ∈ Zn2 , ∀s ∈ C(x), ∃!I s.t. f1(s, I) = x (uniqueness).
2. ∀x, x′ ∈ Zn2 , if C(x) ∩ C(x′) 6= ∅ then C(x) = C(x′).
• The function f2 must be a bijection on the state.
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2.6.2 The g Function
Definition 2.6.4. The g function takes the current value of the state sk+i−1 as
input:
g : Zn2 → Zn2 × Z`2.
The first of the sub functions g1 outputs a block and permutes the state with pi.
A second sub function g2 transforms this intermediate state (or in fact for simpler
proofs may do nothing) using the previous state as additional input. More formally:
g1 : Zn2 −→ Zn2 × Z`2
g2 : Zn2 × Zn2 −→ Zn2
(sk+i, rk+i−1)← g(sk+i−1)
(s∗k+i−1, rk+i−1)← g1(sk+i−1)
s∗∗k+i−1 ← pi(s∗k+i−1)
sk+i ← g2(s∗∗k+i−1, sk+i−1).
A more intuitive picture of how g operates is given in Figure 2.11, though initially
g2 is the identity, but can be generalised as shown in Figure 2.12. For clarity, the
sponge function can be thought of as having g1 output the outer state while leaving
the state itself unchanged, along with g2 as the identity map on y. It is also required
that the g1 and g2 functions satisfy the following:
• The function g1 is a bijection on the state, and when restricted to viewing the
output ri, g1 is balanced.
• The function g2 must also be a bijection on the state.
48
2.6 Generalising the Sponge to the Parazoa Family
sk+i−1
g1
ri
x pi
y
g2 sk+i
Figure 2.11: The g function.
sk+i−1 g1
ri
x pi
y
g2 sk+i
Figure 2.12: The generalised g function.
The f and g functions can be further generalised by using two different permutations
pi1 and pi2 respectively.
Definition 2.6.5. The padding function pad is an injective mapping that takes the
input messages of arbitrary length and transforms them into blocks of length p. It
is required that pad satisfies the following property:
• Either, `b = 1, or
• the last block of a message Ik satisfies ∀s ∈ Zn2 ,∀(s′, I′) ∈ Zn2 × Zp2,
f1(s,Mk) 6= s and f1(f2(s, s′, I′), Ik) 6= s.
Definition 2.6.6. The finalise function fin combines the `b bit strings obtained from
squeezing the parazoa, into the final output. The fin function must be balanced as
per Definition 2.6.1.
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The sponge function uses a finalise function that concatenates the outputs and
truncates this concatenation to the correct length, which trivially meets the balanced
requirement.
2.6.3 Formal Definition of a Parazoa Function
Definition 2.6.7. A parazoa, denoted P, is defined as a tuple (`b, p, `total, `, n)
along with a padding scheme pad as described in Definition 2.6.5, finalise function
fin as described in Definition 2.6.6, together with functions f and g as described in
Definitions 2.6.3 and 2.6.4. The tuple reads as follows:
• `b is the number of output data blocks required to output each `total request.
• p is the size of each input block to the f1 function, denoted Ii.
• `total is the size of the output of the fin function.
• ` is the size of each output block of the g1 function, denoted ri.
• n is the size of the internal state, denoted si.
Along with the individual component requirements given in each definition, it is
required that p, ` ≤ n and ``b ≥ `total.
We note that the number of output data blocks `b may be a larger number due to
complex finalise functions fin that may further compress the output. A technical
variable useful for describing the security of a parazoa P in regards to indifferentia-
bility to a random oracle RO is the following definition of capacity loss d.
Definition 2.6.8. Consider the set of all pairs (s, x) ∈ Zn2×Zn2 such that f1(s, I) = x
for some I ∈ Zp2 uniquely determined by (s, x). The capacity loss of a parazoa P
denoted d ≥ 0, is defined as the minimum of
For x ∈ Zn2 , r ∈ Zr2, there are at most 2d pairs (s, x) such that s ∈ {g−11 (r)};
For s ∈ Zn2 , r ∈ Zr2, there are at most 2d pairs (s, x) such that x ∈ {g−11 (r)}.
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In particular, restricting to the f1 and f2 used by the sponge function, along with
g1 output function of truncating the outer state, yields d = 0. The authors of [3]
extend the indifferentiability of the sponge from a random oracle to the parazoa in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.6.9 (Theorem 1 of [3]).
Let pi be a random n-bit permutation, and let RO be a random oracle. Let P be
a parazoa function parameterised by (`b, p, `total, `, n). Let D be a distinguisher that
makes at most q1 left queries of maximal length (K − 1)p-bits, where K ≥ 1, and q2
right queries, and runs in time t. Then for a simulator sim making at most qS ≤ q2
queries to RO and running in time O(q22), we have:
AdvproP,sim(D) = O
(
((K + `b)q1 + q2)
2
2n−`−d
)
,
where a simulator is formally defined in Definition 2.7.4.
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2.7.1 Indifferentiability
The notion of indifferentiability is the more general form of indistinguishability given
by Maurer et al in [42], with works such as [25] applying it to relevant areas such as
hash functions.
Definition 2.7.1. An (X ,Y)-system is a sequence of probability distributions PYi|XiY i−1
for i ∈ N, where Xi := [X1, . . . , Xi] and Y i−1 := [Y1, . . . , Yi−1] and where Xi is
called the ith input, and Yi the ith output, are random variables with range X and
Y respectively. If each Yi only depends on the actual input Xi, and possibly some
randomness, then the system is called a random function.
Definition 2.7.2. Let S = (Sk)k∈N and T = (Tk)k∈N be two (X ,Y)-systems, then S
and T are computationally indistinguishable if for any computationally efficient dis-
tinguisher D, interacting with one of these systems and generating a binary output,
the advantage
|Pr [D(Sk)→ 1]− Pr [D(Tk)→ 1] | ≤ negl(k),
for security parameter k.
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The following proposition describes how this notion is utilised in security reductions:
Proposition 2.7.3.
For S and T defined above, it is said S and T are indistinguishable if and only if for
every cryptosystem C(T ) using T as a component, the cryptosystem C(S) obtained
from C(T ) by replacing the component T with S is at least as secure as C(T ).
It’s important to note that this proposition only applies when the resources involved
have no public interfaces, i.e an adversary has no direct access to these components.
It is often the case that an adversary will have more access than this; she may have
access to another interface which the first interface interacts with, such as a permu-
tation a construction utilises. We label the interface with the construction to be the
private interface (or interface 1) while the primitive this interface utilises is called the
public interface (or interface 2). This motivates the definition of indifferentiability:
Definition 2.7.4. For S and T defined above, it is said that S is indifferentiable
from T , if for any distinguisher D with binary output there is a system P such that
the advantage
|Pr [D(S1k , S2k)→ 1]− Pr [D(T 1k , P (T 2k ))→ 1] | ≤ negl(k),
for security parameter k. This is easier to understand using Figure 2.13:
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D
priv pub
S
D
priv
pub
Sim
T
Figure 2.13: The distinguisher D differentiating between S and T is either connected
as in the left or right. In the first case D has direct access to both the public and
private interfaces of S, while in the latter case the access to the public interface of
T is replaced by an intermediate system P (called sim) that can make its own calls
to the public interface of T .
An example of differentiability
For clarity we give an example of how two constructions can easily be differentiable
due to the interfaces the adversary has access to.
Theorem 2.7.5.
Let f, g be random functions on {0, 1}n and let f2 denote f applied iteratively twice.
Then, f2, f is differentiable from g, sim[g], or, in other words, there exists no efficient
simulator that can fool the proposed distinguisher D.
The idea behind Theorem 2.7.5 can be seen clearer in Figure 2.14.
53
2.7 Proof Techniques
D
C[f ]=f 2 f g Sim[g]
Figure 2.14: The interfaces available to the distinguisher D.
x a y b z
1 11
2 2
Figure 2.15: Illustrating the method D uses to cause a contradicting output from
the simulator.
Proof. The Distinguisher is defined as follows: Query the left interface with some
x
$← {0, 1}n, with y the result of this query. D queries the left interface again with
y, and receives the response z.
Next, D queries the right interface with y and will receive the response b. If the
right interface is the simulator, it can easily deduce that whatever it outputs must
be linked to z, by querying the left interface with y. This is so that f(y) = b and
f(b) = z to maintain consistency.
The distinguisher now queries the left interface with x, which outputs a value a.
The simulator can deduce that x is linked to y, which is linked to b, but with
overwhelming probability the output a will not be correct if queried to the left
interface. This is due to g(a) 6= b with overwhelming probability (1/2n).
54
2.7 Proof Techniques
Corollary 2.7.6.
This attack does not apply if f, g are random permutations and the construction
allows inverse queries, since the simulator can query (f2/g)−1(b) := a and link this
value with x and y.
2.7.2 H-coefficient Technique
This section gives a brief introduction to Patarin’s H-coefficient technique with a
focus on its use in cryptographic proofs. Influenced by [23] and initially defined in
[47], the H-coefficient technique is applied by splitting the “transcripts” of a game
into two or more distinct sets; calculating the probability of the real or ideal world
outputting transcripts in a particular set yields a close bound for the statistical
distance of the real and ideal world.
A high level overview is that of a q-query information theoretic adversary A which
can be assumed to be deterministic, making no redundant queries without loss of
generality, interacting with an oracle ω representing either the real world or ideal
world. The interaction A has with this oracle ω is represented in a transcript τ ,
which includes a list of queries and their answers given by ω.
Let ω be an oracle that serves as the way the adversary A interacts with the chal-
lenger in the chosen world. Let ΩX refer to the probability space of all real world
oracles with the uniform probability distribution, and similarly ΩY is the probability
space of all ideal world oracles again with the uniform distribution.
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Let T be the set of all transcripts, with τ ∈ T an individual transcript that describes,
in full, the interactions and final output between the adversary A and the oracle she
interacts with.
Further, the random variables X and Y are defined over the probability spaces ΩX
and ΩY respectively. We write X(ω) = τ to refer to running A on oracle ω for
ω ∈ ΩX , which in turn produces the transcript τ . The random variable Y is defined
similarly using ΩY . Alternatively X and Y are the functions
X : ΩX −→ T , Y : ΩY −→ T
ω 7−→ τ, ω 7−→ τ.
If we fix a distinguisher A, we can say that A’s distinguishing advantage is upper
bounded by
SD(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
τ∈T
|Pr [X = τ ]− Pr [Y = τ ]| .
For simplicity we will only consider two sets; good and bad transcripts, which are
denoted TGood and TBad respectively.
We say that an oracle ω ∈ ΩX is compatible with a transcript τ , and denote by
compX(τ)(τ) the set of such oracles. Similarly, we denote by compY (τ)(τ) the
oracles ω ∈ ΩY compatible with τ . It should be noted that this does not mean
running A with ω will always produce τ , since it may be the case that the particular
transcript cannot be output by A, e.g. it contains more queries than A is allowed
to make, i.e. Pr [X = τ ] = Pr [Y = τ ] = 0. The notion of compatible transcripts is
often used in the H-coefficient technique by taking advantage of the following:
Pr [X = τ ] =
|compX(τ)|
|ΩX | and Pr [Y = τ ] =
|compY (τ)|
|ΩY | ,
if either Pr [X = τ ] > 0 or Pr [Y = τ ] > 0, and noting that
Pr [X = τ ] > 0 =⇒ Pr [Y = τ ] > 0.
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These quantities actually have some very interesting consequences. We note that
the right hand sides are in fact independent of the choice of A, which actually means
that two adversaries produce two different transcripts τ1, τ2 that contain the same
set of queries, possibly in different orders, they do so with the same probability.
An alternative way to calculate these quantities that sometimes may prove simpler
is as follows:
|compX(τ)|
|ΩX | = PrΩX [ω ∈ compX(τ)] and
|compY (τ)|
|ΩY | = PrΩY [ω ∈ compY (τ)] .
Defining the split of transcripts is integral to the proof since the H-coefficient tech-
nique allows bounding the statistical distance of the random variables X and Y in
the following way: suppose ∃ ∈ [0, 1], such that ∀τ ∈ TGood, with Pr [Y = τ ] > 0,
Pr [X = τ ]
Pr [Y = τ ]
=
PrΩX [ω ∈ compX(τ)] .
PrΩY [ω ∈ compY (τ)]
≥ 1− .
Finally, this culminates in the fundamental theorem of the H-coefficient technique
as presented in [23]:
Theorem 2.7.7 (Equation 10).
Let X,Y, TGood, TBad, τ,  be as above, then,
SD(X,Y ) ≤ + Pr [Y ∈ TBad] .
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This chapter was published as a paper at SAC2016 and was originally done concur-
rently to work by Gazˇi and Tessaro [33] on improving the sponge.prng design which
was published first and inspired several changes in our SAC2016 paper before its
eventual submission. We compare our design to their updated design. This paper
was also done concurrently to work by Andreeva, Daemen, Mennink and van Assche
[2] who also decided to apply the H-coefficient technique to the sponge construction
to prove security without using a differentiability proof.
We originally began work on modifying and improving the original sponge-based
design sponge.prng, as introduced in [18] and as presented in Section 2.5.3 and Sec-
tion 3.2.1. We designed an improved forward security measure and decided to call
the design Reverie. We initially tried to apply the indifferentiability framework to
analyse the design, however we discovered this was not applicable, as discussed in
Section 3.2.3. We then began modifying the security model and proved security using
the H-coefficient technique. Shortly afterwards, [33] was published and we decided
to adapt their security model modifications, in part to allow for easier comparison.
We altered our proofs to reflect this.
The design of Reverie draws on the Davies-Meyer construction [56, 26] for inspiration
for the feed-forward design, matching the simplicity of the sponge design. The design
was also influenced by the extensive analysis in [50, 19]. Introducing this measure
invalidates the design’s status as a sponge which affects the applicability of the
generic sponge security guarantee. We could have instead reformulated the sponge
security guarantee by proving indifferentiability of the new design with an “ideal”
PRNG.
This chapter first dictates the necessary preliminaries and the original sponge.prng
design before we present the sponge-like design Reverie. We also provide the updates
to the security model [29] from [33] that reflect the increased adversarial access af-
forded to the adversary in the security games due to the public random permutation
that is present in the sponge-based setting.
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3.1 Preliminaries
Here we provide a reminder of the necessary definitions and notions before proceed-
ing to the designs. More detail can be found in Sections 2.3 and 2.5.
3.1.1 Updates to Security Notions
Recall the following basic specification and notation of the sponge construction.
• A sponge is stateful, with an n-bit state si.
• The state s usually denoted with an identifier such as si, to refer to the i-th
state, is split into an inner state of c-bits, denoted by ŝi and outer state of
r-bits and is denoted si.
• We will often write the state as si = (si‖ŝi) where ‖ is the usual concatenation
of strings.
• The construction defined in this thesis utilises a public, random permutation
pi from the set Pn of all permutations on n-bits.
• We denote by ri+1 the output associated with the ith call to the generator
using next, which we denote as next(si) = (si+1, ri+1).
We require a slightly modified definition of a distribution sampler which we give
below in Definition 3.1.1, followed by an updated notion of what it means for a
distribution sampler D to be legitimate, given in Definition 3.1.2.
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Definition 3.1.1 (Originally from [29] but as amended in [33]). A Q-distribution
sampler is a randomised stateful oracle algorithm D which operates as follows:
• It takes a state σi, with initial state σ0 =⊥.
• Dpi(σi) outputs a tuple (σi,Si, γi, zi), where
– σi is the new state of Dpi,
– Si is a source with range [Si] ⊆ {0, 1}`i for some `i ≥ 1,
– γi is an entropy estimation for Si which will be discussed further below,
– zi is the leakage and/or auxiliary information about Si.
• When run qD times, the number of queries to the permutation pi made by Dpi
and S1, . . . ,SqD is at most Q(qD).
For simplicity, (σi, Ii, γi, zi)
$← Dpi(σi−1) is written as the overall process of running
D and the generated source Si. Next, we will require restriction to a certain class
of distribution samplers to avoid trivial wins for the adversary and to allow for the
public random permutation. We start with the following game, as given in [33,
Definition 3].
Let D be a distribution sampler, A an adversary and fix an i∗ ∈ [qD]. Let QD be
the set of all input-output pairs of permutation queries made by D and by all Sj for
j ∈ [qD]/{i∗}.
Then D is said to be a (qD, qpi)-legitimate distribution sampler if for every adversary
A making qpi queries and every i∗ ∈ [qD], all possible values of
(Ij)j∈[qD]/(i∗), (γ1, z1), . . . , (γqD , zqD), VA , QD,
potentially output by the game given in Figure 3.1 with positive probability,
Pr
[
Ii∗ = x | (Ij)j 6=i∗ , (γ1, z1), . . . , (γqD , zqD), VA , QD
]
≤ 2−γi∗ ,
for all x ∈ {0, 1}pi , which refers to the length of the Ii which can be of arbitrary
length but we assume are a-priori fixed parameters of the samplers.
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Game GLEGqpi ,i∗(A,D)
pi
$← Pn
for j = 1, . . . , qD do
(σi,Si, γi, zi) $← Dpi
Ii
$← Spii
VA
$← A((γj , zj)j∈[qD], (Ij)j∈[qD]/{i∗})
return ((I1, γ1, z1), . . . , (IqD , γqD , zqD ), VA , QD)
Figure 3.1: The game GLEG.
Definition 3.1.2 (Originally from [29] but as amended in [33]). A distribution
sampler D as defined above in Definition 3.1.1 is (qD, qpi)-legitimate, if, for every
adversary A making qpi queries, every i∗ ∈ [qD], and for any possible values
(Ij)j 6=i∗ , (γ1, z1), . . . , (γqD , zqD), VA , QD
potentially output by the game GLEGqD,i∗(A,D) with positive probability,
Pr
[
Ii∗ = x | (Ij)j 6=i∗ , (γ1, z1), . . . , (γqD , zqD), VA , QD
]
≤ 2−γi∗ ,
for all x ∈ {0, 1}`i∗ , where the probability is conditioned on these particular values
being output by the game.
3.2 Constructions
First we revisit the original sponge-based PRNG design of [18] as updated in [33].
The sponge.prng initialises a sponge in the usual way, with input materials being
absorbed via the outer state of the sponge and outputs being read also from the
outer state. There is an optional subroutine called p.forget that zeroes the outer
state after an output to make the generator forward secure. This introduces the
need to permute the state before each output, and then a further t times after the
output has been read from the outer state.
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p.forget(s0)
for k = 1 to t do
sk ← pi(sk−1)
sk ← (0r‖ŝk)
return st
sponge.prng.next(seed, si)
s0 ← pi(si)
ri+1 ← s0
si+1 ← p.forget(s0)
j ← 1
return (si+1, ri+1)
sponge.prng.setuppi()
for i = 0, . . . , u− 1 do
seedi
$← {0, 1}r
seed← (seed0, . . . ,
seedu−1)
j ← 1
return seedsponge.prng.refresh(seed, si, I)
si+1 ← pi((si ⊕ I ⊕ seedj)‖ŝi)
j ← j + 1 mod u
return si+1
Figure 3.2: The algorithms describing the behaviour of the sponge.prng.
3.2.1 The Design of sponge.prng
The sponge.prng design originally defined in [18] (which is given in Section 2.5.3)
with the additions from [33] including the addition of a seed, is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.1. Let n, r, c ∈ N, and let seed ∈ {0, 1}ur, t the number of times the
outer state is zeroed with u, t > 1, then
sponge.prngpiu,t,n,r := (sponge.prng.setup
pi, sponge.prng.refreshpi, sponge.prng.nextpi),
as described in Figure 3.2.
s0 s2
Iseedj
pi pi
r2
pi
t times
Figure 3.3: The sponge.prng in operation.
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We improve the design of the next algorithm to ensure our design is more efficient,
making a single call to the permutation pi, compared with 1 + t calls in the p.forget
procedure. This results in a design better suited for practical application, especially
those that restrict the number of calls to pi due to hardware or clock restraints, such
as smart card usage. Since the p.forget procedure of the previous design calls the
permutation 1 + t times, with zeroing, it presents the problem of increased collisions
in the state, something that is avoided by our design and thus our bound is mainly
limited by the collision factor associated with the refresh procedure. This potentially
makes our generator comparatively more secure, since the zeroing of the outer state
in the p.forget procedure means a collision in the inner state leads to a full-state
collision and thus an output cycle which is avoided in our design.
Our improved design can be seen in Figure 3.5 for further clarity. Although this
design departs slightly from the sponge design, it can still be captured by the more
generalised structure of the parazoa as defined in [3] which we explore in Section 3.6.
Given access to the underlying permutation function, our design can be easily im-
plemented.
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Reverie.setuppi()
for i = 0, . . . , u− 1 do
seedi
$← {0, 1}r
seed← (seed0, . . . , seedu−1)
j ← 1
return seed
Reverie.next(seed, si)
ri+1 ← si
si+1 ← (pi(si)⊕ (0r‖ŝi))
return (si+1, ri+1)
Reverie.refresh(seed, si, I)
si+1 ← pi((si ⊕ I ⊕ seedj)‖ŝi)
j ← j + 1 mod u
return si+1
Figure 3.4: The algorithms describing the behaviour of Reverie.
3.2.2 The Design of Reverie
The design of Reverie was inspired by the Davies-Meyer compression function af-
ter identifying that so many calls to the underlying permutation in the sponge.prng
p.forget procedure seemed very inefficient with room for improvement. We consid-
ered several different options, such as splitting the state and using one part to key
a permutation for the other part and vice versa, but decided on the Davies-Meyer
inspired option due to its simplicity.
Definition 3.2.2. Let n, r, c ≥ 1 and c := n− r, ` = p = r, together with pi $← Pn,
and seed seed ∈ {0, 1}ur with u > 1, then
Revpiu,n,r := (Reverie.setup
pi,Reverie.refreshpi,Reverie.nextpi),
as described in Figure 3.4.
s0 s2
Iseedj
pi
r2
pi
Figure 3.5: The Reverie PRNG in operation.
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3.2.3 Differentiability of the Construction
Unfortunately the indifferentiability proof of the sponge construction does not apply
to Reverie for several reasons; one is that Reverie is not a sponge and second, a random
oracle does not capture the behaviour of a PRNG nor the adversarial access afforded
to an adversary in the PRNG security model. Even if RO is replaced with some
notion of an ideal PRNG, the existence of the public random permutation prevents
an indifferentiability proof from being possible. We also note that the paper by
Ristenpart, Shacham and Shrimpton [51] implies that utilising an indifferentiability
result would not be possible in proving the robustness of the construction. This is
in part due to the security notions having multiple disjoint adversarial stages.
3.3 Security Notions in the Ideal Permutation Model
This section defines the notion of robustness originally from [29], but augmented as
in [33], to allow for the publicly available random permutation. Robustness is the
strongest security notion of the security model. We also include definitions of two
weaker notions of security; preserving and recovering security, which together imply
that a PRNG fulfils the requirements of robustness.
As per the definitions of [29], γ∗ refers to a minimal “fresh” entropy in the PRNG
system when security should be expected but below which is assumed to be com-
promised. Minimising γ∗ corresponds to a stronger security guarantee.
An adversary is modelled using a pair (A,D), where A is the actual qpi-query adver-
sary and D is a (qD, qpi)-legitimate distribution sampler. The adversary A’s goal is
to determine a challenge bit b picked during the initialise procedure; this procedure
also returns seed to the adversary.
Definition 3.3.1. A PRNG with input G is called ((qpi, qD, qR, qS), γ∗, rob)-robust
(robγ
∗
G ) if for any adversary A making at most qpi queries to pi±, making at most
qD calls to D−refresh, qR calls to next-ror/get-next and qS calls to get-state/set-state
and any legitimate distribution sampler D, the advantage of any adversary in the
robustness game is at most rob, which is defined in Equation (3.3.1). The adversary
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Procedure: Initialise ()
pi
$← Pn
seed
$← setuppi
s0
$← {0, 1}n
σ ←⊥
corrupt← false
e← n
b
$← {0, 1}
return seed
Procedure: Finalise (b∗)
if b = b∗ then
return 1
else
return 0
Procedure: get-state ()
e← 0
corrupt← true
return si
Oracle: pi(x)
return pi(x)
Oracle: pi−1(x)
return pi−1(x)
Procedure: set-state (s∗)
e← 0
corrupt← true
si ← s∗
Procedure: next-ror ()
(si+1, r0)← nextpi (seed, si)
r1
$← {0, 1}r
if corrupt = true
e← 0
return r0
else
return rb
Procedure: get-next ()
(si+1, ri+1)← nextpi (seed, si)
if corrupt = true then
e← 0
return ri+1
Procedure: D−refresh()
(σ, I, γ, z)
$← Dpi (σ)
si+1 ← refreshpi (seed, si, I)
e← e+ γ
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
return (γ, z)
Figure 3.6: The updated security procedures, updated from the original definitions
given in [29]. Boxed items indicate changes.
A has access to a subset of the following oracles, dependent on the security game
that it is playing; the full set is available in robγ
∗
G (A,D). We say that an adversarial
pair (A,D) playing the robustness game as described in Figure 3.6, with a PRNG
G, have advantage
Advγ
∗−rob
G (A,D) :=
∣∣∣2Pr [robγ∗G (A,D)⇒ 1]− 1∣∣∣ ≤ rob. (3.3.1)
Next, we define two further security notions: preserving security and recovering
security. If a PRNG satisfies both these notions then, by Theorem 1 of [29] (updated
in the IPM in [33, Theorem 4]), the generator in question satisfies the robustness
security notion under the corresponding parameters.
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PreserveG(A)
pi
$← Pn , seed $← setuppi() , b $← {0, 1}, s0 $← {0, 1}n
(I1, . . . , Id)← Api (seed)
for j = 1, . . . , d do
sj ← refreshpi (seed, sj−1, Ij)
(s0, r0)← nextpi (seed, sd)
(s1, r1)
$← {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r
b∗ ← Api (sb, rb)
return b == b∗
Figure 3.7: The security game for preserving security, updated from the original
definitions given in [29, Definition 4]. Boxed items indicate changes.
3.3.1 Preserving Security
Informally, preserving security states that if the state of a generator starts uncompro-
mised, and is refreshed using compromised input, then the next output and resulting
state are still indistinguishable from random.
Definition 3.3.2. A PRNG with input is said to have (qpi, p)-preserving security
if the advantage of any adversary A making at most qpi queries to pi± in the game
given in Figure 3.7 is at most p, where the advantage is defined to be
AdvpresG (A) := |2Pr [PreserveG(A)⇒ 1]− 1| ≤ p.
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Recover
(γ∗,qpi)
G (A,D)
pi
$← Pn , seed $← setuppi() , b $← {0, 1}, σ0 ←⊥
for k = 1, . . . , qD do
(σk, Ik, γk, zk)← Dpi (σk−1)
k ← 0
(s0, d)← Api,get-refresh (γ1, . . . , γqD , z1, . . . , zqD , seed)
if k + d > qD then return ⊥
else
if
k+d∑
j=k+1
γj < γ
∗ then return ⊥
else
for j = 1, . . . , d do
sj ← refreshpi (sj−1, Ik+j , seed)
(s0, r0)← nextpi (seed, sd)
(s1, r1)
$← {0, 1}n × {0, 1}r
b∗ ← Api ((sb, rb), Ik+d+1, . . . , IqD )
return b == b∗
Oracle get-refresh ()
k ← k + 1
return Ik
Figure 3.8: The security game for recovering security, updated from the original
definitions given in [29, Definitions 3]. Boxed items indicate changes.
3.3.2 Recovering Security
Informally, recovering security implies that if a PRNG is compromised, inserting
enough random entropy to refresh the internal state will ensure that the next output
and state will be indistinguishable from random.
Definition 3.3.3. A PRNG with input has (qpi, qD, γ∗, r)-recovering security if the
advantage of any adversary A making at most qD queries to pi± and distribution
sampler D, making at most Q(qD) queries to pi±, in the following game with γ∗ > 0
is at most r where advantage is defined as
Adv
(γ∗,qD)−rec
G (A,D) :=
∣∣∣2Pr [Recover(γ∗,qD)G ⇒ 1]− 1∣∣∣ ≤ r.
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3.4 Security Proofs
This section consists of the security proofs of Reverie; the approach is to analyse the
security of the next function as a PRG, which can then be applied in both preserving
and recovering security. We then focus on the preserving and recovering security
games, making use of the IPM composition theorem [33, Theorem 4].
Theorem 3.4.1.
For Reverie = Revpiu,n,r as defined in Definition 3.2.2, let γ
∗ > 0, let D be a (qD, qpi)-
legitimate distribution sampler, let qpi := qpi + Q(qD) and q̂ := qpi + qR + qDd.
Then Revpiu,n,r is ((qpi, qD, qR, qS), γ∗, r)-robust, for rob as defined in the following
equation:
Advγ
∗-rob
Revpiu,n,r
(A,D) ≤ qR ·
(
qpi + 1
2γ∗
+
Q(qD)
2ur
+
7(q̂2 + 1) + 29q̂
2c−1
+
(2d2 + 3)q̂ + d(3d+ 2d)
2n
)
.
Proof. The theorem is the result of the preserving and recovering security bounds
in Lemmas 3.4.11 and 3.4.13 respectively, combined by [33, Theorem 4], stated in
Theorem 2.3.10.
Lemma 3.4.2 (PRG security of the next function).
Let Ux be the uniform distribution over x-bit strings, let next be as defined in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, let s0
$← {0, 1}n, then for any qpi-query adversary A,
PRG := Adv
dist
A (next(Un), (Un,Ur)) ≤
(
2− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
+
3qpi
2c−1
=
(
5− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
.
Proof outline: Distinguishing between next(s0) and random output (s1, r1)
$←
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}r naively, it seems like the adversary’s only option is to guess the
inner state of the secret initial state, by either a direct forward query to pi or by an
indirect guess that would reveal a candidate for this inner state through a query to
pi−1.
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The proof proceeds by showing that this is in fact the optimal strategy. Since
there are two parts to the challenge, the logical approach is to split the proof into
first proving that one part of the challenge can be replaced with random, before
approaching the remaining part of the challenge.
We note that unlike [33], the next function requires a uniformly random state; the
difference is made up for in a game jump in the proof, but allows us to avoid an
additional call to pi, as is required in [33]. This step can be reinstated at the cost of
a single additional call to pi.
Proof. The formal proof proceeds by first defining three versions of the next algo-
rithm in Figure 3.9.
These algorithms are set up so that on input s0
$← {0, 1}n, next0 is precisely the
next function on input s0, while next2 has the same distribution as (Un,Ur). Lastly,
nextpi1 will be used as a hybrid game. Thus, by the triangle inequality,
AdvdistA (next(s0), (Un,Ur)) ≤AdvdistA (nextpi0 (s0), nextpi1 (s0))
+AdvdistA (next
pi
1 (s0), next2(s0)).
What follows is to prove the bound using the H-coefficient technique. As described
in Section 2.7.2, we assume that A is deterministic and makes qpi non-repeating
queries to the permutation pi, denoted as
τA := (x1, y1, z1), . . . , (xqpi , yqpi , zqpi),
Algorithm nextpi0 (s0)
t← s
t← pi(s0)
s← t⊕ (0r‖ŝ0)
return (s, t)
Algorithm nextpi1 (s0)
t
$← {0, 1}r
t← pi(s0)
s← t⊕ (0r‖ŝ0)
return (s, t)
Algorithm next2(s0)
t
$← {0, 1}r
s
$← {0, 1}n
return (s, t)
Figure 3.9: The algorithms nextpi0 , next
pi
1 , next2 used in proving the security of the
next function.
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where ∀i ∈ [1, . . . , qpi],
yi = pi(xi),
zi = yi ⊕ (0r‖x̂i).
In addition to the challenge, the adversary in this distinguishing game is also given
several other pieces of information at the end of the game, after all queries to pi have
been made, but before the adversary must output her decision. Formally, A is given
ŝ0 and t
′ := (s‖(ŝ0⊕ ŝ)) which it can compute for itself but is given for clarity. This
completes the definition of a transcript for these experiments,
τ := ((x1, y1, z1), . . . , (xqpi , yqpi , zqpi), ŝ0, t
′, (s, t)). (3.4.1)
We say a transcript τ is compatible with nextpi0 (s0) if it can be output in the ex-
periment where A receives nextpi0 (s0). Since nextpi1 (s0) and next2(s0) differ only by
replacing real output with random, it is clear that if a transcript is compatible with
nextpi0 (s0) then it is compatible with next
pi
1 (s0) and next2(s0).
What follows is bounding the probability of different transcripts from each experi-
ment.
Lemma 3.4.3.
For the experiments nextpi0 (s0), next
pi
1 (s0) as described in Figure 3.9,
AdvdistA (next
pi
0 (s0), next
pi
1 (s0)) ≤
(
2− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
+ 0 =
(
2− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
.
Proof. First we define the bad transcripts for this pair of experiments:
Definition 3.4.4 (Bad transcripts TBad for (nextpi0 (s0)nextpi1 (s0))). A compatible
transcript as in Equation (3.4.1), is called a bad transcript if either of the following
occur:
State Collision (SC): ∃j ∈ [qpi] such that xj = (t‖ŝ0),
Image Collision (IC): ∃j ∈ [qpi] such that yj = t′.
The set of bad transcripts is denoted TBad.
Let X0, Y0 be the random variables outputting transcripts that describe when A
interacts with nextpi0 (s0) and next
pi
1 (s0) respectively.
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Lemma 3.4.5.
For an adversary making no more than qpi ≤ 2c−1 queries to an oracle in the exper-
iment next1(s0),
Pr [Y0 ∈ TBad] ≤
(
2− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
.
Proof. Note that if Y0 ∈ TBad then SC ∨ IC must occur.
Pr [Y0 ∈ TBad] ≤ Pr [SC] + Pr [IC | ¬SC] .
The first probability is relatively easy to bound:
Pr [SC] ≤ qpi
2c−1
. (3.4.2)
Since the adversary is given t at the start of the game and s0 is uniformly distributed
over all the 2c n-bit strings with outer bits equal to t, and recalling that qpi ≤ 2c−1,
the probability that A’s i-th query is of the form ((t‖ŝ0), yi, zi) is 12c−i+1 . More
formally, let Pr [wini] := Pr [xi = (t‖ŝ0)], then
Pr [win] ≤
qpi∑
i=1
Pr [wini] =
qpi∑
i=1
1
2c − i+ 1
≤
qpi∑
i=1
1
2c − 2c−1 =
qpi
2c−1
.
The second, since SC has not occurred, must be where the adversary is interacting
with nextpi1 (s0), where t was chosen uniformly at random from r-bit strings, and
as such, was not used to produce s. There is the possibility that the randomly
chosen t matches the real value of s0 which is reflected in the factor of
(
1− 12r
)
in
Equation (3.4.3).
The second probability is similar, in that the adversary has knowledge of s, with
(s‖(ŝ0 ⊕ ŝ)) uniformly distributed over all the 2c n-bit strings with outer bits equal
to s. It is also assumed that a SC has not occurred, meaning nothing beyond ŝ0 is
known about s0. Then, similarly to above,
Pr [IC | ¬SC] ≤
(
1− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
. (3.4.3)
Equation (3.4.3), together with Equation (3.4.2), complete the lemma.
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Lemma 3.4.6.
For all compatible transcripts τ ∈ TGood,
Pr [X0 = τ ] = Pr [Y0 = τ ] .
Proof. For all τ ∈ TGood (and for pi $← Pn),
Pr [X0 = τ ] =
Pr [∀i ∈ [qpi], pi(xi) = yi] · Pr [pi(s0) = (s‖(ŝ0 ⊕ ŝ)) | ¬SC ∨ ¬IC]
=
1
2r
2r
(2n − qpi − 1)!
2n!
= Pr [Y1 = τ ] .
Putting Lemmas 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 together yields the result.
Next, we prove the following:
Lemma 3.4.7.
For the experiments nextpi1 (s0), next2(s0) as described in Figure 3.9 and by Theo-
rem 2.7.7,
AdvdistA (next
pi
1 (s0), next2(s0)) ≤
3qpi
2c−1
+ 0 =
3qpi
2c−1
.
Proof. This time the transcript is slightly different, in that the adversary is given
the entire s0 at the end of her queries to pi, so
τ := ((x1, y1, z1), . . . , (xqpi , yqpi , zqpi), s0, t
′, (s, t)).
Comparing the distributions of these two experiments yields one more bad event,
along with a modified state collision and unchanged image collision:
Definition 3.4.8 (Bad transcripts TBad for (nextpi1 (s0), next2(s0))). A compatible
transcript as above, is called a bad transcript if any of the following occur:
State Collision (SC): ∃j ∈ [qpi] such that xj = s0,
Image Collision (IC): ∃j ∈ [qpi] such that yj = t′,
Inversion (IN): ∃j ∈ [qpi] such that zj = s.
The set of bad transcripts is denoted TBad.
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Let X1, Y1 be the random variables outputting transcripts that describe when A
interacts with nextpi1 (s0) and next2(s0) respectively.
Lemma 3.4.9.
For an adversary making no more than qpi ≤ 2c−1 queries to an oracle in the exper-
iment next2(s0),
Pr [Y1 ∈ TBad] ≤ qpi
2n−1
+
(
2− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
=
2qpi
2c−1
.
Proof. Note that if Y1 ∈ TBad then SC ∨ IC ∨ IN must occur, and thus:
Pr [Y1 ∈ TBad] ≤ Pr [SC] + Pr [IC | SC] + Pr [IN | ¬SC ∧ ¬IC] .
The first probability is similar to before, but this time the adversary knows that s
(with high probability) was not queried to pi to produce the challenge. This results
in the following:
Pr [SC] ≤ qpi
2n−1
.
The second probability is similar to the case where an IC occurs in a transcript
in either nextpi0 (s0) or next
pi
1 (s0). Once again since ŝ0 is uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}c, the probability that any of the adversary’s queries (xi) = yi or pi−1(yi) = xi
is such that yi = (s‖ŝ⊕ ŝ0) is at most 12c−i+1 resulting in the bound qpi2c−1 . It is also
assumed that a SC has not occurred, meaning nothing beyond ŝ0 is known about
s0. Thus,
Pr [IC | ¬SC] ≤
(
1− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
.
Lastly, if neither a SC or IC has occurred, the probability of an IN can be expressed
as
Pr
[
pi−1(s‖ŷi) = (x̂i‖(ŷi ⊕ ŝ))
]
,
which again is bounded by qpi
2c−1 and together with the other events, yields the desired
bound.
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Lemma 3.4.10.
For all compatible transcripts τ ∈ TGood,
Pr [ΩX1 = τ ] = Pr [ΩY1 = τ ] .
For all τ ∈ TGood (and for pi $← Pn),
Proof.
Pr [X1 = τ ] = Pr [∀i ∈ [qpi], pi(xi) = yi] · Pr [pi(s0) = (s‖(ŝ0 ⊕ ŝ)) | ¬SC ∨ ¬IC ∨ ¬IN]
=
(2n − qpi − 1)!
2n!
=
(2n − qpi)!
2n
· 1
2n − qpi = Pr [Y1 = τ ] .
Putting Lemmas 3.4.9 and 3.4.10 together yields the result.
Finally, these two lemmas complete the proof of the security of next.
3.4.1 Preserving Security
Now that we have this tool, we can prove the following:
Lemma 3.4.11.
Given Reverie as defined in Section 3.2.2, and with PRG as above, then for every qpi-
query adversary A playing the preserving security game defined in Definition 3.3.2
with d adversarial refresh inputs, we have
AdvpresRevpiu,n,r
(A) ≤ PRG(qpi) + qpi
′ + d
2n
+
(d+ 1)(2qpi
′ + d)
2n
≤ 5qpi
2c−1
+
(2d+ 3)qpi + d(d+ 2)
2n
,
for qpi
′ := |τ ′A | ≤ qpi.
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Proof outline The proof relies on proving that for a random secret initial state
s0, the resulting state sd will look random and thus, by our previous analysis of the
next function, the challenge output will also be random.
Proof. Formally, we adapt the preserving security game, so that the intermediate
state sd is chosen uniformly at random rather than calculated using the adversarial
inputs.
Let A be the adversary playing in the preserving security game. Define τ ′A to be
as in Equation (3.4.1); the set of adversarial queries, but, restricted to only those
made in the first part of the game, before the adversary has submitted her inputs
and such that |τ ′A | := qpi ′ ≤ qpi. Let I1, . . . , Id be the r-bit adversarial refresh inputs.
Let PreserveRevpi be the real world preserving security game as defined in Defini-
tion 3.3.2 with the defined algorithms of Reverie and chosen permutation pi. Let
Preserve′Revpi be identical to PreserveRevpi except sd is replaced with sd
$← {0, 1}n.
We now aim to prove in two parts that, in the real world case, the first two games
act the same with a small bound while in the ideal world case, they are identi-
cal. Following this, what remains is to prove that the advantage of an adversary
in distinguishing the ideal world from the real world in Preserve′ is precisely the
security bound of the next function from Lemma 3.4.2. For clarity, we say that
PreserveRevpi(A)→ 1 means the adversary outputs 1 as her guess of b.
Lemma 3.4.12.
For PreserveRevpi and Preserve
′
Revpi where the former is as described in Definition 3.3.2
and with the latter identical except sd
$← {0, 1}n,∣∣∣Pr [PreserveARevpi → 1 | b = 0]− Pr [Preserve′ARevpi → 1 | b = 0]∣∣∣
≤ qpi
′ + d
2n
+
(d+ 1)(2qpi
′ + d)
2n
.
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Proof. To begin, we note that s0
$← {0, 1}n, and is not revealed to the adversary.
With this in mind, using lazy sampling of the permutation pi (each new output is
generated ad-hoc depending on what has been previously queried and output), we
have
Pr
[∃i ∈ [qpi ′]s.t.xi = s0 ⊕ ((I1 ⊕ seed1)‖0c)] ≤ qpi ′
2n−1
.
Provided that this does not happen, the first intermediate state of the adversarial
refreshes will be an unassigned value s1 which will be uniformly chosen over the
remaining 2n − qpi ′ unassigned values of pi, and thus the probability that the next
call to pi will be on an already assigned value will be qpi
′+1
2n−1 . Iterating this method,
we obtain:
qpi
′
2n−1
+
qpi
′ + 1
2n−1
+ · · ·+ qpi
′ + d
2n−1
=
d(2qpi
′ + (d+ 1))
2n
.
So, with probability 1− qpi ′
2n−1 +
d(2qpi ′+(d+1)
2n = 1− (d+1)(2qpi
′+d)
2n , the resulting state sd
after the adversarial refreshes will be the result of pi called on an unassigned state.
Then sd will be chosen uniformly from the remaining 2
n−qpi ′−d unassigned values.
Finally, this implies the statistical distance between sd in PreserveRevpi and sd in
Preserve′Revpi is at most
qpi ′+d
2n , which, together with the previous probability, yields
the result.
Next, construct an adversary A′ that runs A and simulates the Preserve′ game while
inserting its own challenge and outputting the same bit as A, which yields∣∣∣Pr [PreserveARevpi → 1 | b = 0]− Pr [Preserve′ARevpi → 1 | b = 1]∣∣∣
≤ AdvdistA′ (nextpi(Un), (Un,Ur)).
This, together with Lemma 3.4.12, completes the proof.
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3.4.2 Recovering Security
Thanks to the result of [33], the proof of recovering security can be expressed as an
adaptation of their result; using the sponge as an extractor and the security of the
next function. To formalise this:
Lemma 3.4.13.
Let qpi, qpi := qpi+Q(qD), r, s, c be as in Section 3.2.2. Let ext(qpi, qD) be as described
in [33, Section 5.3] and let next(qpi) be the bound as in Lemma 3.4.2 as a function of
qpi; both with n, r, c as previously described. Given Reverie, also as in Section 3.2.2,
γ∗ > 0, qD ≥ 0,A, a qpi-query adversary against recovering security, and D, a
(qD, qpi)-legitimate distribution sampler as defined in Definition 3.1.2. Then,
Adv
(γ∗,qpi)-rec
Revpiu,n,r
(A,D) ≤ ext(qpi + 1, qD) + 2next(qpi) + qpi
2n−1
≤ qpi + 1
2γ∗
+
Q(qD)
2ur
+
7(q2pi + 1) + 24qpi
2c−1
+
(qpi + 1)d+ d
2 + qpi − 2qpi
2n−1
.
Proof outline: The strategy of the proof is to use the extractor properties of the
sponge to replace the resulting state with a random state; following this the output
of next will be random by the arguments of Lemma 3.4.2.
Proof. To formalise this, we require the construction of two adversaries, A1,A2 with
the former being a (qpi+1)-adversary for the extraction lemma of [33] and the latter,
a qpi-adversary in the next distinguishing game. Then we have,
Adv
(γ∗,qpi)−rec
Revpiu,n,r
(A,D) ≤ Adv(γ∗,qD)-extSpn,r,u (A1) + Adv
dist
A2 (next
pi(Un), (Un,Ur)). (3.4.4)
Let A be the normal recovering security adversary, then A1 is built by running A
on seed, γ1, . . . , γqD , z1, . . . , zqD received from the challenger, A1 forwards any pi±
queries from A to the pi oracle, along with any get-refresh oracle queries to the
associated oracle. Once this has been done, A will output it’s chosen pair (s0, d),
which A1 will again forward to the challenger as its chosen pair.
The challenger will then return the challenge s′d and the remaining Ik+d+1, . . . , IqD
to A1, which forwards the latter straight to A along with the output of next(s′d)
which it computes. A1 continues to forward any pi± queries that A makes, before A
79
3.4 Security Proofs
makes it’s guess b∗, which A1 forwards to the challenger as its own guess. Since A1
only forwards the queries A makes to pi± together with calling next(s′d), the query
complexity of A1 is qpi + 1.
For b = 0, this simulates precisely the recovering security game, while b = 1 cor-
responds to A receiving (s, t) ← next(Un), as opposed to the correct challenge
(s, t)
$← (Un,Ur). This is considered in the second term of Equation (3.4.4). A2
is now constructed by simulating the b = 1 version of the extraction game, while
running A1 and using the distinguishing challenge.
Finally, all that is left is to upper bound these advantages; [33, Lemma 6] yields
Adv
(γ∗,qD)-ext
Spn,r,u
(A1) ≤ ext(qpi + 1, qD) + Adv(γ
∗,qD)−hit
D,n (A1),
where the latter value is precisely the probability that A1 queries pi−1(sd) in the
ideal case. Since A1 is only making queries to pi that A makes, this is in fact the
probability that A queries pi−1(sd), and since A would either have to guess this
value with probability qpi
2n−1 or have to invert the next challenge to have made this
query, this is in fact the advantage of A2 playing the distinguishing game on the
next function, albeit with qpi queries, due to the queries by the distribution sampler.
Thus, by Lemma 3.4.2 we have
PRG(qpi) ≤
(
5− 1
2r
)
qpi
2c−1
,
and
ext(qpi + 1) ≤ qpi
2γ∗
+
Q(qD)
2ur
+
7(q2pi + 2qpi + 1)
2c
+
(qpi + 1)qD + qD2
2n−1
,
which completes the proof.
Comparing our bound to the bound proved in [33], the expected reduction from t+1
to 1 calls is easily seen in the numerators, especially the 12n term, which contains a
large number of multiplied terms. Both bounds are still dominated by the extraction
bound, though our bound overall is improved, especially in the situation with a small
outer state size r, which is where the sponge.prng performs poorest due to the p.forget
procedure.
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3.5 Practical Comparison
For completeness, we ran timing tests of both Reverie and the sponge.prng with
various parameters set, both utilising the relevant Keccak permutation. The imple-
mentations were done in python and included calls to the respective forward security
measures of each design after each block of output. In keeping with the underlying
Keccak permutations, we tested the constructions on b = 400, 800, and 1600, with
` = 512, 1024, and 4096 respectively. For ease and time saving, we precomputed ini-
tial states for each test and set them for better analysis of the output mechanisms;
this equates to a generator that has been initialised and absorbed sufficient entropy
to be in a random state.
In Section 3.2.1, we theorised that, in terms of calls to the underlying permutation pi,
Reverie takes time
⌈
`
r
⌉
, while sponge.prng takes 1 +
⌈
`
r
⌉ ⌈
c
r
⌉
time. In reality, Reverie
also has the more complex XOR while sponge.prng zeroes states but this should not
affect findings too drastically.
3.5.1 Results
We present our predictions and findings in Table 3.1 with associated graphs (Fig-
ures 3.10a to 3.10c) for visual aid.
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b = 400, ` = 512
Reverie sponge.prng
Prediction 2pi 3pi ≈ 1.5×
r = 256 2.19ms 4.27ms
Actual 1× ≈ 2×
Prediction 4pi 9pi ≈ 2×
r = 144 3.27ms 10.4ms
Actual 1× ≈ 3×
b = 800, ` = 1024
Reverie sponge.prng
Prediction 2pi 3pi ≈ 1.5×
r = 544 1.3ms 3.41ms
Actual 1× ≈ 2.5×
Prediction 4pi 9pi ≈ 2×
r = 256 4.89ms 10.83ms
Actual 1× ≈ 2×
b = 1600, ` = 4096
Reverie sponge.prng
Prediction 4pi 9pi ≈ 2×
r = 1088 4.64ms 9.5ms
Actual 1× ≈ 2×
Prediction 8pi 17pi ≈ 2×
r = 576 10.13ms 28.45ms
Actual 1× ≈ 3×
Table 3.1: Timing test results, where results given in terms of pi are calls to the
permutation pi.
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3.5.2 Conclusion
Our results agree with our predictions, bar a few cases such as b = 800.r = 544
where Reverie performs better than expected. This could be due to several factors
in the Python deployment, or the XOR vs zeroing steps in the constructions, but
remains close to our predictions. Ideally, we would compare our results with well
known Crypto libraries, but this would require implementing the generators in C
or C++ with a higher level of knowledge of optimising software than the authors
possess.
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3.6 Extension to Parazoa
Although Reverie cannot be described as a sponge, it does fit into the generalised
family of parazoa, as described in Section 2.6. We remove the seed mechanism
in favour of the vanilla sponge padding scheme, together with the vanilla sponge’s
finalise algorithm that concatenates and truncates output. Removing the seed is
necessary for both the padding and finalise functions to meet the requirements set
out in Definitions 2.6.5 and 2.6.6. We also note that the reason for the seed is to
“blind” adversarial input, whereas in the context of a parazoa function this is not
necessary or could be incorporated into the f1 function, with each seed hard coded
into f1. Following Definition 2.6.7, we describe Reverie as a (`b, r, `total, r, n)-parazoa
with f1, f2, g1 as described in the sponge function, together with g2 given as the feed
forward operation.
Proposition 3.6.1.
For Reverie as defined above, the capacity loss d = 0.
Proof. This follows in the same way as the sponge construction. To be precise, the
first criterion in Definition 2.6.8, the capacity loss d is 0. We require that for a fixed
x and a fixed output r, f1(s, I) = x for some I and g1(s) = r. The former fixes the
inner state which is left fixed by f1 and is thus entirely defined by the value x, while
the latter fixes the outer r-bits of s that match r.
What remains is to prove that g2 is a bijection on the state which given full knowledge
of pi, along with si, si+1 is trivial.
Then by [3, Theorem 1] Reverie has
AdvproRevpi ,sim(D) = O
(
((K + `b)q1 + q2)
2
2n−r
)
.
This matches the derived indifferentiability bound of the sponge, meaning our design
does not reduce security in this setting and may present an alternate avenue to prove
robustness via indifferentiability from an idealised PRNG.
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3.7 Conclusion
We have presented an updated construction, Reverie, for a sponge-like PRNG. The
construction incorporates an effective and efficient forward-security mechanism and
we have provided proofs of both preserving and recovering security in the chosen
security model. Our design makes a single call to the permutation on every invoca-
tion of Reverie.next, while the comparable generators make 1 + t calls. Our design
choice ensures the underlying permutation is called far fewer times. Thus, the loss
of security from collisions is reduced when compared to the relevant bounds of other
designs.
The main limiting factor of the bound relates to the recovering security bound; and
more precisely the extraction bound. This begs the question: can this bound be
improved? This is briefly discussed in [33] in the present setting, but we would
also like to consider other, possibly similar, mechanisms that may present a better
security bound; for instance, would a full state refresh yield a better bound? Work by
Mennink, Reyhanitabar and Viza´r [44] suggests there may be room for improvement.
A full state refresh, however, enables in practise an adversary to more easily affect
or even set the state of the generator. The generation of output could be modified to
only make use of the feed-forward after several outputs to reduce the complexity of
the next function. This would give rise to a second version of Reverie when viewed
as a parazoa.
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This chapter extends the security model of Dodis et al.[29], motivated by the design
of the NIST PRNGs [7]. The principle aim of this extension is to better capture the
possible ways the NIST PRNGs may be used in practise, allowing for a generate sub-
routine that performs a “small” state update between outputs. Other aims include
better modelling the setup phase of a PWI, allowing for more accurate analysis of
cold boot situations where sufficient entropy may not be available to the generator.
We begin by recalling and building upon the definition of a PWI (PRNG with input),
with our own definition of a variable-output PWI. We then update the notion of a
masking function from [55] with the idea of a split masking function, which will be
useful in later security proofs when a state contains, by design, non-random parts.
We then update the notion of robustness, followed by preserving and recovering
security. Once these notions have been established, we are able to update the com-
bination proof that implies robustness from having both preserving and recovering
security.
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4.1 Preliminaries
To analyse the NIST PRNG constructions we will require an extended definition of
a PWI, building on [29] and the additions of non-random parts of the state with the
use of masking functions by Shrimpton-Terashima [55]. Our extended definitions
will allow calls to the next function to request a varying amount of output, within
a limit, as opposed to a set amount. This will capture PWIs that have a subroutine
and an extra input to deal with requests that are over a certain length, yet only
update the internal state once. This ability for the adversary to vary the amount of
output is an almost mirror of the update the authors of [29] made to the security
notion of refreshing the generator from [4] to enable an adversary to slowly feed
entropy into the generator as opposed to all at once. Shrimpton and Terashima [55]
add another field called IFace which refers to the interface to which the adversary is
making a request. However, this does not help us in terms of analysing the NIST
constructions, unless an implementation allowed for an interface that called the PWI
with the derivation function enabled and another without the derivation function.
Consequently we only consider a single interface.
Recall the original definition of the distribution sampler as given in [29] and Defini-
tion 2.3.1.
Definition 4.1.1. The distribution sampler D is a stateful and probabilistic algo-
rithm which, given the current state σ, outputs a tuple (σ′, I, γ, z) where:
• σ′ is the new state for D,
• I ∈ {0, 1}p is the next input for the refresh algorithm,
• γ is some fresh entropy estimation of I,
• z is the leakage about I given to the adversary A.
Let qD be the maximum number of calls to D in our security games. Then it is said
that D is legitimate if, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , qD},
H∞(Ij |I1, . . . , Ij−1, Ij+1, . . . , IqD , z1, . . . , zqD , γ1, . . . , γqD) ≥ γj ,
where H∞ is the minimum entropy function as defined in Definition 2.1.4.
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We model an adversary using a pair (A,D), where A is the actual adversary and D
is a stateful distribution sampler. The adversary A’s goal is to determine a challenge
bit b picked during the initialise procedure, which also returns the public parameters
to the attacker.
The following definition is the updated definition from [55].
Definition 4.1.2 (PWI). Let p, ` ∈ N, let IFace, Seedspace, Statespace, be non-
empty sets. A PRNG with input (PWI) with interface set IFace, seed space Seedspace,
and state space Statespace, is a tuple of deterministic algorithms
G = (setup, refresh, next, tick), where
• setup: takes no input, and generates an initial PWI state s0 ∈ Statespace.
Although setup itself is deterministic, it may be provided oracle access to
an entropy source D, in which case its output s0 will be a random variable
determined by the random coins of D.
• refresh: Seedspace×Statespace×{0, 1}p −→ Statespace is a deterministic algo-
rithm that takes a seed seed ∈ Seedspace, the current PWI state si ∈ Statespace,
and a string Ij ∈ {0, 1}p as input, and returns a new state si+1 ∈ Statespace.
• next: Seedspace × IFace × Statespace −→ Statespace × ({0, 1}` ∪ {⊥}) is a
deterministic algorithm that, given seed, an interface label m ∈ IFace, and the
current state si ∈ Statespace, returns a new state si+1 ∈ Statespace, and either
an `-bit output value ri+1 ∈ {0, 1}` or a distinguished symbol ⊥.
• tick: Seedspace × Statespace −→ Statespace is a deterministic algorithm that
takes the seed seed ∈ Seedspace and the current state si as input, and returns
a new state si+1.
It should be noted that this definition assumes that the seed is generated externally
and provided to the PWI. The definition of a PWI is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Definition of a PWI.
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We extend Definitions 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 in several ways:
• The distribution sampler will output an initial value I0 which may be a con-
catenation of several outputs, which is independent of all other outputs and is
used solely in the setup algorithm to generate the initial generator state.
• We add functionality to next so that each call can request a specific amount
of output, bounded above by a parameter `max. This reflects the capability
of some generators to generate a varying amount of output per state update,
often using a different subroutine to do so, or by just truncating output.
• We add a separate algorithm seedgen to model the generation of the seed. This
is to capture the notion that in practice the seed cannot in general be chosen
uniformly at random; the seed must be generated using either system entropy
or be a fixed value. In our theoretical setting however, this becomes restrictive
on D since there must be a certain amount of separation between entropy used
to generate the seed and entropy inputs to the generator.
One alternative option would be to have an entirely separate entropy source
just for generating the seed. This is unlikely to be the case in practice due to
the difficultly in providing good, independent entropy sources for the generator.
There is also the question of whether providing more “good” entropy sources
would negate the need for the seed; even if each entropy source was again
modelled adversarially, albeit without the ability to communicate with the
distinguisher or other entropy sources.
• We modify the algorithm setup slightly to take as input the public seed seed,
which may be used in creation of the initial state s0. The algorithm setup is
also given access to the entropy source. The latter generates a special I0 that
contributes to the creation of the initial state. We add several changes to D to
reflect this change and how this entropic I0 must be independent of the other
entropy values produced by D.
The changes made to the setup algorithm are a conscious choice that could
easily have been incorporated into the refresh algorithm. For example, a PWI
state could include a single bit that represents whether the generator has been
initialised. If this bit is set to 0 then the refresh algorithm would run in a
different way to normal that would represent the initialisation of the state of
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the PWI. We decided to alter the definition of the setup algorithm to be more
concrete in separating and highlighting this aspect of the design of a PWI.
4.2 Definition of a VOPWI
Formally, we have the following definition of a Variable-Output PRNG with Input:
Definition 4.2.1 (VOPWI). Let p, `i, `max ∈ N, let IFace, Seedspace, Statespace, be
non-empty sets. A variable-output PRNG with input (VOPWI) with maximum out-
put size `max ≥ `i, with interface set IFace, seed space Seedspace, and state space
Statespace, is a tuple of deterministic algorithmsG = (seedgen, setup, refresh, next, tick),
where
• seedgen is a randomised algorithm that outputs seed ∈ Seedspace.
• setup is a deterministic algorithm that takes input seed, and is provided access
to the entropy source D which passes I0 to setup. setup generates and outputs
an initial VOPWI state s0 ∈ Statespace.
• refresh: Seedspace×Statespace×{0, 1}p −→ Statespace is a deterministic algo-
rithm that takes a seed seed ∈ Seedspace, the current PWI state si ∈ Statespace,
and a string Ij ∈ {0, 1}p as input, and returns a new state si+1 ∈ Statespace.
• next: Seedspace× IFace×Statespace×1≤`max → Statespace×({0, 1}≤`max ∪{⊥})
is a deterministic algorithm that, given seed, an interface label m ∈ IFace, the
current state si, and the encoding of an integer `i+1 ≤ `max, and returns a
new state si+1, and either an output value ri+1 ∈ {0, 1}`i+1 or a distinguished,
symbol ⊥. If the generator never outputs ⊥ then it is called “non-blocking”.
• tick: Seedspace × Statespace −→ Statespace is a deterministic algorithm that
takes a seed seed and the current state si ∈ Statespace as input, and returns a
new state si+1 ∈ Statespace.
The definition of a VOPWI is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Definition of a VOPWI.
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Definition 4.2.2. The distribution sampler D is a stateful and probabilistic algo-
rithm which, given the current state σ, outputs a tuple (σ′, I, γ, z) where:
• σ′ is the new state for D,
• I ∈ {0, 1}p is the next input for the refresh algorithm,
• γ is some fresh entropy estimation of I,
• z is the leakage about I given to the adversary A.
In addition, we require that the distribution sampler outputs a special initial value
I0, which we define as the totality of outputs from D given as input to the algorithm
setup. We do the same for γ0 and z0. Often, we will assume γ0 is enough to ensure
the initial state generated is uniformly random, and z0 = ∅. We will state this
explicitly when we assume it.
Let qD be the maximum number of calls to D in our security games. Then it is said
that D is legitimate if, for all j ∈ {0, . . . , qD},
H∞(Ij |I0, . . . , Ij−1, Ij+1, . . . , IqD , z0, . . . , zqD , γ0, . . . , γqD) ≥ γj .
Because of the special requirements on the initial I0 we now also require I0 to be
independent of all the other refresh values, leakage and estimates and to satisfy a
new minimum entropy requirement γ0.
It may be possible that we only require
H∞(I0|I1, . . . , IqD , z0, . . . , zqD , γ0, . . . , γqD) = H∞(I0) ≥ γ0.
This is a slight weakening of independence since there may be a difference in the
actual amount of entropy of I0. However, as an example, we could define a distri-
bution sampler such that the first bit of I0 and I1 are always the same and skewed
towards 1, while the remaining bits are chosen uniformly at random. The minimum
entropy of I0 given I1 would be equal, but this first bit could dictate a particular
way the setup algorithm is run. This knowledge gives an adversary in possession of
the first bit of I1 a non-negligible advantage.
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4.3 Masking Functions
In this section we will provide an overview of masking functions, as introduced in
[55]. before updating them for our purposes and our new definition of a VOPWI.
Masking functions allow for non-uniform state, be it a counter or other unchanging
or predictively changing parts of the state. It is still required that a part of the state
is unpredictable to an attacker. This allows for proper modelling of generators that
use states consisting of non-random parts along with an unpredictable, high-entropy
part.
Formally, a masking function is defined as follows:
Definition 4.3.1 (Masking Function). Let Statespace be as defined in Definition 4.1.2.
A masking function M is a randomised algorithm M : Statespace→ Statespace, that
takes a state as input and outputs an ideal state.
As an example, let a state be of the form (a, b), where a is a collection of static or
predictable fields, while b is a high-entropy buffer, and define M(s) := (a, b′) where
b′ is sampled from some distribution by M.
The purpose of a masked state is to capture what characterises a “good” or perfect
PWI state, for example, M(s) should be indistinguishable from a state s that has
accumulated enough entropy. Since a masked state should produce such a “good”
state, a PWI called on such a state should produce pseudo-random output.
Of particular interest is the initial state of the PWI, s0. Initialise is modified slightly
from the original definition given in Figure 2.4 as described in Figure 4.3; where the
setup algorithm is given access to the entropy source. At this point we start thinking
of an entropy source D, which we will later place restrictions on similar to the
distribution sampler. The behaviour of Initialise motivates the following definition:
Definition 4.3.2 (Honest-Initialisation Masking Functions). Let D be an entropy
source, G = (setup, refresh, next, tick) be a PWI with statespace Statespace,A an
adversary and M : Statespace → Statespace a masking function. Let (seed, Z) be a
random variable output by running the initialise procedure (Figure 4.3), and s0 be
93
4.3 Masking Functions
Procedure: Initialise ()
σ ← 0, e← 0, x← −1
seed
$← seedgen
I0
$← ES
s0 ← setup(I0)
e← γ0
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
b
$← {0, 1}
return (seed, (γ0, z0))
Figure 4.3: The updated procedure Initialise. The boxed item denotes the change
from the original definition in Figure 2.4.
the PWI state produced by this procedure. Set
AdvinitG,D,M(A) = Pr [A(s0, seed, Z) =⇒ 1]− Pr [A(M(s0), seed, Z) =⇒ 1] .
If AdvinitG,D,M(A) ≤ h for all adversaries A running in time t, then M is said to be a
(G,D, t, h)-honest-initialisation masking function.
The definition of an honest-initialisation masking function is made with respect to a
specific entropy source D, making the assumptions required of D dependent on the
PWI in question, but these assumptions should be as weak as possible.
Following this definition we now define the notion of “bootstrapped” security, which
refers to when a PWI starts from an “ideal” state, i.e. what we expect after a secure
initialisation of the system.
Definition 4.3.3 (Bootstrapped Security). Let G be a PWI and M be a masking
function. For x ∈ {fwd, bwd, res, rob} as defined in Section 2.3.1, let Advx/MG,D (A) be
defined as AdvxG,D(A) (as defined in Definition 2.3.6), but changing the procedure
Initialise to the procedure given in Figure 4.4.
These new notions are useful, since they allow us to work with an idealised ini-
tial state. However, it is necessary to prove that the masking function fully and
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Procedure: Initialise ()
σ ← 0, e← 0, x← −1
seed
$← seedgen
I0
$← ES
s0 ← setup(I0)
e← γ0
s0 ← M(s0)
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
b
$← {0, 1}
return (seed, (γ0, z0))
Figure 4.4: The updated procedure Initialise for bootstrapped security. The boxed
item denotes the change from the definition in Figure 4.3.
accurately reflects the setup procedure being run.
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Theorem 4.3.4 (from Theorem 1.6 of [55]).
Let G be a PWI, D an entropy source, and M a masking function. Suppose that M
is a (G,D, t, h)-honest initialisation mask. Then for any x ∈ {fwd, bwd, res, rob} as
defined in Section 2.3.1, there exists some adversary B(·) such that for any adversary
A,
AdvxG,D(A) ≤ Advx/MG,D (B(A)) + h.
If it takes time t′ to compute M, A makes q queries and runs in time t, then B(A)
makes q queries and runs in time O(t) + t′.
The authors of [55] proceed by proving an analogy of [29, Theorem 1]. The theo-
rem shows that if a PWI satisfies two simpler notions of security, called preserving
and recovering security, as defined in Definitions 2.3.7 and 2.3.8, then the PWI in
question satisfies the conditions of robustness in the Shrimpton-Terashima setting.
This Shrimpton-Terashima setting refers to the authors’ extended definitions of the
original definitions of [29].
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Theorem 4.3.5 (Informal).
Let G be a PWI and suppose there exists a split masking function M such that
1. When starting from an arbitrary initial state s0 of the adversary’s choosing,
the final PWI state s is indistinguishable from M(s′0), provided the PWI obtains
sufficient entropy specified by the construction. This requirement is formalised
as recovering security.
2. When starting from an initial state M(s′0) (adversarially chosen s′0), the final
PWI state s is indistinguishable from M(s), even if the adversary controls
the intervening entropy inputs. This requirement is formalised as preserving
security.
3. G produces pseudo-random outputs when in a masked state.
Then G is robust.
The following additional property is required of the masking function for use in the
proof of robustness and is as stated in [55, Definition 8].
Definition 4.3.6 (Idempotent Masking Functions). A masking function M : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n is idempotent if, for any state s ∈ {0, 1}n, M(s) and M(M(s)) are identically
distributed random variables.
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Having summarised the modifications of [55] to the definitions of [29], we extend
their definitions for analysis of the NIST generators. We start by updating the
existing security notions to encompass our changes in Figure 4.5.
Definition 4.4.1 (Variable-Output Robustness). A Variable-Output PRNG with
input is called (t, `max, `total, qD, qS, γ∗, rob)-robust (rob`total) if for any attacker A
Procedure: Initialise ()
σ ← 0, e← 0, x← −1
seed
$← seedgen
I0
$← ES
s0 ← setup(I0)
e← γ0
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
b
$← {0, 1}
return (seed, (γ0, z0) )
Procedure: Finalise (b∗)
if b = b∗ then
return 1
else
return 0
Procedure: get-state ()
e← 0
corrupt← true
return si
Oracle: ES()
x← x+ 1
(σ′, Ix, γx, zx)
$← D(σ)
return Ix
Procedure: set-state (s∗)
e← 0
corrupt← true
si ← s∗
Procedure: next-ror (`i+1)
(si+1, r0)← next(si, `i+1)
if corrupt = true then
e← 0
return r0
else
if r0 =⊥ then
r1 ←⊥
else
r1
$← {0, 1}`i+1
return rb
Procedure: get-next (`i+1)
(si+1, ri+1)← next(si, `i+1)
if corrupt = true then
e← 0
return ri+1
Procedure: wait()
si+1 ← tick(seed, si)
Procedure: D−refresh()
x← x+ 1
(σ, I, γ, z)
$← D(σ)
si+1 ← refresh(si, I)
e← e+ γ
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
return (γ, z)
Figure 4.5: The updated security procedures, updated from the original definitions
given in [29, 55]. Boxed items indicate changes. The inclusion of seed has been
omitted from several algorithms.
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running in time at most t, making at most qD calls to D−refresh, requesting at
most `total bits of cumulative output from the VOPWI, and no more than `max from
each next call, qS calls to get-state/set-state, and any legitimate distribution sampler
D, the advantage in the game specified in Figure 4.5 is at most . The value γ∗
is the minimum entropy required to reset the “corrupt” flag back to “false”. As
usual, the challenger first executes the Initialise algorithm and the adversary is given
access to the bottom six oracles. Once the adversary has asked all her queries, she
outputs her guess, passes it to the challenger and the challenger runs Finalise with
the adversary’s guess as input.
Further, we define three more games which are restrictions of the robustness game:
Definition 4.4.2. Resilience (res`total) is the restricted game where qS = 0.
Definition 4.4.3. Forward-secure (fwd`total) is the restricted game where A makes
no calls to set-state and a single call to get-state, which must be the very last oracle
call that A makes.
Definition 4.4.4. Backward-secure (bwd`total) is the restricted game where A makes
no calls to get-state and a single call to set-state which is the very first call A makes.
Variable-Output Robustness implies all three other notions and is the strongest
notion. Resilience is the most restricted notion; it captures security against arbitrary
distribution samplers when the VOPWI is not corrupted. Forward security protects
past VOPWI outputs in the event that a state is compromised. Backward security
protects future VOPWI outputs if enough entropy is input into the system. Since
the NIST generators have states that update in very situational-dependent ways,
we define a split masking function, specifically a masking function that behaves in
different ways depending on the situation.
Definition 4.4.5 (Split Masking Functions). Let Statespace be as defined in Defi-
nition 4.2.1, and define M := (MI,MP,MR) to be a tuple of randomised algorithms
MI,MP,MR : Statespace→ Statespace.
Each algorithm is used at a specific point in the security games. MI is used in
Initialise, MP is used after a preserving call to next, and lastly, MR is used after a
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recovering call to next. We call M a split masking function over Statespace. By using
a split masking function, we allow for different behaviours during the running of the
VOPWI, which correspond to how the notion of “ideal state” changes depending
on the situation. For example, after recovering from insufficient entropy, we might
expect the state to look random over several fields, while on the other hand, on a
preserving next call, where there is no additional entropy available we might expect
some of these fields to remain constant.
As an example, for a state s := (a, b, c), where a, b ∈ {0, 1}n are “working states”
and c is a counter, a masking function could be as follows:
MI(s) = (a
′, f(a′), 0x1) a′ $← {0, 1}n for some function f , during initialisation,
MP(s) = (a
′, b, c) a′ $← {0, 1}n after a preserving next call,
MR(s) = (a
′, b′, c) a′, b′ $← {0, 1}n after a recovering next call.
The example reads as follows:
• After initialisation the first field is randomly sampled, the second field is some
function of the first field, while the last field, the counter, is initialised.
• After a preserving next call the first field is again sampled from random, while
the second and third fields remain constant.
• Lastly, after a recovering next call, the first and second fields are sampled from
random, while the third field remains constant.
Definition 4.4.6 (Idempotent Split Masking Functions). A split masking function
M = (MI,MP,MR) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is idempotent if, for any state s ∈ {0, 1}n, and
for any a ∈ {P,R}, b ∈ {I,P,R}, Ma(s) and Ma(Mb(s)) are identically distributed
random variables.
We note that Definition 4.4.6 is slightly stronger than necessary for the purpose of
the robustness proof which follows in Section 4.5.
To complete the updated notions we also need to modify Definitions 4.3.2 and 4.3.3,
together with Theorem 4.3.4. We present these in Definitions 4.4.7 and 4.4.8.
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Procedure: Initialise ()
σ ← 0, e← 0, x← −1
seed
$← seedgen
s0 ← setupES
e← γ0
s0 ← MI(s0)
if e ≥ γ∗ then
corrupt← false
b
$← {0, 1}
return (seed, (γ0, z0))
Figure 4.6: The updated procedure Initialise for Variable-Output bootstrapped se-
curity. Updated from Figure 4.4.
Definition 4.4.7 (Honest-Initialisation Split Masking Functions). Let D be an en-
tropy source, G = (seedgen, setup, refresh, next, tick) be a VOPWI with statespace
Statespace,A an adversary and M : Statespace → Statespace a split masking func-
tion. Let (seed, Z) be a random variable output by running the Initialise procedure
(Figure 4.3), and s0 be the VOPWI state produced by this procedure. Set
AdvinitG,D,M(A) = Pr [A(s0, seed, Z) =⇒ 1]− Pr [A(MI(s0), seed, Z) =⇒ 1] .
If AdvinitG,D,M(A) ≤  for all adversaries A running in time t, then M is said to be a
(G,D, t, h)-honest-initialisation split masking function.
Definition 4.4.8 (Bootstrapped Security). Let G`max be a VOPWI with maximum
output `max-bits, and let M be a split masking function. For x ∈ {fwd`total , bwd`total ,
res`total , rob`total} as defined in Definitions 4.4.1 to 4.4.4, let Advx/M
G`max ,D(A) be defined
as AdvxG`max ,D(A), but changing the procedure Initialise to the procedure given in
Figure 4.6.
Theorem 4.4.9.
Let G`max be a VOPWI with maximum output size `max, D an entropy source, and
M a split masking function. Suppose that M is a (G,D, t, h)-honest initialisation
split mask. Then for any x ∈ {fwd`total , bwd`total , res`total , rob`total} as defined in Defi-
nitions 4.4.1 to 4.4.4, there exists some adversary B(·) such that for any adversary
A,
AdvxG`max ,D(A) ≤ Advx/MG`max ,D(B(A)) + h.
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If it takes time t′ to compute M, A makes q queries and runs in time t, then B(A)
makes q queries and runs in time O(t) + t′.
Proof. This follows directly from the proof of Theorem 4.3.4 since our split masking
function acts precisely as the original masking function in Initialise. The only other
change introduced that is relevant to the Initialise procedure is the addition of the
special entropy input I0 which is used by setup to create the initial VOPWI state.
The changes we have made only affect the output of the setup algorithm. This leaves
the rest of the game untouched.
4.5 Variable-Output Robustness
To obtain an analogy of the robustness theorem of [29, Theorem 1] we must first
adapt the notions of preserving and recovering security to capture the updates that
we made in Section 4.4.
Recall, preserving security concerns the situation where the VOPWI starting with
a “good” state, remains “good” even after being refreshed with adversarially con-
trolled inputs. Recovering security concerns the situation where the VOPWI has
been compromised to an adversarially chosen state, but is then refreshed with suffi-
cient entropy from multiple calls to D−refresh such that the corrupt flag is set back
to false, resulting in a “good” state. Both are measured by the adversary’s ability to
distinguish the resulting state and generator output from an ideal state and random
output.
In Figure 4.7 we present the updated preserving and recovering security games with
the changes from the original definitions given in [29, Definitions 3 & 4] highlighted.
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Recover(G,A,D,M, `)
(seedgen, setup, refresh, next, tick)← G
seed← seedgen; b $← {0, 1}
σ0 ← 0;µ← 0
for k = 1, . . . , qD do
(σk, Ik, γk, zk)← D(σk−1)
(s0, d, σ
′) $← Aget-refresh(seed,
γ1, . . . , γqD , z1, . . . , zqD )
if µ+ d > qD or
µ+d∑
j=µ+1
γj < γ
∗ then
return 0
for j = 1, . . . , d do
sj ← refresh(seed, sj−1, Iµ+j)
(s∗0, r
∗
0)← next(seed, sd, `)
s∗1
$← MR(s∗0)
if r∗0 =⊥ then
r∗1 ←⊥
else
r∗1
$← {0, 1} `
b∗ $← A(σ′, s∗b, r∗b , Iµ+d+1, . . . , IqD )
if b∗ = b then
return 1
else
return 0
Preserve(G,A,M, `)
(seedgen, setup, refresh, next, tick)← G
seed← seedgen; b $← {0, 1}
(s′0, I1, . . . , Id, σ
′)← A(seed)
s0
$← MP(s′0)
for j = 1, . . . , d do
sj ← refresh(seed, sj−1, Ij)
(s∗0, r
∗
0)← next(seed, sd, `)
s∗1
$← MP(s∗0)
if r∗0 =⊥ then
r∗1 ←⊥
else
r∗1
$← {0, 1} `
b∗ $← A(σ′, s∗b, r∗b)
if b∗ = b then
return 1
else
return 0
get-refresh ()
µ← µ+ 1
return Iµ
Figure 4.7: Preserving and recovering security games for G outputting `-bits with
split masking function M. Boxes indicate changes from [29, Definitions 3 & 4].
4.5.1 Variable-Output Preserving Security
One of the main differences in the preserving security game is that unlike the original
preserving security of [29], the initial state is controlled by the adversary, similar
to recovering security. However, the split masking function is then applied before
the game proceeds, which should yield an “ideal” state. We present the following
definitions that describe variable-output preserving security and a witnessed version
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of the same, which utilises a split masking function to make the proof easier.
Definition 4.5.1 (Variable Output Preserving Security). A VOPWI is said to have
(t, `max, p)-variable output preserving security, if, for any adversary A running in
time t, and for all `i ∈ [1, `max] the preserving advantage defined by
Advpres
G`max
(A) = 2Pr [Preserve(G,A, `i) = 1]− 1,
satisfies Advpres
G`max
(A) ≤ p, for Preserve as in Figure 4.7.
Definition 4.5.2 ((Witnessed) Variable Output Preserving Security). A VOPWI is
said to have (t, `max, p)-variable output preserving security, witnessed by the split
masking function M, if, for any adversaryA running in time t, and for all `i ∈ [1, `max]
the preserving advantage defined by
Advpres
M;G`max
(A) = 2Pr [Preserve(G,A,M, `i) = 1]− 1,
satisfies Advpres
M;G`max
(A) ≤ p for Preserve as in Figure 4.7 with the masking function
MP set to return a string sampled uniformly at random.
4.5.2 Variable-Output Recovering Security
We present the following definitions that describe variable output recovering security
and a witnessed version of the same.
Definition 4.5.3 (Variable Output Recovering Security). A VOPWI is said to have
(t, qD, `max, γ∗, r)-variable output recovering security, if, for any adversary A and
legitimate sampler D, both running in time t, and, for all `i ∈ [1, `max], the recovering
advantage defined by
AdvrecG`max (A) = 2Pr [Recover(G,A,D, `i) = 1]− 1,
satisfies AdvrecG`max (A) ≤ r for Recover as in Figure 4.7.
Definition 4.5.4 ((Witnessed) Variable Output Recovering Security). A VOPWI is
said to have (t, qD, `max, γ∗, r)-variable output recovering security, witnessed by the
split masking function M, if, for any adversary A and legitimate sampler D, both
running in time t, and, for all `i ∈ [1, `max], the recovering advantage defined by
AdvrecM;G`max (A) = 2Pr [Recover(G,A,D,M, `i) = 1]− 1,
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satisfies AdvrecM;G`max (A) ≤ r for Recover as in Figure 4.7 with the masking function
MR set to return a string sampled uniformly at random.
4.5.3 Updated Robustness Notion
The changes introduced in Figure 4.5 culminate in the full variable-output robustness
game. Instead of limiting the adversary by the number of get-next and next-ror
queries, we will limit her based upon the total output of the generator.
This allows an adversary more freedom, for example, if a generator is preserving
secure for `max then it may seem obvious that reducing the output size would only
decrease the adversarial advantage. However, there could be an output value that
may cause bad behaviour in the algorithm, such as outputting the first half of the
updated state when ` is precisely half the size of the state. Varying the output size
also allows an adversary to make more queries at the cost of output size, or receive
a larger amount but at the cost of future calls. This more accurately represents the
requests made to a PRNG in practice, where the amount of randomness requested
by consuming applications varies.
Recall, qD is the number of calls an adversary is allowed to make to D−refresh, and
qS is the number of calls an adversary is allowed to make to get-state and set-state.
Theorem 4.5.5 (Boostrapped Variable-Output Robustness).
Let `total be a positive integer and the total amount of output in bits an adversary
A is allowed to request. Let q be the total number of next calls in a particular
iteration of M-rob, assuming the amount of output is less than or equal to `total and
no single `i exceeds `max. If there is an idempotent split masking function M that
witnesses the (t, `max, p)-variable output preserving and (t, qD, `max, γ∗, r)-variable
output recovering security of a VOPWI G and M is (G,D, t, h)-honest, then G ist′, `max, , `total, qD, qS, γ∗, h + max(`1,...,`q):
q∑
i=1
`i≤`total
(
q∑
i=1
(p + r)
) -variable-output robust.
An example of the total amount of output an adversary is allowed to make would
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be to use the old system of `total = ` ∗ qS for some normal maximum number of
queries qS. When referring to a particular instance of the robustness game where
an adversary requests output sizes `1, . . . , `q, we speak of A’s requests in terms of a
vector (`1, . . . , `q).
Proof. We proceed by partitioning the uncorrupted next queries into “preserving”
and “recovering” queries. We use the term “next query” to refer to both next and
next-ror oracle queries. If at any point the corrupt flag is set to “true”, the next next
query once the flag has been reset is called a “recovering query”. When a recovering
query is made, we associate with it a most recent entropy drain (MRED) query,
which will be the previous get-state, set-state or get-next query. We assume without
loss of generality that the adversary does not make a next query when the corrupt
flag is set to true, since this will reset the entropy counter and always output real
output. The leftover uncorrupted next queries are called “preserving queries”.
Let M-rob be the robustness experiment where the initial state s0 is overwritten
with MI(s0). Next, define the game Gi to be the same as M-rob with the following
changes, assuming the ith next query is uncompromised:
• In the first i next queries, next-ror replaces the updated state with a masked
version MP(si+1) (or MR(si+1) if it is a recovering call) and always returns r1.
• Similarly, in the first i next queries, get-next replaces the updated state with
masked version MP(si+1) (or MR(si+1) if it is a recovering call) and overwrites
the output of the get-next query with r
$← {0, 1}`j .
Further, define Gi+1/2 which behaves precisely the same as Gi+1 when the (i+1)-st
next query is a preserving next query, by replacing the i+ 1st output with a random
string, and the updated state MP(si+2). For all other next queries, i.e. the recovering
queries, Gi+1/2 behaves like Gi.
The edge cases here are as follows
Pr [G0(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1] ≤ Pr [M-rob(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1] + h, (4.5.1)
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from the properties of the masking function, and
Pr [Gq(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1] = 1
2
, (4.5.2)
since all outputs are independent of the choice of the bit b. This leaves us with
Pr[M-rob(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]
≤
(
q−1∑
i=1
∣∣Pr [Gi(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]− Pr [Gi+1/2(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]∣∣
+
∣∣Pr [Gi+1/2(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]− Pr [Gi+1(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]∣∣
)
.
The proof follows very closely to the original proof [29] and the adapted proof of
[55] by proceeding with the following two lemmas:
Lemma 4.5.6.
Let Gi,Gi+1/2 be defined as above and let G be a (t, `max, p)-variable output pre-
serving secure VOPWI, witnessed by the split masking function M. Then for any
adversary A,∣∣Pr [Gi(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]− Pr [Gi+1/2(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]∣∣ ≤ p.
Proof. Assume an adversary A exists, we will construct from A a new adversary
B for the preserving security game. Also assume that the (i + 1)st next query is
a preserving query, since otherwise Gi and Gi+1/2 are identical. We present the
construction and explanation in Figure 4.8.
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Challenger B
A
seed
Sim(Gi)
s0, I1, . . . , Id
$← B
s0, I1, . . . , Id
(sb
∗, rb∗)
b′ $← B get-next
(s′b
∗∗
, r′b
∗∗
)
$← B r′b∗∗
Sim(Gi(s
′∗∗
b ))
b∗
b∗
′ $← B(b∗)
b∗
′
Figure 4.8: The construction of preserving security adversary B from adversary A.
1. To begin, B is given seed by the challenger, and uses it, along with knowledge
of D to simulate Gi for A until the i+ 1st next query.
2. Let s0 be the resulting state from this simulation that B uses for the i + 1st
next query.
3. B generates entropy inputs I1, . . . , Id and passes them, along with s0 to the
challenger.
4. The challenger replies with (s∗b, r
∗
b), and B flips its own bit, b′
$← {0, 1}.
5. On receipt of A’s (i+ 1)st next query, B calculates the following
(s∗∗b′ , r
∗∗
b′ ) =:

(s∗∗0 , r∗∗0 ) = (s∗b, r
∗
b) for b
′ = 0,
(s∗∗1 , r∗∗1 ) =
(
MP(s
∗
b),
{
⊥ if r∗b =⊥,
r∗∗1 otherwise
)
for b′ = 1.
for r∗∗1
$← {0, 1}`i+1 , and returns r∗∗b′ to A.
6. Next, B continues simulating the remainder of the game for A using s∗∗b′ .
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7. When A outputs b∗, B outputs b∗′ = 1 if b∗ = b′ or b∗′ = 0 otherwise.
We now walk through the different possibilities:
First, if the original challenge bit b = 0, then B has exactly simulated Gi for A; the
first i next queries followed the definition of Gi and the (i+1)st next query returned
the “real” values if b′ = 0, and returned a mask of the state and random bits if
b′ = 1. Since M is idempotent, the distribution of s0, taken from the output of the
last next query, is not changed when the challenger applies a mask to it in line 4 of
the preserving game in Figure 4.7. Gi requires the state be masked after every next
query and so s0 is essentially already masked.
Secondly, if the original challenge bit b = 1, then regardless of b′, B has exactly
simulated Gi+1/2 for A; since it gives A a mask of the state and uniformly random
bits for the (i+1)st query. In the case where b′ = 0, A passed MP(s∗0) to B along with
random output, which are passed straight onto A. When b′ = 1, B masks the state
it was given by the challenger, resulting in MP(MP(s
∗
0)), which by the idempotence
of M is identically distributed to MP(s
∗
0), it picks a new output string uniformly at
random and passes both to A. Lastly, the above gives us that∣∣Pr [Gi(A,D, `max, `total) = 1]− Pr [Gi+1/2(A,D, `max, `total) = 1]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr [b′ = b∗ | b = 0]− Pr [b′ = b∗ | b = 1]∣∣
=
∣∣∣2Pr [b∗′ = b]− 1∣∣∣ ≤ p.
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Challenger B
A
seed, (γj , zj)
qD
j=1
s′ $← Bsetup
Sim(Gi)
get-refresh
I
D-refresh
(γj , zj)
get-refresh
I
s0 ← Sim(Gi(I, . . . ))
s0, d
(s∗b, r
∗
b), Ik+d+1 . . . , IqD
get-next
b′ $← B
(s′b
∗∗
, r′b
∗∗
)
$← B r′b∗∗
Sim(Gi+1(s
′∗∗
b , Ik+d+1, . . . , IqD ))
b∗
b∗
′ $← B(b∗)
b∗
′
Figure 4.9: The construction of the recovering security adversary B from adversary
A.
Lemma 4.5.7.
Let Gi+1/2,Gi+1 be defined as above and let G be a (t, qD, `max, γ∗, r)-variable output
recovering secure VOPWI, witnessed by the split masking function M, then for any
adversary A,∣∣Pr [Gi+1/2(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]− Pr [Gi+1(G,A,D, `max, `total) = 1]∣∣ ≤ `i+1r .
Proof. Assume an adversary A exists, we will construct from A a new adversary
B for the recovering security game. Similarly to Lemma 4.5.6, assume that the
(i+ 1)st next query is a recovering query. We present the construction in Figure 4.9
and explain the steps below.
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1. To begin, B is given seed and information relating to the refresh values (γj , zj)qDj=1
by the challenger, and generates an initial state s′ $← setup.
2. B simulates Gi for A, providing A with seed and using the leaked information
it received and its get-refresh oracle to simulate the D−refresh oracle for A.
3. After the ith next query B, in response to a D−refresh query from A will only
return the associated pair (γj , zj) it received from the challenger, it does not
update the state.
4. On the (i+ 1)st next query, B calls its get-refresh oracle to update the state to
the point immediately following the MRED to the recovering query, and sets
this as s0.
5. B counts the number of D−refresh calls A made after the MRED and submits
(s0, d) to the challenger.
6. B receives the challenge (s∗b, r∗b) and the remaining entropy strings Ik+d+1, . . . , IqD
which it uses later to continue the simulation.
7. On receipt of A’s (i + 1)st next query, B flips its own bit b′ $← {0, 1} and
calculates the following
(s∗∗b′ , r
∗∗
b′ ) =

(s∗∗0 , r∗∗0 ) = (s∗b, r
∗
b) for b
′ = 0,
(s∗∗1 , r∗∗1 ) =
(
MR(s
∗
b),
{
⊥ if r∗b =⊥,
r∗∗1
$← {0, 1}`i+1 otherwise
)
for b′ = 1.
and returns r∗∗b′ to A.
8. Lastly, B uses the remaining entropy strings Ik+d+1, . . . , IqD to continue simu-
lating Gi+1 for A from the state s∗∗b′ .
9. When A outputs b∗, B outputs b∗′ = 1 if b∗ = b′ or b∗′ = 0 otherwise.
We now walk through the different possibilities:
First, if the original challenge bit b = 0, then B has exactly simulated Gi+1/2 for A;
the first i next queries followed the definition of Gi and the (i+ 1)st query returned
the “real” values if b′ = 0, and returned a mask of the state and uniformly random
bits if b′ = 1.
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Secondly, if the original challenge bit b = 1, then regardless of b′, B has exactly
simulated Gi+1 for A; since it gives A a mask of the state and uniformly random
bits for the (i+1)st query, again by using the property that MR(MR(s)) is identically
distributed as MR(s).
Lastly, the above gives us that∣∣Pr [Gi+1/2(A,D, `max, `total) = 1]− Pr [Gi+1(A,D, `max, `total) = 1]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr [b′ = b∗ | b = 0]− Pr [b′ = b∗ | b = 1]∣∣
=
∣∣∣2Pr [b∗′ = b]− 1∣∣∣ =≤ r.
Putting these two lemmas together, with eqs. (4.5.1) and (4.5.2), while taking the
maximum over the possible combinations of (`1, . . . , `q) (which determines each q),
yields the result.
4.6 Constructing a VOPWI from a PWI
The natural progression of our extension is a way to construct a secure VOPWI from
a secure PWI. In this section we briefly investigate several propositions for building
a VOPWI from a PWI, stating if they are achievable or justifying why they are not.
Let us assume that the refresh algorithm of the PWI fulfils the new requirements of
the setup algorithm. Then what remains is to consider the different modifications
we can make to the next function. This in itself can be broken down into four
possibilities:
1. Redesign the next algorithm of the PWI by adding a generate algorithm; this
will be specific to the PWI design, and thus cannot be generalised.
2. Modify the next algorithm of the PWI to return output of a length `i ≤ `,
maintaining the restriction on the number of calls to the next algorithm. Since
this is essentially reducing the amount of output a PWI adversary receives,
this is trivial.
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3. Add a generate algorithm that takes as input the raw PWI output and expands
it as required. This can easily be achieved with a suitably secure PRG.
4. Similar to the second item, modify the next algorithm of the PWI to return
output of a length `i ≤ `, but maintain the total amount of output an adversary
may receive as `total = q`. This is the most complex proposition.
In the fourth item we described changing the restrictions on output of a PWI to the
total amount of output restriction of a VOPWI. We assert that this cannot be done
in general without restrictions based upon properties of the PWI. This is motivated
by the following example:
Given a secure PWI, which is secure, up to a maximum of q calls to the next algo-
rithm, else the PWI repeats its outputs in order. We construct a VOPWI from this
PWI, and an adversary that will distinguish its output from random. The adversary
requests maximal output on the first call to next, but the minimum amount (say 1
bit) from the following q − 1 outputs. The adversary then requests the maximum
amount of output on the q + 1st call to the next algorithm, which, will be equal to
the first output by the properties of the underlying PWI, and thus is distinguishable
from random through being equal to the first output the adversary saw. This cannot
be fixed by reducing the amount of output the adversary may request, but could be
captured and mitigated by adding a reseed counter, similar to practical generators.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we extended the security models of [29, 55] to allow a generator
to output varying amounts of output, possibly utilising a sub-procedure that does
a “small” state update between blocks of output. We also added a seedgen algo-
rithm and expanded the setup algorithm to capture the initial state generation more
accurately.
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In this chapter we make use of the security model developed in Chapter 4 to analyse
the robustness of the NIST generators.
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5.1 Preliminaries
The NIST special publications on random bit generation are SP800-90A [7], SP800-
90B [9], and SP800-90C [8]. Document SP800-90A details specifications of several
deterministic random bit generators (which we call PRNGs with input or PWIs). The
SP800-90B document details recommendations for entropy sources used in conjunc-
tion with the PWIs detailed in SP800-90A. Lastly, SP800-90C is a comprehensive
document on implementing the PWIs from document A and the entropy sources
from document B securely.
We will be investigating the security of the hash drbg and ctr drbg in the security
model defined in Chapter 4. We do not investigate the security of the hmac drbg
since there are papers such as [38, 58] that investigate the security claims for this
generator.
In the NIST specification [7], there are several parameter and optional-extra choices
for each DRBG design. This includes, but is not limited to the use of a derivation
function to “mix” inputs into states. We will not be analysing each combination of
choices, but will make our choices clear, along with justifying them.
We proceed in this chapter by defining some notation shared between the generators,
followed by the specification of the hash drbg and ctr drbg in the format of our VOPWI
definition (Definition 4.2.1). We follow this with a formal analysis of both generators
in our security model in Chapter 4.
5.1.1 NIST Seed Structure
Here we summarise the different parts of what we will treat as the seed of the
generator.
The nonce nonce, discussed in [7, Section 8.6.7] used in the NIST generators is
not required to be kept secret, but is required to have either “at least λ/2 bits of
entropy, or does not repeat for at least λ/2 bits”. One example can be built from a
time-stamp and monotonically increasing sequence. The nonce is used in the setup
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algorithm.
The personalisation string perstring is an optional but recommended input to the
setup algorithm; it is primarily used to separate the instantiation from others, though
knowledge of the personalisation string by the adversary should not degrade the
security strength of the DRBG.
The additional input add is an optional input provided to the refresh and next algo-
rithms. Knowledge of the additional input should not degrade the security strength
of the generator. It is suggested in the specification that applications requesting
randomness may provide add for each request, which could be used to separate
generator next calls or provide a small amount of entropy.
The security field λ is an optional input in the setup algorithm for both the hash drbg
and ctr drbg. Since the nonce nonce and additional input add are optional, the
entropy of the initial state of the generator may rely entirely on the entropy input
used by setup.
5.1.2 General NIST Notation
We start by describing in Table 5.1 some general notation applicable to both gen-
erators, including updates that we have made to port the NIST notation to our
own. We do this for ease of reading and for later applying the security model to the
generators.
We include generator specific notation at the beginning of each section to avoid a
notation overload.
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Our Notation NIST Notation Size
(bits)
Description
hash drbg hash drbg
The NIST generator based on an
approved hash function.
ctr drbg ctr drbg
The NIST generator based on an
approved block cipher.
λ security strength
Advertised security strength of
the generator.
n seed length
Size of different sub-states of the
generators in bits.
`i requested number
of bits
Requested number of bits from
the generate process of the
hash drbg and ctr drbg.
0xab 0xab Hexadecimal notation of a byte.
si Working State State of the generators.
s0 seed
Initial state of a generator, either
after initialisation (and reseeding
in the NIST notation).
Ii entropy input p
The entropy input used to refresh
the state of a generator.
ri returned bits `
The output of the PWI produced
from state i− 1.
nonce nonce
A generated nonce for input into
the setup algorithm.
perstring personalization s ≤ 235 An optional string used in the
setup algorithm.
add additional input ≤ 235 An optional string used in the
refresh algorithm.
seed (nonce, perstring,
add)
The optional strings.
Len(A) Len(A) |A| The length in bits of the string
A.
La(A) leftmost(A,a) Left most a bits of A.
Ra(A) rightmost(A,a) Right most a bits of A.
Selba(A) select(A,a,b) Select from A, bits a to b.
Table 5.1: The notation used in [7], updated for continuity with our own notation.
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5.2 The hash drbg
5.2.1 Notation
Table 5.2 describes the additional notation required for the hash drbg. The state of
the hash drbg s : (v, c, rc) is made up of the v-state v which is frequently updated and
used to produce output, and the c-state c which is supposed to retain the entropy
from the previous entropy input and to separate outputs between refreshes.
The NIST specification states that the maximum number of calls between refreshes
shall be at maximum 248. Since the reseed counter rc is initialised to 1, it will reach
1 + 248 which requires 49 bits to represent.
Our Notation NIST Notation Size
(bits)
Description
hash drbg HASH DRBG
The NIST generator based on an
approved hash function.
hash df Hash df
An auxiliary algorithm used in
the hash drbg.
hashgen Hashgen
An auxiliary algorithm used in
the hash drbg.
nH outlen variable
Output length of the hash func-
tion.
`max 2
19 Maximum requested number of
bits from the generate algorithm.
vi V n Sub-state of the working state.
ci C n Sub-state of the working state.
rc reseed counter 49
Number of next calls since last
refresh, maximum 248.
si := (vi, ci, rc) Working State 2n+ 49
i-th working state of the genera-
tor in full.
Table 5.2: Notation for the hash drbg, updated for continuity with our notation.
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SHA-1
SHA-224 &
SHA-512/224
SHA-256 &
SHA-512/256 SHA-384 SHA-512
nH 160 224 256 384 512
n 440 440 440 888 888
perstring ≤ 235
add ≤ 235
p ≤ 235
`max ≤ 219 bits
Requests
between
reseeds
≤ 248
Table 5.3: Parameters of the different hash drbg instantiations.
5.2.2 Specification of the Generator
Definition 5.2.1. In addition to the notation given in Table 5.2 and parameters in
Table 5.3, let H be a hash function from {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}nH . Let
n ≈ 2nH ,
λ ≤ p ≤ 235,
`i ≤ `max := 219,
IFace := {0},
(nonce, perstring, add) ∈ Seedspace := {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}≤235 × {0, 1}≤235 ,
(vi, ci, rc) ∈ Statespace := {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}49.
The value of IFace is chosen since we are only using a single interface and will
omit it from the rest of the specification. The hash drbg algorithms are specified in
Figure 5.2, making use of two auxiliary algorithms given in Figure 5.1.
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hash df(x, `)
y ← null
m← d`/nHe
ctr ← 0x01
for i = 1 to m
y ← y‖H(ctr‖`‖x)
ctr ← ctr + 1
endfor
return L`(y)
hashgen(vi, `i+1)
m← d`i+1/nHe
W ← null
for j = 1 to m
w ← H(vi)
W ←W‖w
v′i ← (vi + 1) mod 2n
endfor
return (v′i, L`i+1(W ))
Figure 5.1: The auxiliary algorithms hash df and hashgen of hash drbg.
hash drbg.setup(seed, (I0, γ0, z0))
parse seed as (nonce, perstring, add)
v0 ← hash df((I0‖nonce‖perstring), n)
c0 ← hash df((0x00‖v0), n)
rc← 1
return s0 = (v0, c0, rc)
hash drbg.seedgen
nonce
$← {0, 1}∗
perstring
$← {0, 1}≤235
add
$← {0, 1}≤235
seed← (nonce, perstring, add)
return seed
hash drbg.next(seed, si, `i+1)
parse seed as (nonce, perstring, add)
parse si as (vi, ci, rc)
w ← H(0x02‖vi‖add)
v′i ← (vi + w) mod 2n
(v′i+1, ri+1)← hashgen(v′i, `i+1)
u← H(0x03‖v′i+1)
vi+1 ← (v′i+1 + u+ ci + rc) mod 2n
ci+1 ← ci
rc← rc + 1
return (si+1, ri+1) = ((vi+1, ci+1, rc), ri+1)
hash drbg.refresh(seed, si, I)
parse seed as (nonce, perstring, add)
parse si as (vi, ci, rc)
s← 0x01‖vi‖I‖add
vi+1 ← hash df(s, n)
ci+1 ← hash df((0x00‖vi+1), n)
rc← 1
return (vi+1, ci+1, rc)
hash drbg.tick(seed, si)
si+1 ← si
return si+1
Figure 5.2: The algorithms describing the behaviour of the hash drbg following the
format of Definition 4.2.1.
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state
setup refresh
next
seedgen
psnonce addI
r
Figure 5.3: The hash drbg algorithms and seed usage.
We now provide several overview diagrams of the different hash drbg algorithms,
including their subroutines for clarity. We use rounded edged boxes to indicate
algorithms, such as the underlying block cipher, hash function or a subroutine. We
use circles to represent entropy inputs including parts of the seed. We use rectangles
to indicate states; a long rectangle split in two represents how a larger output is split
into separate states. Lastly, we use squares to represent generator output.
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I0 nonce ps
I0‖nonce‖ps
1
rcI
H
H(0x01‖n‖I)‖H(0x02‖n‖I)‖H(0x03‖n‖I)
v0 H
H(0x01‖n‖0x00‖v0)‖H(0x02‖n‖0x00‖v0)‖H(0x03‖n‖0x00‖v0)
c0
Figure 5.4: The hash drbg setup algorithm.
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vi ci rc
H
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H(0x02‖vi‖add)
v
+
Hashgen
H(v)‖H(v + 1)‖H(v + 2)‖ · · ·
ri+1
v +m H
H(0x03‖v +m)
+
vi+1 ci rc
+ 1
Figure 5.5: The hash drbg next algorithm.
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I vi add
0x01‖vi‖I‖add
s
H
H(0x00‖n‖s)‖H(0x01‖n‖s)‖H(0x02‖n‖s)
vi+1 H
H(0x00‖n‖0x00‖vi+1)‖H(0x01‖n‖0x00‖vi+1)‖H(0x02‖n‖0x00‖vi+1)
ci+1
1
rc
Figure 5.6: The hash drbg refresh algorithm.
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5.2.3 Algorithm Descriptions
hash df The hash derivation function is an auxiliary algorithm of the hash drbg.
On input of a string x and required output length `, the hash df repeatedly hashes
a counter concatenated with the required length and input string. The hash df
algorithm then returns a concatenation of the hash outputs, truncating as necessary.
The algorithm is designed to either derive an internal state from the input given, or
to distribute entropy throughout a bit string.
hashgen The hash generation algorithm is the second auxiliary algorithm of the
hash drbg. The hashgen algorithm takes as input a string vi and requested number
of output bits `i+1. The hashgen algorithm then proceeds by calculating the number
of hash calls required to produce the requested amount of output, before hashing
the input vi, incrementing it between hashes and concatenating the output, which
is truncated as necessary. It returns the concatenated hashes as output.
hash drbg.seedgen The seedgen algorithm of the hash drbg has several different
options; for simplicity we will assume that each part of the seed is sampled from
random. We will also set |nonce| = n and both perstring, add ∈ {0, 1}235 .
hash drbg.setup The setup algorithm of the hash drbg takes as input an entropy
input I0 output by the entropy source with leakage z0 and entropy estimate γ0, along
with the seed. The setup algorithm makes a call to the hash df function, passing the
entropy input concatenated with the nonce and personalisation string from the seed.
It sets the output of hash df as the initial v-state, which it then prepends with 0x00
and again passes to hash df. The output of hash df becomes the initial c-state. The
setup algorithm then sets the reseed counter to 1 and returns the combined values
as the initial state of the hash drbg.
hash drbg.refresh The refresh algorithm takes as input an entropy input I along
with the seed and current state s. The refresh algorithm calls the hash df algorithm
on the current v-state prepended with 0x01, and appended with the entropy input
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and add of the seed. The result is the updated v-state, which in turn is used via
hash df prepended with 0x00 to produce the updated c-state. The rc is reset back
to 1 and these values are output as the refreshed hash drbg state.
hash drbg.next The next algorithm takes as input the current state of the generator
si, along with the seed seed and the requested number of bits `i+ 1. First the current
v-state is hashed along with part of the seed and prepended by 0x02. This hashed
output is then added to the vi-state modulo 2
n, since the output of the hash function
is shorter than the state length. This updated v-state v′i is input into the hashgen
algorithm along with the requested number of bits `i+1. The hashgen algorithm
outputs an updated v-state v′i+1 and generator output ri+1. This v-state v
′
i+1 is
then hashed, prepending with 0x03 to get u. The next algorithm then calculates
v′i+1 +u+ ci+ rc modulo 2
n to again attain the correct length. The calculated value
is then returned as the updated v-state vi+1, while ci remains the same and rc is
incremented by 1.
hash drbg.tick The tick algorithm in the hash drbg is a dummy algorithm that
leaves the state unchanged. It is included for completeness of the generator descrip-
tion, as per Definition 4.2.1.
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5.3 The ctr drbg
5.3.1 Notation
Table 5.4 describes the additional notation required for the ctr drbg. The state of
the ctr drbg is s := (v, k, rc). This differs from the hash drbg by replacing the k-state
with a key state k, which is also designed to retain entropy from the last entropy
input and to separate outputs between refreshes.
Our Notation NIST
Notation
Size (bits) Description
ctr drbg CTR DRBG
The NIST generator based on an
approved block cipher.
Ek(v) Block Encrypt(
key,input block)
nE
Block cipher encryption of an in-
put v under a key k.
bcdf Block Cipher df An auxiliary algorithm.
bcc bcc An auxiliary algorithm.
bcup ctr drbg
Update
An auxiliary algorithm.
s seed material
nE blocklen
Size of the block cipher’s input
and output block.
nk keylen Key length of the block cipher.
ctrlen ctr len ctrlen Size of the counter.
`max (for
B := (2ctr len −
4) ∗ nE)
max number of
bits per request
min(B, 219)
bits.
Maximum requested number of
bits from the generate algorithm.
`total
Maximum cumulative requested
number of bits.
vi V nE Sub-state of the working state.
ki Key nk Sub-state of the working state.
si := (vi, ki, rc) Working State State of the ctr drbg.
Table 5.4: Notation for the ctr drbg, updated for continuity with our notation.
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3 Key
TDEA
AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
nE 64 128
ctrlen 4 ≤ ctrlen ≤ nE
nk 168 128 192 256
n = nE + nk 232 256 320 384
If a df is used (not used):
p λ ≤ p ≤ 235 (n)
|perstring| ≤ 235 (n)
|add| ≤ 235 (n)
`max (for
B := (2ctrlen − 4) ∗ nE)
min(B, 213) min(B, 219)
Number of requests
between reseeds
232 ≤ 248
Table 5.5: Parameters of the different ctr drbg instantiations.
5.3.2 Specification of the Generator
The ctr drbg, like the hash drbg, has several instantiations (again called “envelopes”
in the NIST standard) with associated values given in Table 5.5.
Definition 5.3.1. In addition to the notation given in Table 5.4 and parameters in
Table 5.5, let
nk ≈ 2nE
Ek(v) : {0, 1}nk×{0, 1}nE −→ {0, 1}nE ,
λ ≤ p ≤ 235,
`i ≤ `max := min(B, 219),
IFace := {0},
(nonce, perstring, add) ∈ Seedspace := {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}≤235 × {0, 1}≤235 ,
(vi, ki, rc) ∈ Statespace := {0, 1}nE × {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}49.
Where Ek() is the chosen block cipher. The ctr drbg is specified in Figure 5.8, making
use of three auxiliary algorithms given in Figure 5.7.
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bcup(x, k, v)
y ← null
while Len(y) < n do
if ctrlen < nE
inc← (Rctrlen(v)) mod 2ctrlen
v ← LnE−ctrlen(v)‖inc
else
v ← v + 1 mod 2nE
y ← y‖Ek(v)
y ← Ln(y)
y ← y ⊕ x
k ← Lnk(y)
v ← RnE(y)
return (k, v)
bcc(k, x)
cv← 0nE
m← Len(x)/nE
parse x as block1 to blockm
for i = 1 to m
cv← cv ⊕ blocki
cv← Ek(cv)
return cv
bcdf(x, `)
L← Len(x)/8
N ← `/8
x← L‖N‖x‖0x80
while (Len(x) mod nE) 6= 0, do
x← x‖0x00
y ← null
i← 0
k ← Lnk(0x00010203 . . . 1D1E1F)
while Len(y) < nk + nE, do
cv← i‖0nE−Len(i)
y ← y‖bcc(k, (cv‖x))
i← i+ 1
k ← Lnk(y)
x← Selnnk+1(y)
y ← null
while Len(y) < `, do
x← Ek(x)
y ← y‖x
return L`(y)
Figure 5.7: The auxiliary algorithms bcup, bcdf and bcc of the ctr drbg.
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ctr drbg.next(seed, si, `i+1)
parse seed as (nonce, perstring, add)
parse si as (vi, ki, rc)
if add 6= null
add← bcdf(add, n)
(k, v)← bcup(add, ki, vi)
else
add← 0n
y ← null
while Len(y) < `i+1 do
if ctrlen < nE
inc← (Rctrlen(v) + 1) mod 2ctrlen
v ← LnE−ctrlen(v)‖inc
else
v ← v + 1 mod 2nE
y ← y‖Ek(v)
ri+1 ← L`i+1(y)
(ki+1, vi+1)← bcup(add, k, v)
rc← rc + 1
return ((vi+1, ki+1, rc), ri+1)
ctr drbg.setup(seed, (I0, γ0, z0))
parse seed as (nonce, perstring, add)
s← bcdf(I0‖nonce‖perstring, n)
k ← 0nk
v ← 0nE
(k0, v0)← bcup(s, v, k)
rc← 1
return s0 = (v0, c0, rc)
ctr drbg.refresh(seed, si, I)
parse seed as (nonce, perstring, add)
parse si as (vi, ki, rc)
s← I‖add
s← bcdf(s, n)
(ki+1, vi+1)← bcup(s, ki, vi)
rc← 1
return (vi+1, ki+1, rc)
ctr drbg.tick(seed, si)
si+1 ← si
return si+1
Figure 5.8: The algorithms describing the behaviour of the ctr drbg in the format of
Definition 4.2.1.
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state
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next
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Figure 5.9: The ctr drbg algorithms and seed usage.
We now provide several overview diagrams of the different ctr drbg algorithms in-
cluding their subroutines for clarity.
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vi kix
+
vi + 1
1
E
Eki(vi + 1)‖Eki(vi + 2)‖Eki(vi + 3)
⊕
ki+1 vi+1
Figure 5.10: The ctr drbg bcup algorithm.
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xn k
|x|/8‖n/8‖x‖0x80‖0x0 · · ·
x
i0 · · · 0‖x
CBC-MACE
ctr i++
k x
CBCE
y
Figure 5.11: The ctr drbg bcdf algorithm.
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0nE0nk nI0 nonce ps
I‖nonce‖ps
bcdf
sbcup
k0 v0 rc
1
Figure 5.12: The ctr drbg setup algorithm.
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viki
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+ 1
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Figure 5.13: The ctr drbg next algorithm.
135
5.3 The ctr drbg
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1
Figure 5.14: The ctr drbg refresh algorithm.
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5.3.3 Algorithm Descriptions
bcup The block cipher update function is an auxiliary algorithm of the ctr drbg.
On input of a string x, key k and state v, repeatedly encrypts v, incrementing the
rightmost ctrlen bits of v between encryptions. This is done until the concatenated
output is n-bits long (after truncation if necessary), which is then XORed with the
input x and split into the new k and v as leftmost and rightmost parts of the output
respectively. This is used to refresh the state with fresh entropy or update it between
calls to next.
bcdf The block cipher derivation function is the second auxiliary algorithm of the
ctr drbg. For a given input string x and requested number of output bits `, the
bcdf algorithm calculates the number of bytes of both input and output requested.
These values are then concatenated with the input x, which is appended with 0x80
and padded until it is a multiple of the nE. Next, the bcdf algorithm calls the
bcc algorithm using a set key, a counter and the input x. The output of the bcc
algorithm is then stored as a temporary string, the counter is incremented and the
bcc algorithm is called again in the same way with the output appended to the
temporary string. This is repeated until the temporary string is of a length greater
than or equal to n = nk + nE. This concatenated output is then truncated to n-bits
before being split into a new key k and updated x. These updated values are then
used as inputs to the block cipher which is called a number of times, with each
output being the next input to the block cipher while concatenating the output in a
temporary string. Finally, the concatenated output of the block cipher is truncated
to the requested number of bits ` and returned as output of the algorithm. The
algorithm is designed to derive internal state or distribute entropy throughout a
bitstring.
This algorithm essentially runs CBC-MAC with three iterations (since n ≈ 3nE),
with a counter separating the inputs to produce an intermediate (k, v), which are
then used in CBC mode to generate the required amount of output (e.g. three blocks
to be used as the updated state).
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bcc The bcc algorithm is the third auxiliary algorithm of the ctr drbg which takes
as input a key k and input string v. It initialises a chaining value to 0, splits the
input v into blocks of length nE and updates the chaining value by XORing it with
the first block. The algorithm then encrypts the chaining value under the given key
and repeats this process until all blocks have been incorporated. The bcc algorithm
then returns the final chaining value as output.
ctr drbg.seedgen The seedgen algorithm of the ctr drbg has several different op-
tions; for simplicity we will assume that each part of the seed is sampled from
random. We will also set |nonce| = n and both perstring, add ∈ {0, 1}235 .
ctr drbg.setup The setup algorithm of the ctr drbg requires an entropy input I0.
The entropy input I0 is output by the entropy source, together with leakage z0, and
entropy estimate γ0. The setup algorithm also requires the seed. The setup algorithm
makes a call to the bcdf algorithm, passing the entropy input, concatenated with
the nonce nonce and personlisation string perstring of the seed. It then initialises the
k-state k and v-state v as zero strings, inputs these and the previous output of the
bcdf algorithm into the bcup algorithm, which outputs values for the initial state
values k0 and v0. It sets the reseed counter to 1 and outputs the combined values
as the initial state of the ctr drbg.
ctr drbg.refresh The refresh algorithm takes as input an entropy input I along with
the seed and current state s of the ctr drbg. The algorithm calls the bcdf algorithm
on I and additional input add of the seed. The output of the bcdf algorithm is
then input, along with the current k-state k and v-state v into the bcup algorithm,
which returns updated k and v-states. The reseed counter is reset back to 1 and the
updated values (v, k, rc) are returned as the new ctr drbg state.
ctr drbg.next The next algorithm takes the current state of the generator si as
input, along with the seed and the requested number of bits `i+1. The next algorithm
first updates the current k-state ki and v-state vi using the additional input add of
the seed (which may be the zero string) by inputting these values into the bcup
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algorithm. The updated values k′i and v
′
i are used as input to the block cipher, with
output written to a temporary string. The value of v′i is incremented and encrypted
again under k′i with the output appended to the temporary string. This is repeated
until the temporary string is at least `i+ 1. The temporary string is truncated
to `i+1 and returned as the generator output. The next algorithm then inputs the
current values k′i, v
′
i into the bcup algorithm, along with add. The output of the bcup
algorithm is returned as the updated values ki+1 and vi+1 along with the generator
output ri+1.
ctr drbg.tick The tick algorithm in the ctr drbg is a dummy algorithm that leaves
the state unchanged. It is included for completeness of the generator by Defini-
tion 4.1.2.
5.4 Security of the hash drbg
We begin by noting that since the c-state of the generator depends on the last
refreshed v-state, the adversary can easily distinguish between s and M(s) after a
refresh by checking hash df((0x00‖v), n) == c. This motivates the split masking
function to treat a refresh or initialisation masking differently than after a call to
next.
Below we define the split masking function M of the hash drbg. We note that the c
depends entirely on the initial v after a refresh or initialise, but remains constant
otherwise.
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5.4.1 Masking Function of hash drbg
Definition 5.4.1. For Statespace defined as in Definition 5.2.1, the hash drbg mask-
ing function, is as follows:
M : = (MI,MP,MR) : {0, 1}2n+49 −→ {0, 1}2n+49,
MI(s) = (v
′, c′, 1) where v′ $← {0, 1}n, c′ = hash df((0x00‖v′), n),
MP(s) = (v
′, c, rc) where v′ $← {0, 1}n,
MR(s) = (v
′, c′, rc) where v′, c′ $← {0, 1}n.
This captures how the notion of the “ideal state” of the generator changes depending
on the situation.
• After initialisation we expect a random v-state, but the c-state should be
entirely dependent on the current v-state.
• After a preserving next call we expect the v-state to still be random, but the
c-state is expected to remain constant, being dependent on the v-state closest
to the last entropy input.
• Lastly, after a recovering next call we expect the v-state to again be random,
but we also expect the c-state to have been updated, but not directly dependent
on the current v-state since it will have been updated as part of the next call.
Lemma 5.4.2.
The hash drbg split masking function as defined in Definition 5.4.1 is idempotent.
Proof. For a state s ∈ Seedspace, the split masking function of the hash drbg al-
ways fixes the “public” part the reseed counter rc and overwrites the v-state with
uniformly random bits. We look at the separate cases, focusing on the first mask
applied:
• If the first mask is MI then s must be a result of setup and will be of the form
(v, c := f(v), rc) where f(x) is hash df((0x00‖x), n). We note that MI(s) is
identically distributed to this s with a random v-state. With this knowledge,
140
5.4 Security of the hash drbg
applying either MP or MR will always overwrite the v-state, leaving rc = 1. In
the case of MR, the c-state will also be overwritten, so the resulting state will
always be of the form (v′, c′, 1) for v′, c′ chosen uniformly from random. In the
case of MP, the v will always be chosen uniformly from random, while the c is
a function of the previous v and rc = 1. In both cases, the mask of the masked
state is identically distributed to the masked state.
• If the first mask is MP then only the v-state will have been overwritten as
uniformly random. Applying either MP or MR afterwards will overwrite at
least the v-state, leaving the rcunchanged. Depending on the choice of second
mask the c-state is either overwritten or left constant, in either case the state
is left identically distributed to MP(s).
• If the first mask is MR then the v-state and c are overwritten. If the second
mask is also MR then the v-state and c-state are again overwritten, making
the double masking identically distributed to MR(s). If the second mask is MP
then the v-state is overwritten, the c is left constant, which is still uniformly
random, and rcis left constant. This makes the double masking also identically
distributed to MR(s).
Lemma 5.4.3.
The split masking function of the hash drbg defined in Definition 5.4.1 is a (D, t, h)-
honest initialisation split masking function under the assumption that the entropy
source D outputs at minimum k bits of entropy and where h := 12
√
22nH−k + α(α+ 2).
Proof. Since MI overwrites the v-state with uniformly random bits, while calcu-
lating the resulting c-state in the same way as the setup algorithm, an adversary
distinguishing between s0 and MI(s0) would be able to distinguish the output of the
hash df algorithm from random. We will therefore show that the hash df algorithm
is a (k, h)-extractor and thus
AdvinitG,D,M(A) ≤ h.
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Before we discuss details of the hash df function, we look at the advice given in the
NIST document about underlying hash functions. We note that all of the combi-
nations given mean that at most, hash df in the initialise algorithm would call the
underlying hash function thrice; this stems from the required length n being at most
three times the size of nH . We will in fact restrict ourselves to the situation with
SHA256 and SHA512 for simplicity, both of which only require two calls.
Lemma 5.4.4.
In the context of the hash drbg.setup algorithm, let H : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}nH be a
strong ρ-universal hash function, with the family defined over nonce and perstring,
which we assume to be uniformly random strings. Let ρ := (1 + α)2−nH . Then the
hash df function is a ρ′-universal hash function H′ : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}2nH and again
with the family defined over nonce and perstring, with ρ′ := (1 + α′)2−2nH . This
yields α′ = α(α+ 2).
Proof. Assuming that the hash df outputs the entire output string, we have that
H′(x) := H(1‖`‖x)‖H(2‖`‖x), where ` is the size of the output, and thus a constant.
Since the counter separates the two inputs to H we have that for all x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n,
x1 6= x2, for a collision to occur, both H(1‖`‖x1) = H(1‖`‖x2) and H(2‖`‖x1) =
H(2‖`‖x2), which are both bounded as at most ρ. Thus a collision will occur with
probability ρ2.
Defining H′ : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}2nH , we can conclude that H′ is a strong ρ′ := ρ2-
universal hash function. This yields ρ′ = (1 + α′)2−2nH = ρ2 = (1 + α)22−2nH =⇒
α′ = α(α+ 2).
Lemma 5.4.5.
In the context of the hash drbg.setup algorithm, assuming the underlying hash func-
tion H : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}nH is a strong ρ-universal hash function family over the
space of all nonce and perstring ({0, 1}d where d ≤ |nonce| + 235). For an entropy
source with minimum entropy k and with entropy loss L := k−2nH, by Lemma 5.4.4
and by applying the leftover hash lemma (Lemma 2.4.5), we have that the hash df
algorithm is a (k, )-extractor for  := 12
√
22nH−k + α(α+ 2).
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Proof. By Lemma 5.4.4 we have that hash df is a ρ′-universal hash function family
over the same space. We then use the leftover hash lemma that states that hash df,
as described in Figure 5.1, is a (k, )-extractor where  := 12
√
22nH−k + α′ . We
also need to assert that the seed length meets the required length; namely, d ≥
min(|I| − 2nH , 2nH + 2 log(1/) − O(1)) = min(p − 2nH , 2nH + 2 log(1/) − O(1)).
Since the seed length is d = |nonce|+ 235, this is easily met.
Lemma 5.4.5 also concludes the proof of Lemma 5.4.3.
This requires several fairly strong assumptions that do not translate to a standard
implementation of the hash drbg; namely, the nonce and perstring are not generally
uniformly random, and the underlying hash function, e.g. SHA512, will yield a ρ
resulting in large α. For now, we will proceed with our assumptions to prove our
security claims.
Corollary 5.4.6.
In the context of the hash drbg.refresh algorithm, assuming that the add is chosen
uniformly at random, the hash df is a (k, 12
√
22nH−k + α∗(α∗ + 1))-extractor for the
above parameters when used to refresh the v state. Similarly the seed length for the
extractor is 235 bits which meets the required minimum length.
Proof. Following the same argument as Lemma 5.4.4, we obtain that the hash df is a
ρ′′-universal hash function in the same way but with the family over {0, 1}add, hence
we use α∗.
5.4.2 PRG Security of the next Function of the hash drbg
We now need to consider the PRG security of the next function. We could model it
similarly to [34], where the circuits are describing the counter used in the generate
algorithm, but since the adversary obtains all of the output and the circuits are so
restricted, it makes more sense to approach the proof more directly.
We do this by defining the security game res1 given in Figure 5.15.
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res1(APRG,Di,Di+1, `i+1)
seed← seedgen; b $← {0, 1}
s′0
$← {0, 1}2n+49
s0 ← MI(s′0)
(si+1, ri+1)← Di+b(seed,M(s′0), `i+1)
b∗ $← Anext((si+1, ri+1), rc)
return b == b∗
Figure 5.15: The security game for distinguishing between hash drbg.next and a
random generator output and masked state.
Definition 5.4.7. For an algorithm Di representing the next function, for a masked
input state MI(s0), seed seed, requested number of bits `i+1 ≤ `max, and any adver-
sary APRG running in time no more than t playing the game described in Figure 5.15,
which is derived from the resilence notion (from Definition 4.4.2) restricted to one
call to next, has advantage
Advres1APRG(Di(si, `i+1),Di+1(si, `i+1)) ≤
∣∣∣Pr [ADiPRG = 1]− Pr [ADi+1PRG = 1]∣∣∣ .
Lemma 5.4.8.
Let si be a random variable on the Statespace, then for any q adversary APRG, and
`i+1 ≤ `max,
Advres1APRG(next(si, `i+1), (M(si+1),U`i+1)) ≤ PRG ≤
(⌈
`i+1
nH
⌉
+ 2
)
AdvowfH (q, nH) .
Proof. The proof will proceed in two parts. First we will show that an adversary
cannot distinguish between the real or masked output state, while always having real
output. Following this, given masked output state the adversary cannot distinguish
between real and random output. Recall m := d`i+1/nEe.
We define three algorithms in Figure 5.16 that we will use for the hybrid game
jumps. We omit parsing the seed for simplicity.
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Alg. D0(seed, si, `i+1)
parse si as (vi, ci, rc)
w ← H(0x02‖vi‖add)
v ← (vi + w) mod 2n
(ri+1, v)← hashgen(`i+1, v)
u← H(0x03‖v)
vi+1 ← (v + u+ ci) mod 2n
ci+1 ← ci
rc← rc + 1.
return (ri+1, si+1)
Alg. D1(seed, si, `i+1)
parse si as (vi, ci, rc)
w ← H(0x02‖vi‖add)
v ← (vi + w) mod 2n
(ri+1, v)← hashgen(`i+1, v)
u← H(0x03‖v)
vi+1 ← (v + u+ ci) mod 2n
ci+1 ← ci
rc← rc + 1.
si+1 ← M(s)
return (ri+1, si+1)
Alg. D2(seed, si, `i+1)
parse si as (vi, ci, rc)
w ← H(0x02‖vi‖add)
v ← (vi + w) mod 2n
(ri+1, v)← hashgen(`i+1, v)
ri+1
$← {0, 1}`i+1
u← H(0x03‖v)
vi+1 ← (v + u+ ci) mod 2n
ci+1 ← ci
rc← rc + 1.
si+1 ← M(s)
return (ri+1, si+1)
Figure 5.16: The algorithms D0,D1 and D2 used in proving the PRG security of the
hash drbg.next function.
We then have,
Advres1APRG(next(si, `i+1), (M(si+1),U`i+1)) = Adv
res1
APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1))
≤ Advres1APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D1(si, `i+1))
+ Advres1APRG(D1(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1)).
We note that the first part is relatively straightforward. We present it in Lemma 5.4.9.
Lemma 5.4.9.
Let si be as described in Definition 5.4.7. Let H be a strong ρ-universal hash function.
Then for any adversary working in time t=q, APRG, and `i+1 ≤ `max,
Advres1APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D1(si, `i+1)) ≤ 2AdvowfH (q, nH) .
Proof. We simplify the distinguishing game by giving the adversary the intermediate
values w ← H(0x02‖vi‖add) and u← H(0x03‖v+m), once all queries to H have been
made. The latter value can be reconstructed using the challenge and the adversary
can always disregard the additional information. Therefore,
Advres1APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D1(si, `i+1)) ≤ Adv
res1
APRG(D0(si, `i+1, w, u),D1(si, `i+1, w, u)).
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After receiving this information, an adversary must either have found a pre-image
of H(0x02‖vi‖add) or found a pre-image of H(0x03‖v +m), which by the properties
of H is precisely AdvowfH (q, nH) respectively.
Lemma 5.4.10.
Let si be as described in Definition 5.4.7 and let H be a strong ρ-universal hash
function. Then for any adversary working in time t=q, APRG, and `i+1 ≤ `max,
Advres1APRG(D1(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1)) ≤ mAdvowfH (q, nH) .
Proof. The output the adversary receives is either random, or, of the form H(v)‖H(v+
1)‖ · · · ‖H(v +m− 1), where m := `i+1/nH . Similar to Lemma 5.4.9, if we give the
adversary the intermediate value vi + H(0x2‖vi‖add), to succeed, an adversary must
have found a pre-image of one of the hash blocks. We also note that each query the
adversary makes to H reduces the number of possible pre-images by m, since the
output is a chain of values.
This yields adversarial advantage mAdvowfH (q, nH).
Putting together Lemmas 5.4.9 and 5.4.10 concludes the proof.
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5.4.3 Variable-Output Robustness of the hash drbg
Theorem 5.4.11.
The hash drbg is (t′, `max, `total, qD, qS, γ∗, rob)-variable outupt robust witnessed by
the (D, t, h)-honest idempotent split masking function M, where
rob ≤ h + max
(`1,...,`q):
q∑
i=1
`i≤`total
(
q∑
i=1
(p + r)
)
,
and for legitimate distribution sampler D, under the assumption that H is a ρ-
universal hash function for ρ = (1 + α)2−nH , k = γ∗ + 2nH and for p and r given
in the following lemmas.
Proof.
Proof outline The proof proceeds as normal by proving the hash drbg satisfies
both variable output preserving and variable output recovering security.
Lemma 5.4.12.
Let the hash drbg be as described in Definition 5.2.1. Then the hash drbg has (t, `max, p)-
variable output preserving security, witnessed by the masking function M defined in
Definition 5.4.1 and for:
p ≤
(⌈
`i+1
nH
⌉
+ 6d+ 2
)
AdvowfH (q, nH) .
Proof. The proof proceeds by hybrid argument. First we show that we can replace
the intermediate state sd after the adversarial refreshes have been made with a
masked state, followed by using the earlier result of Lemma 5.4.8 to show that the
final challenge is indistinguishable from random output and a masked state.
If we give the adversary additional information after she has made all of her queries
to H, namely the value of vi+1 and the value s, then an adversary able to distinguish
between the challenge and a masked state and output must have queried one of these
two two values with the correct prefix. Since the adversary is allowed to make d
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adversarial refresh calls, this becomes
6dAdvowfH (q, nH) .
Putting this together with Lemma 5.4.8 yields
p ≤
(⌈
`i+1
nH
⌉
+ 6d+ 2
)
AdvowfH (q, nH) .
We set Game 0 as the VOPWI preserving security game witnessed by the masking
function M, Game 1 is identical to Game 0 but replacing the intermediate value sd
with a masked state, and finally, Game 2 replaces the final output with a masked
state using Lemma 5.4.8.
Lemma 5.4.13.
Let H be a ρ-universal hash function for ρ := (1+α)2−nH and let the hash drbg be as
described in Definition 5.2.1. The hash drbg has (t, qD, `max, γ∗, r)-variable output
recovering security, witnessed by the masking function M defined in Definition 5.4.1
and for:
r ≤ refresh′ext + PRG.
Proof. The proof proceeds with a hybrid argument. First we show that we can
replace the intermediate state after the refresh queries with a masked state, fol-
lowed by using the earlier result of Lemma 5.4.8 to show that the final challenge is
indistinguishable from random output and a masked state.
If we modify the refresh algorithm to take as input the entire string of refresh values
as an on-line extractor, call it refresh′(seed, si, I′) for I := I1, . . . , Id, we can prove
that this new algorithm is a universal hash function and employ the leftover hash
lemma.
Lemma 5.4.14.
The algorithm refresh’, as described in the previous paragraph, assuming that H is a
strong ρ-universal hash function and:
ρ′ :=
d∑
i=2
(Pr [coll|Evi]) = 1
23nE
(ρ∗) ,
is a ρ′-universal hash function.
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Proof. Let I′0 6= I′1, with I′j := (Ij;1 . . . , Ij;d). We split into several cases. Let Evi
be the event corresponding to I′0, and I′1 only differ in the first i blocks, with Ev1
meaning they differ in the first block alone, while Evd mean they differ in all d
blocks. Since the cs are not used to propagate the state, we need only focus on
finding a collision in the v.
In Ev1 the probability of a collision in the first iteration is precisely the probability
that there is a collision in vi+1 over the choice of add. Since H is a ρ-universal hash
function, this probability is precisely 1
ρ3
. However, even if a collision does not occur
in the first block, there is still a non-zero probability that for each block the vi+1 will
collide, again with probability 1
ρ3
. Putting this together yields Pr [coll|Evi] = dρ3 ,
since once a collision has occurred, the remaining blocks will be equal.
Now that we have dealt with the case Ev1 we can look to the general case of Evi.
The general case can be split as follows:
• On input block k ≤ i there is a collision denoted coll(k), then there must also
be a collision in the remaining i− k blocks that differ between I′0 and I′1.
• On input block k > i there is a collision in one of the remaining (d− k) blocks
where I′0 and I′1 match.
The first case can be calculated to be:
Pr [coll(k)|Evi ∧ (k ≤ i)] = 1
ρ3
1
(ρ3)i−k
=
1
ρ3(1+i−k)
.
Which means that for all such k we have:
Pr [coll|Evi ∧ (k ≤ i)] = 1
ρ3
i−1∏
k=1
1
(ρ3)i−k
=
1
ρ3
i−1∏
j=1
1
(ρ3)j
=
1
ρ3
1
(ρ3)
i(i−1)
2
= ρ−
3(i(i−1)+2)
2 . (5.4.1)
The second case is simpler, as follows:
Pr [coll(k)|Evi ∧ (k > i)] = 1
ρ3
.
So for all such k this becomes:
Pr [coll|Evi ∧ (k > i)] =
d∑
k=i+1
1
ρ3
=
d− i
ρ3
. (5.4.2)
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Putting Equations (5.4.1) and (5.4.2) together yields
ρ′ : =
d∑
i=2
(Pr [coll|Evi]) + d
ρ3
=
d∑
i=2
(
1
(ρ3)
i(i−1)+2
2
+
d− i
ρ3
)
+
d
ρ3
=
2d+ (d− 1)(d− 2)
2ρ3
+
d∑
i=2
(
1
(ρ3)
i(i−1)+2
2
)
=
1
2nH
(ρ∗) , (5.4.3)
and thus refresh’ is a strong ρ′ = 2−nH (1 + (ρ∗ − 1))-universal hash function.
Corollary 5.4.15.
The algorithm refresh’ as described above is a (k, refresh
′
ext )-extractor for 
refresh′
ext given
in Lemma 5.5.14 under the assumption that E is an ideal cipher.
Proof. By the leftover hash lemma we have that since refresh’ is a 2−nH (1+(ρ∗−1))-
universal hash function, it is also a (k, refresh
′
ext )-extractor for 
refresh′
ext ≤
√
2nH−k + ρ∗ − 1.
Inputting k ≥ γ∗ yields our result.
Putting this together with Lemma 5.4.8 yields
r ≤ refresh′ext + PRG.
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5.5 Security of the ctr drbg
We now turn to the security of the ctr drbg. We will assume the block cipher E is a
secure PRP unless otherwise specified.
Whenever the ctr drbg updates the state it uses the bcup algorithm. This is not lim-
ited to next function; each of the ctr drbg algorithms calls bcup. The bcup algorithm
utilises the previous state and the block cipher in counter mode to generate the new
state. Because of this, the split masking function of ctr drbg is much simpler than its
counterpart of the hash drbg. In Definition 5.5.1 we define the split masking function
M of the ctr drbg.
5.5.1 Masking Function of ctr drbg
Definition 5.5.1. For Statespace defined as in Definition 5.3.1, the ctr drbg masking
function is as follows:
M := (MI,MP,MR) : {0, 1}nE × {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}49 −→ {0, 1}nE × {0, 1}nk × {0, 1}49,
MI(s) = (v
′, k′, 1) where v′ $← {0, 1}nE , k′ $← {0, 1}nk ,
MP(s) = (v
′, k′, rc) where v′ $← {0, 1}nE , k′ $← {0, 1}nk ,
MR(s) = (v
′, k′, rc) where v′ $← {0, 1}nE , k′ $← {0, 1}nk .
Lemma 5.5.2.
The ctr drbg split masking function as defined in Definition 5.5.1 is idempotent.
Proof. The ctr drbg split masking function acts the same in all situations and always
overwrites the v-state and k-state, leaving the reseed counter untouched. Each suc-
cessive application of the split masking function overwrites the states with samples
from the same distribution, therefore the mask applied iteratively results in the same
distribution.
Lemma 5.5.3.
The split masking function of the ctr drbg defined in Definition 5.5.1 is a (D, t, h)-
honest initialisation split masking function under the assumption that D is a legiti-
mate distribution sampler outputting I0 with minimum entropy 3·2k = 6nE-bits, that
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E is an ideal cipher, seedgen outputs a uniformly random seed seed from Seedspace,
and where
h ≤ 32 · 2−nE/2 + 3
2nE
+ q22nE−1 +
(
(qnE)
2
n2E
− qnE
nE
)
2−nE .
Proof. Running Initialise, the setup algorithm uses the bcdf algorithm to extract en-
tropy from the entropy input I0. This value is then used by the bcup algorithm,
which XORs it with initial values of k, v derived from E0nk (0
nE). The proof proceeds
by showing that bcdf acts as an extractor and outputs an n-bit string y indistin-
guishable from random. Once this is established, since the initial values (v0, k0) are
a constant c, XORed with this value y and split into the required lengths, we arrive
at the desired uniformly random initial working state.
Lemma 5.5.4.
The bcdf algorithm is a (6nE, h)-extractor under the assumption that E is a secure
PRP and the seed of the extractor is nonce‖perstring which are uniformly random
strings.
Proof. We proceed with a hybrid argument utilising the following games:
• Game 0 is the unmodified bcdf algorithm,
• Game 1 modifies bcdf so that instead of returning the concatenation of the
constant keyed output of the bcc algorithm of length nk + nE, a new string is
chosen uniformly at random from Unk+nE .
• Game 2 the final output of the bcdf algorithm y is replaced with y $← Unk+nE .
The bcdf algorithm first uses CBC-MAC with key k′ to output (k, v), which is
then used in CBC mode to output the requested bits, so we proceed with a hybrid
argument, first switching out the intermediate (k, v) for uniformly random strings,
followed by the final output produced by bcdf which is split and used as the initial
state.
The bcdf algorithm runs CBC-MAC up to three times to generate enough output
to be used as the intermediate k-state and v. A different initialisation vector is
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used, namely Ek′(1),Ek′(2),Ek′(3) on the same input. Since k
′ is fixed, these IVs are
entirely predictable to the adversary but work to separate each instance by keeping
them prefix-free. The downside to this is that a uniformly random choice of the
intermediate value can result in a collision (albeit with low probability) while the
construction will never collide since E is a permutation starting from different values.
Looking at the first output, under the assumption that E is an ideal block cipher and
the input to bcdf is a source with minimum entropy 2k and with L = 3, k = nE, then,
by [28, Theorem 1] the statistical distance between bcc(k′, (1‖x)) and the uniform
distribution on {0, 1}nE is√
2nE−H∞(x) +O(2nE · (O(32/22nE)),
and since L = 3 ≤ 2nE/4 we have√
2nE−H∞(x) +O(2nE · (O(32/22nE)) ≤ 3 · 2−nE/2.
Since this is repeated three times, with different IVs the statistical distance between
(v, k) and Un is
|Pr [G0(A) = 1]− Pr [G1(A) = 1] | ≤ 32 · 2−nE/2 + 3
2nE
. (5.5.1)
The second part of the bcdf algorithm then uses this intermediate pair (k, v) with
the same E in CBC mode with L = 3 and IV = 0. By [11, Theorem 17], we have
|Pr [G1(A) = 1]− Pr [G2(A) = 1] | ≤2AdvPRPE (t, q)
+q22nE−1 +
(
(qnE)
2
n2E
− qnE
nE
)
2−nE ,
and since E is a random permutation, AdvPRPE = 0, thus
|Pr [G1(A) = 1]− Pr [G2(A) = 1] | ≤q22nE−1
+
(
(qnE)
2
n2E
− qnE
nE
)
2−nE . (5.5.2)
Putting Equations (5.5.1) and (5.5.2) together yields
h = 3
2 · 2−nE/2 + 3
2nE
+ q22nE−1 +
(
(qnE)
2
n2E
− qnE
nE
)
2−nE .
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The proof of Lemma 5.5.3 follows directly from Lemma 5.5.4, since the split masking
function of the ctr drbg in the initialise function overwrites the v-state and k-state
with uniformly random strings of length nE and nk respectively. Since bcdf out-
puts a string of length nk + nE indistinguishable from a uniformly random string,
which is then XORed with constants, resulting in the output state being distributed
identically to the masked state.
5.5.2 PRG Security of the next Function of the ctr drbg
We now turn our attention to the output of the ctr drbg next algorithm. We utilise
the following definition of ctr drbg.next PRG security:
Definition 5.5.5. Let Di be an algorithm representing the next function, MI(s
′
0) be
a masked input state, seed seed, `i+1 ≤ `max be the requested number of bits, and
APRG be any adversary running in time no more than t playing the game described
in Figure 5.15. The game described in Figure 5.15 is derived from the resilence
notion (from Definition 4.4.2) restricted to one call to next. We say that APRG has
advantage: has advantage
AdvdistAPRG(Di(s0, `i+1),Di+1(s0, `i+1)) :=
∣∣∣Pr [ADiPRG = 1]− Pr [ADi+1PRG = 1]∣∣∣ .
res1(APRG,Di,Di+1, `i+1)
seed← seedgen; b $← {0, 1}
s′0
$← {0, 1}nE+nk+49
s0 ← M(s′0)
(si+1, ri+1)← Di+b(seed,M(s′0), `i+1)
b∗ $← APRG((si+1, ri+1), rc)
return b == b∗
Figure 5.17: The security game for distinguishing between ctr drbg.next and a ran-
dom generator output and masked state.
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Lemma 5.5.6.
Let si be a random variable on the Statespace, then for any q adversary, APRG, and
`i+1 ≤ `max,
Advres1APRG(next(si, `i+1), (M(si+1),U`i+1)) ≤ PRG
with
PRG ≤ 2
(
AdvPRPE
(
t,
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉)
+
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉2
2−nE
)
+ 2
(
AdvPRPE (t, 3) + 3
22−nE
)
.
Proof. The proof will proceed in two parts. First we will show that an adversary
cannot distinguish between the real or masked output state, while always having real
output. Following this, given masked output state the adversary cannot distinguish
between real and random output.
We define three algorithms in Figure 5.18 that we will use for the hybrid game
jumps. We omit parsing the seed for simplicity.
Alg. D0(seed, si, `i+1)
parse si as (vi, ki, rc)
add← bcdf(add, n)
(k, v)← bcup(add, ki, vi)
y ← null
while Len(y) < `i+1 do
v ← v + 1 mod 2nE
y ← y‖Ek(v)
ri+1 ← L`i+1(y)
(ki+1, vi+1)← bcup(add, k, v)
rc← rc + 1
return ((vi+1, ki+1, rc), ri+1)
Alg. D1(seed, si, `i+1)
parse si as (vi, ki, rc)
add← bcdf(add, n)
(k, v)← bcup(add, ki, vi)
y ← null
while Len(y) < `i+1 do
v ← v + 1 mod 2nE
y ← y‖Ek(v)
ri+1 ← L`i+1(y)
(ki+1, vi+1)← bcup(add, k, v)
rc← rc + 1
si+1 ← M(si+1)
return ((vi+1, ki+1, rc), ri+1)
Alg. D2(seed, si, `i+1)
parse si as (vi, ki, rc)
add← bcdf(add, n)
(k, v)← bcup(add, ki, vi)
y ← null
while Len(y) < `i+1 do
v ← v + 1 mod 2nE
y ← y‖Ek(v)
ri+1 ← L`i+1(y)
ri+1
$← {0, 1}`i+1
(ki+1, vi+1)← bcup(add, k, v)
rc← rc + 1
si+1 ← M(si+1)
return ((vi+1, ki+1, rc), ri+1)
Figure 5.18: The algorithms D0,D1 and D2 used in proving the PRG security of the
ctr drbg.next function.
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We then have,
Advres1APRG(next(si, `i+1), (M(si+1),U`i+1)) = Adv
res1
APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1))
≤ Advres1APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D1(si, `i+1))
+ Advres1APRG(D1(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1)).
The ctr drbg.next algorithm updates the state using the bcup algorithm, which
doesn’t affect the distribution of the intermediary state when acting on a masked
state. This is proved formally in Corollary 5.5.10. This intermediate state is
processed in counter mode to produce the generator output which we capture in
Lemma 5.5.7. Finally, the updated intermediate state is used in the bcup algorithm,
which again uses counter mode to produce the updated states with three blocks of
output, captured in Corollary 5.5.10.
Lemma 5.5.7.
Let si be as described in Definition 5.5.5 and let E be a secure block cipher. Then
for any adversary working in time t, APRG, and `i+1 ≤ `max,
Advres1APRG(D1(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1)) ≤ 2
(
AdvPRPE
(
t,
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉)
+
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉2
2−nE
)
.
Proof. By the prp/prf switching lemma (given in Lemma 5.5.8) and security of a
block cipher in counter mode using a PRF (given in Theorem 5.5.9) [11, Proposition
8 and Theorem 13] we have
Advres1APRG(D1(si, `i+1),D2(si, `i+1)) ≤ 2AdvPRFE
(
t,
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉)
≤ 2
(
AdvPRPE
(
t,
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉)
+
⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉2
2−nE
)
.
Lemma 5.5.8 (Proposition 8 of [11]).
For any permutation family P with length l,
AdvPRFP (t, q) ≤ AdvPRPP (t, q) + q22−l−1.
Theorem 5.5.9 (Theorem 13 of [11]).
Suppose F is a PRF family with input length l and output length L. Then for any
t, q, µ = min(q′L,L2l),
Advror−cpaCTR[F] (t, q, µ) ≤ 2AdvPRFF (t, q′).
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The jump between D0 and D1 is a simpler case of Lemma 5.5.7 where the number
of blocks is 3, relating to n = 3nE. Formally:
Corollary 5.5.10.
Let si be as described in Definition 5.5.5, let E be a secure block cipher, then for any
adversary working in time t, APRG, and `i+1 ≤ `max,
Advres1APRG(D0(si, `i+1),D1(si, `i+1)) ≤ 2
(
AdvPRPE (t, 3) + 3
22−nE
)
.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 5.5.7.
Putting together Lemma 5.5.7 and corollary 5.5.10 concludes the proof.
5.5.3 Variable-Output Robustness of the ctr drbg
Theorem 5.5.11.
Let E be an ideal cipher, let the ctr drbg be as described above, with legitimate dis-
tribution sampler D. Then the hash drbg is (t′, `max, `total, qD, qS, γ∗, rob)-variable
outupt robust witnessed by the (D, t, h)-honest idempotent split masking function M
where
rob ≤ h + max
(`1,...,`q):
q∑
i=1
`i≤`total
(
q∑
i=1
(p + r)
)
,
for p and r given in the following lemmas.
Proof. The proof proceeds as normal by proving the ctr drbg satisfies both variable-
output preserving and variable output-recovering security.
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Lemma 5.5.12.
Let E be an ideal cipher, let the ctr drbg be as described above. Then the ctr drbg has
(t, `max, p)-variable output preserving security, witnessed by the masking function M
defined in Definition 5.5.1 and for:
p ≤ 21−nE
(⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉2
+ 32(d+ 1)
)
.
Proof. The proof proceeds by using a hybrid argument. First we show that we can
replace the intermediate state sd after the adversarial refresh queries with a masked
state, followed by using the earlier result of Lemma 5.5.6 to show that the final
challenge is indistinguishable from random output and a masked state.
Since the adversary has knowledge of the additional input add, the output s of
bcdf(I‖add, n) is predictable for each adversarial refresh I. The ctr drbg.refresh algo-
rithm then utilises this value in the bcup algorithm, which XORs the input s with
the updated state. By Corollary 5.5.10 we know that for random state si and pre-
dictable input x, the bcup algorithm returns a state indistinguishable from random.
Since the adversary is allowed to make d adversarial refresh calls this becomes
d
(
AdvPRPE (t, 3) + 3
22−nE
)
= 32d21−nE .
Putting this together with Lemma 5.5.6 yields
p = 3
2d21−nE + 21−nE
(⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉2
+ 32
)
= 21−nE
(⌈
`i+1
nE
⌉2
+ 32(d+ 1)
)
.
Lemma 5.5.13.
Let E be an ideal cipher, let the ctr drbg be as described in Definition 5.3.1, with le-
gitimate distribution sampler D. Then the hash drbg has (t, qD, `max, γ∗, r)-variable
output recovering security, witnessed by the masking function M defined in Defini-
tion 5.5.1 and for:
r := 
refresh′
ext + PRG.
Proof. The proof proceeds by using a hybrid argument. First we show that we
can replace the intermediate state after the refresh queries with a masked state,
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followed by using the earlier result of Lemma 5.5.6 to show that the final challenge
is indistinguishable from random output and a masked state.
If we modify the refresh algorithm to take as input the entire string of refresh values
as an on-line extractor, call it refresh′(seed, si, I′) for I′ := I1, . . . , Id, we can prove
that this new algorithm is a universal hash function and employ the leftover hash
lemma. Recall that m in the context of bcc is m := Len(x)/nE ∈ N>1, m > 1 since
the first block is always the IV, while the second contains two fields dictating the
size of the input/output, followed by the input which may span several blocks.
Lemma 5.5.14.
The algorithm refresh’ as described above is a ρ-universal hash function, assuming
that E is an ideal cipher and for:
ρ :=
d∑
i=2
(Pr [coll|Evi]) + bcdfcoll =
1
23nE
(
ρ′
)
.
Proof. Let I′0 6= I′1, with I′j := (Ij;1 . . . , Ij;d). We split into several cases. Let Evi be
the event corresponding to where I′0 and I′1 only differ in the first i blocks, with the
edge cases being Ev1 and Evd. The former, Ev1 is where refresh0
′ and refresh1′
differ in the first block alone, while the latter, Evd refers to differences in all d
blocks.
In Ev1, the probability of a collision is precisely the probability that either there is
a collision in the output of bcdf, with the probability taken over the choice of add.
To begin, we focus on the bcc algorithm, noting that if m = 2 then a collision is
impossible since k is constant and by assumption I0;1 6= I1;1. We will assume m > 2.
Building upon this, the probability of a collision is therefore(
m− 2
2nE
)(
AdvPRPEk′ (t,m) +
m2
2nE−1
)
,
making use of the PRP/PRF switching lemma. Since this is repeated at most three
times with a different IV/first block, this becomes
bcccoll0 :=
(
m− 2
2nE
)3(
AdvPRPEk′ (t,m) +
m2
2nE−1
)3
. (5.5.3)
If this collision occurs, then the remaining parts of bcdf will also collide, resulting
in a collision. However, if this does not collide, there is still the possibility that the
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final three blocks output from CBC mode will collide, which occurs with probability:
bcccoll1 :=
(
1
23nE
)(
AdvPRPEk (t, 3) +
32
2nE−1
)3
, (5.5.4)
and putting together with Equation (5.5.3) yields the collision probability of bcdf
with distinct inputs to be
bcdfcoll := 
bcc
coll0 + 
bcc
coll1 =
(
m− 2
2nE
)3(
AdvPRPEk′ (t,m) +
m2
2nE−1
)3
(5.5.5)
+
(
1
23nE
)(
AdvPRPEk (t, 3) +
32
2nE−1
)3
=
1
23nE
(
(m− 2)3)(AdvPRPEk′ (t,m) + m22nE−1
)3
.
We note that in general m will be reasonably small, but note that Table 5.5 states
the maximum input size of a single block of input is 235. In the case of Ev1, if there
is not a collision in the output of bcdf, there cannot be an output collision since the
current value of the state is identical, meaning the output of bcup will be distinct,
since Ek0 is a permutation called on the same input and key.
Now that we have dealt with the case Ev1 we can look to the general case of Evi.
The general case can be split as follows:
1. Similarly to Ev1, the output of bcdf may collide in the first refresh call, followed
by a collision in the output of bcdf for all remaining i− 1 distinct inputs.
2. On input block k, which has distinct kk, vk and input block Ij;k there is a
collision in the output of bcup, followed by a collision in the output of bcdf
for all remaining i− k distinct inputs.
The first case is relatively simple, since it requires a collision in bcdf for i distinct
input pairs, which is (bcdfcoll )
i for bcdfcoll given in Equation (5.5.5).
The second case requires us to calculate the probability that the output of bcup
collides with distinct input values. Since we have assumed that Ek is an ideal cipher,
this is precisely the probability that (after XORing two distinct values s) there are
three collisions which will be exactly 1/2nE . For a collision in the final output of
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refresh’ we now require a collision in the remaining i − k outputs from bcdf, which
together yields:
Pr [coll|Evi] =
i−1∑
k=2
((
bcdfcoll
)i−k
23nE
)
+ (bcdfcoll )
i (5.5.6)
=
1
23nE
(
i−2∑
k=1
(bcdfcoll )
k
)
+ (bcdfcoll )
i.
By taking the geometric progression sum this becomes:
=
1
23nE
(
(bcdfcoll )
i−1 − bcdfcoll
bcdfcoll − 1
)
+ (bcdfcoll )
i
=
1
23nE
(
23nE(bcdfcoll − 1)(bcdfcoll )i + (bcdfcoll )i−1 − bcdfcoll
bcdfcoll − 1
)
, (5.5.7)
for k ≥ 2. Therefore, the total collision probability will be
ρ :=
d∑
i=2
(Pr [coll|Evi]) + bcdfcoll =
1
23nE
(
ρ′
)
,
and thus refresh’ is a ρ = 2−n(1 + (ρ′ − 1))-universal hash function.
Corollary 5.5.15.
The algorithm refresh’ as described above is a (k, refresh
′
ext )-extractor for 
refresh′
ext given
in Lemma 5.5.14 under the assumption that E is an ideal cipher.
Proof. By the leftover hash lemma we have that since refresh’ is a 2−n(1 + (ρ′− 1))-
universal hash function, it is also a (k, refresh
′
ext )-extractor for 
refresh′
ext ≤
√
2n−k + ρ′ − 1.
Inputting k ≥ γ∗ yields our result.
Putting this together with Lemma 5.5.6 yields
r ≤ refresh′ext + PRG.
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We have presented the two NIST VOPWIs in the format of our updated security
model from Chapter 4 and have analysed their security under some ideal assump-
tions and concluded that they meet the notion of variable-output robustness. This
essentially means that for a reasonable family of adversarial entropy sources, as-
suming the underlying primitives are ideal, the NIST generators do support a very
reasonable level of security.
However, to highlight one of the largest chasms between theory and practice in this
area, we require some very strong assumptions on the randomness of the seed of the
generator that goes against the NIST framework and in general is not implemented
in practice. In practice these values will contain little entropy, or possibly not be
included, which is a problem in a theoretical setting where the adversarial entropy
source is able to find distributions that are predictable to an adversary. In practice,
however, the family of entropy sources that NIST recommends, and in fact requires
to be used with the generators, is far more restricted and in effect may negate this
problem entirely, especially since in the designs there are additional health checking
mechanisms that are not included in the theoretical security modelling.
This is an unfortunate gap that is very difficult to address due in part to the dif-
ficulty in accurately measuring entropy, however the theoretical security that we
have proved is still valid, if overly restrictive. Our result has allowed us to provide a
meaningful result for the NIST generators, which, at the time of writing had received
no formal analysis, possibly due to their “incompatibility” with the current models.
162
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Contents
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Here we give an overview of the findings of the thesis, including discussion of several
areas, and possible future directions in the field.
6.1 Overview
In this thesis we have considered and analysed several PWI constructions. In Chap-
ter 3 of the thesis we commented on the current sponge-based PWIs in the literature,
and identified where we thought improvements could be made, specifically the num-
ber of calls to the underlying permutation needed in the next algorithm. We then
presented a more efficient forward security mechanism to use in the next algorithm,
presented in the format of the security model of [29]. We then proved that this
new sponge-like PWI, named Reverie, satisfied the relevant security notions despite
departing slightly from the sponge construction. We did this by utilising the H-
coefficient technique. Specifically, by formalising an adversary’s queries into good
and bad transcripts, we were able to arrive at a bound for security. By incorpo-
rating this updated next algorithm, we significantly reduced the number of calls to
the underlying permutation needed from t+ 1 calls to 1 call, making our PWI more
suitable for constrained environments where minimising the calls to the underlying
primitive is essential. We still had to rely on the assumption that the seed of the
generator was generated uniformly at random to avoid non-negligible adversarial
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advantage from the adversarial entropy source.
We then focused primarily on the security model of Dodis et. al. [29] in Chapter 4,
and extended the model in several ways, primarily to allow for an adversary to
request varying amounts of output from the PWI and basing security on the amount
of output as opposed to the number of queries. We defined PWIs that satisfied this
behaviour as variable-output PWIs (VOPWIs) and updated the notion of robustness
from [29] accordingly, including an update to the simpler notions of preserving and
recovering security. We then proved an analogy of the composition theorem, proving
that if a VOPWI satisfied the notions of variable-output preserving and variable-
output recovering security, then the VOPWI satisfies the notion of variable-output
robustness.
Although we identified a large gap between theory and practice regarding the uni-
formity of the seed of the generator, we were not able to find a way to overcome this
problem. This is in part due to the difficulty in measuring entropy accurately and
efficiently. We did make modifications to the generation of the seed and initial state
to reflect on real world PWI specifications, making steps towards the idea that the
initial state in practice draws entropy from the same entropy source that the PWI
later relies on for fresh entropy.
We then applied our updated security model to two of the NIST PWIs, namely the
hash drbg and ctr drbg in Chapter 5. The updated security model allows us to accu-
rately model the generators and their subroutines that allow for differing amounts of
output per next call. We prove that under some fairly strong assumptions, including
uniform seeds, which is not the case in practice, both generators satisfy the notion
of variable-output robustness. We prove this by proving that each generator satis-
fies the updated notions of variable-output preserving security and variable-output
recovering security. Unfortunately the bounds are fairly complex, which often is the
case when analysing real world generators.
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There were several other extensions we would have liked to have made to our security
model. One instance would be to investigate restricting the number of next requests
or output from a PWI since the last entropy input. This in effect would limit and
perhaps simplify the possible requests an adversary acting in our variable-output
security model could make, but would reflect specifications in real world generators,
including the NIST generators, which do restrict the number of calls and output per
recent entropy injection. We would like to investigate combining our extensions with
the later security model extension of [30]. Since that model allows for a modular
approach to constructing a robust PWI secure against premature get-next queries,
it may be possible with small adjustments to extend to this setting.
We would also like to investigate the notion of a variable seed; the NIST genera-
tors allow for additional information from requesting applications to be supplied to
the generator when output is requested. This would possibly be a step closer to
less reliance on the common assumption of having a uniform seed generated dur-
ing initialisation. This variable seed could perhaps be a separate entropy source,
which could similarly be modelled as adversarial but, again, restricted in terms of
communication with the other adversaries.
Another interesting extension would be to model two or more entropy sources in the
same adversary model as [29], in the hopes that due to their inability to communicate
and collude may negate the need for a seed.
We believe there are interesting options for extending the sponge-based design, pos-
sibly beyond the notion of a parazoa using, for example, the “sum” of two permuta-
tions or even the same permutation with domain separation, as suggested by Bellare,
Krovetz and Rogaway in [12]:
XoPpi1,pi2(x) := pi1(x)⊕ pi2(x),
XoP′pi(x) := pi(0‖x)⊕ pi(1‖x).
Patarin showed that the single permutation with domain separation achieved similar
security as XoP [48]. More recently, the encrypted Davies-Meyer (EDM) construc-
tion has been considered [24, 43]. Possibly this construction could be utilised.
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It is possible that our proofs could be improved in several ways, especially given
the complexity of the bounds. The proofs of Reverie are not made using the no-
tion of masking functions, which would be a reasonable improvement. It may also
be possible to utilise Patarin’s mirror theory in conjunction with his H-coefficient
technique, similar to [49]. We also argue that since the refresh algorithm in the con-
structions acts as a universal hash function over several entropy inputs, it would be
nicer to prove or construct a refresh algorithm that is a multiple-sampler extractor,
as defined in [5].
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